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BY AUTHORITY ... 3 May 72 ...
BY Lawrence ...
ON 10 August 1977

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ANNEX ITEM

TO

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

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DIVISION ARTILLERY REPORT

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

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HEADQUARTERS, FOURTEENTH MARINES, 4TH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

13 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division, FMF.

Subject: Operation Report, transmittal of.

1. Transmitted herewith is one (1) complete copy of the Fourteenth Marine Regiment Operation Report of the Iwo Jima action.

L. G. DE HAVEN

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ANNEX ITEM TO DIVISION OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Continued).

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1. Administration.

(a) Casualty reports and reports of KIA & WIA.

(1) The reporting of casualties in the Fourth Marine Division by the use of casualty cards simplifies the paper work and checking of casualties. Accuracy has increased. This Regiment first used this system on the Tinian operation and it proved itself far superior to the casualty reports of the mimeographed type.

(2) The importance of identification tags cannot be over emphasized. When this Regiment left the rear area a thorough check was made and the report showed 100% tags in hands of all members of this command. One mistake was found in that an enlisted man was promoted to 2dLt enroute to the target and new tags were not changed with his file number. Subsequently, he was killed in action and buried as an unknown enlisted man in the Division Cemetery. This error was corrected.

(b) Morale of troops, methods used to maintain high morale throughout the operation.

(1) The morale of the troops of this Regiment was high at all times. The food was a contributing factor as the change from "K" to "C" and 10-1 was a great improvement. This is the first operation in which canned fruit and fruit juices and new "C" rations have been available. The reception was most enthusiastic.

(2) The very prompt mail service has greatly helped the morale of the men; also the fact that censorship permitted the men to write of their current experiences aided morale. The gift package of Air Mail stationery was greatly appreciated as the troops frown upon writing V-Mail continually.

(3) During the operation no plan for recreation was in effect. Recreation aboard ship from the rear area to the target consisted of reading pulp books which were passed from man to man, card playing, and shows put on by the troops.

(4) The PX Ration, containing smokes, matches, candy, and toilet articles, drawn by the Mess Sergeant along with the regular rations, was available to all hands at all times.

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1. Administration (Continued)

(b) (Continued)

(5) Whenever conditions permitted, a situation map was maintained on the organizational bulletin boards. This added greatly to the interest and intelligent understanding of the progress of the operation.

2. Intelligence.

(a) Maps, Photographs and Supplementary Intelligence.

(1) Maps.

a. The maps provided for this operation were sufficient in quantity for the purposes of an artillery regiment. The paper stock upon which they were printed was of superior quality to that used for maps on previous operations. Detail on the maps was complete in the open beach areas, and around the airfields of IWO JIMA. The detail in the map of the broken terrain in the north portion of the island, bordering the volcanic central plateau, was poor and misleading to artillery forward observers, and gave artillery operations officers an erroneous impression in planning fires. It is realized that maps cannot be made completely accurate in detail without ground survey and vertical control, but it is hoped that the details of the natural terrain will be completely represented on future maps.

Enemy situation from API, printed on Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps, tends to confuse detail in that the symbols are too large to fit in with the scale of the map, and these maps are made up at such an early date that the final enemy situation proves to be entirely different from that printed on the maps. The enemy situation should be restricted to the G-2 Situation Maps printed during the planning period and immediately prior to the invasion.

Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps of scale 1:10,000 and 1:20,000 were used by the artillery. The 1:5,000 maps were used during the planning phase, and for briefing of troops aboard ship. The quantity of 1:5,000 maps provided was far in excess of needs. The entire supply of 1:5,000 maps would have been used if more terrain detail had been represented on them than on the smaller scale maps. These large scale maps could have thus been a great aid in analyses of terrain and target areas of enemy held ground.

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2. Intelligence (Continued)

(a) (Continued)

(1) (Continued)

b. Maps provided at the staging area and during the combat operation were adequate and complete as far as the known situation was concerned. It is believed that corrections to G-2 Situation Maps which ordinarily consist solely of aerial photograph interpretations should include information of installations and enemy dispositions located from captured enemy maps, and documents, and POW interrogation.

(2) Photographs.

a. Photographic coverage received by this regiment was of good quality and complete. The number of sorties that were received by the R-2 were, in fact, in excess of needs. It is believed that the best sets of stereo verticals of scale 1:10,000 or larger without visible interference such as clouds or bomb bursts would suffice, and the resulting conservation of reproducing facilities and materials would enable distribution of these sets to include battalions.

b. Photographs received during the operation were provided by D-2 and were of good quality and low altitude. These photos aided in locating targets and in studying terrain, but were of insufficient quantity.

It is recommended that low obliques made during operations be gridded prior to distribution with a target area grid projected to the oblique photograph. The distribution of these photographs should be sufficient to reach artillery battalions, and provide copies for the artillery forward observers. The fact that observation was so limited in this operation would have made photos of particular value to forward observers. The large scale verticals of enemy held territory in the 4th Division Z/A were very good, and useful in terrain analysis in conjunction with the above mentioned low obliques. The fact that these verticals were scaled at 1:5,000 made the use of the TA template possible, lining it up with located points on the photo and reading off map locations of other points directly from the photograph.

(3) Hydrographic inform

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2. Intelligence (Continued)

(a) (Continued)

(3) Continued)

a. The hydrographic information provided to all units prior to landing was accurate, timely, and complete. This is especially true of the information obtained by Pre-D-day underwater demolition teams, except that the report as to conditions of beach sand was incorrect and misleading, in that wheeled vehicles could not traverse the beaches and terrace

(4) Dissemination of Information from Higher Echelons.

a. The information and special intelligence studies sent down from higher echelons during the planning phase, at the staging area, and after D-day were adequate and timely, and all information of the target was useful.

(b) Intelligence Functioning.

(1) Collection of information.

a. On this operation the following means of collecting information, listed in order of importance, were used: forward observers, aerial observers, sound ranging, O.P.'s, and reconnaissance. A flash ranging O.P. was set up on Mt. Suribachi, although the diameter of the crater was too narrow to provide an adequate base. Nevertheless, this O.P. was of value in observing fires and enemy activity during the daytime, using 20-power, captured, Japanese field glasses, and at night, in spotting enemy gun flashes. No other suitable Flash O.P.'s were found on IWO JIMA in the 4th Division Z/A.

Forward observers, who were on the ground with the infantry, observed enemy front line activity and positions. The ability of F.O.'s to observe and report enemy activity over a large area was restricted, due to the rugged volcanic terrain in the 4th Division Z/A. Aerial observers had surveillance deep in enemy held territory, observing and firing on enemy activity, gun and mortar positions. Air observers also made valuable reports on the nature

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(b) (Continued).

(1) (Continued).

a. (Continued). of the terrain. Sound ranging was used on this operation, for the first time, and proved effective in locating enemy guns and mortars, and in directing counterbattery fire against them. Use of sound ranging was limited during the daytime due to interference of front line small arms activity, friendly artillery, mortar fire, and rear area vehicular activity. A total of seventy-two enemy positions were located by Sound Ranging during the operation, including three positions which were located during the daytime.

b. Reconnaissance of forward areas, and of newly captured areas, was made to locate OP's and also to examine captured enemy installations in order to determine best method of attack by our artillery against such installations.

(2) Evaluations and Dissemination of Information.

a. Evaluation of intelligence information was carried out by R-2, 14th Marines only where it applied to artillery targets or enemy artillery. The shelling reports which, with the above listed information agencies, served as a source of counterbattery information often contained haphazard guesses regarding the enemy artillery locations. These guesses confused interpretation by the R-2 when compared with his picture of the enemy artillery situation. Echelons which had no right to evaluate counterbattery problems, in view of their narrow scope, were inclined to make deductions regarding location of enemy artillery positions. Information received, which was of immediate use, was forwarded at once, both to higher and lower echelons, and if of passing interest only, it was forwarded in the periodic report. Battalions received a copy of the R-2 daily periodic report. Information of interest to artillery was usually phoned directly to the R-2 from the D-2. This timely information was used in the continuous evaluation of the enemy

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(b) (Continued).

(2) (Continued).

a. (Continued) artillery and in keeping an up-to-date enemy situation. D-2 periodic reports, delivered early in the morning following the report period, were accurate and complete in detail, but came in too late to aid in formulating plans for night defensive fires and preparation fires. They were a great aid in keeping all echelons of the regiment abreast of the situation. In order to obtain a complete picture of the enemy situation over the entire division front, the Artillery R-2 can call all the infantry R-2's of front line regiments and discuss the situation with them. He gets the required information to aid the R-3 in planning the defensive and preparation fires in this manner, but he duplicates the efforts of the D-2 and keeps essential communications in use over a long period. A suggested solution to this problem would be a concise telephonic summary from the D-2 to the Artillery R-2 early in the evening following the report period.

(3) Communications.

a. Artillery communications from front to rear are exceedingly well suited to intelligence purposes. Information is transmitted rapidly from observers to battalion and regimental command posts by both wire and radio. The only difficulty encountered in this system is that these channels are designed for fire control, and essential intelligence information was often retained and evaluated unintentionally by fire direction and operation centers. Battalion Fire Direction Centers, because of their intense activity in combat, do not welcome additional personnel or telephones. The activity in the FDC also makes it impossible to pass information to Bn-2's by telephone. A suggested solution to this problem is to "tap" the FDC lines for a listening watch in the Bn-2 section. This system would require additional intelligence personnel. Another solution offered by 4/14 which ordinarily had a general support mission, was the

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(b) (Continued).

(3) (Continued).

a. (Continued) placing of an intelligence clerk in the FDC as a telephone operator, doubling in other FDC duties. This method would have a drawback in direct support battalions since the volume of messages received would prevent the clerk from helping in the FDC.

(4) Liaison.

a. No continuous liaison was maintained, but occasional visits to infantry R-2's, D-2 and Corps. Arty. -2 by R-2 and Bn-2's could be termed as intelligence liaison. An officer from D-2 visited R-2 daily for liaison purposes in exchange of general intelligence information. Liaison could be had for the exchange of information, and was used on occasions, through the excellent telephonic communications within the Division. In the opening phase of the operation, prior to establishment of all CP's ashore, an SCR300 Intelligence Net was used. Though inferior to wire communications, it assured continuous flow of information.

(5) Training and Use of Personnel.

a. Prior to the operation a short training program within the regiment was carried out embodying general intelligence training, counterbattery intelligence methods, Japanese weapons, Japanese maps, and Japanese combat phrases. The Sound Ranging section was assigned to the 14th Marines completely trained, and their training consisted of working with the regiment in the field. The meteorological section had been with the Regiment since activation and required no special training.

b. Centralized intelligence training within the artillery regiment is necessary to keep interest up to date on intelligence technique. Further training in the reproduction of overlays and small strip maps from aerial photographs, and training in elementary drafting was found to be needed by most of the intelligence clerks during this operation.

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(b) (Continued).

(5) (Continued).

c. Artillery officers serving as Bn-2's in artillery battalions seem to have a fair idea of the duties of an intelligence officer, but they are not sufficiently impressed with the importance and details of their duties. This lack of training showed up especially when enemy resistance became so strong that our lines were unable to move from day to day. At that time intelligence was needed in the greatest of quantities. When informed of the need for continuous up-to-date information, they were energetic and capable, and their reports aided immeasurably in obtaining the enemy situation.

d. The work of the language officer assigned to the artillery regiment was generally as anticipated, and consisted of scanning captured documents and materiel to expedite its handling by the Division Language Section, and of interpreting Japanese artillery and mortar firing charts, maps, and sketches for the R-2. The language officer's training was adequate, and he was a great help to intelligence functioning as he took care of many details concerning captured documents and equipment which ordinarily requires time of more essential intelligence personnel.

(6) Counterbattery Intelligence.

a. The method used was to keep a complete counterbattery chart showing enemy gun and mortar positions located by API, FO's, AO's, OP's, sound ranging, flash ranging and information from SHELLREPS. This system was used in conjunction with the Enemy Situation Map.

b. API, OP's, AO's and sound ranging reports aided in building up the overall enemy artillery situation.

c. Artillery air observer's reports were very accurate in that they described the target before and after firing on them, thoroughly identifying the nature

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(b) (Continued).

(6) (Continued).

c. (Continued) and condition of enemy installations. Reports by tactical air observers were considered unreliable since confirmation of their reports could seldom be obtained through artillery air observers or other agencies. Flash ranging was set up on Mt. Suribachi, as previously mentioned, but it could not range on artillery flashes because of the inadequate base available. An azimuth was measured and reported on each gun flash observed. This information was plotted on the counterbattery chart and coordinated with other reports sent in during the same period of time.

d. Shelling Reports were frequent, but did not measure up to the standards expected of them. Many were lacking in essential information, and vital communications systems had to be used in order to obtain the correct and complete information. Often SHELLREPS were transmitted too late for immediate use in locating enemy guns, but the old saying of "better late than never" is applicable.

e. Front line troops and lower intelligence echelons showed a tendency to neglect reporting the continuance or cessation of mortar or artillery activity in their sectors after having once reported the activity. Reports indicating continued activity of guns and mortars previously located aid immeasurably in more accurately pin pointing enemy gun positions and in determining the enemy artillery strength. It follows that this information aids in bringing down counter-battery fire to silence the enemy guns.

(c) Enemy Documents and Materiel.

(1) The emplacements along the central beach area were completely investigated and stripped, and a few additional materials were turned in by special parties operating in other areas.

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(c) (Continued).

(2) Two medium mortar unit locations were found by restitution of captured maps and firing charts sent down from D-2 for R-2 study. In additon, captured sketches and maps established the location of several positions which had already been overrun by the 4th Division and thus had lost immediate value in the enemy situation. The place-name maps issued by C-2 aided in the translation of these documents and locating enemy installations.

(3) A clear cut policy for recovery and disposal of captured materiel should be stated. Difficulty was met in reporting, recovering, and turning in captured materiel in that there was no apparent understanding as to cognizance between the 2-section and the 4-section in higher units. A directive from Division would clarify this situation.

(d) Propaganda.

(1) Ten propaganda shells were fired by the 14th Marines. No direct observation of the effect of this propaganda on the enemy was made.

(e) Counter-Intelligence.

(1) Prior to the operation, battalion commanders and certain regimental and battalion staff officers were familiarized with the target and operation plans. A Quonsett hut was set aside as a planning hut in which work and discussion of the operation plans could be carried out. An NCO guard was placed over the hut.

(2) During the period preceeding embarkation the enlisted personnel indulged in the usual round of rumors. All hands were cautioned as to the danger of rumors, and constructive efforts were made to squelch rumors. Nevertheless, some of the conjectures as to the target were "too right." It is not believed that the target was compromised within this regiment, since the information in the rumors was fragmentary, and partially incorrect. It is believed that correct

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(e) (Continued).

(2) (Continued) guesses grew out of the obvious strategic location of the target rather than actual information.

(3) Censorship regulations and special censorship instructions were followed by all personnel throughout, and were believed to be adequate.

(4) In combat the principle means of counter-intelligence used was camouflage of guns and installations. Heavy activity on the beach in the vicinity of position areas, and the valuable commanding ground held by the enemy for the major part of the operation nullified our attempts to conceal the location of our guns and command posts.

(5) All forward observers, liaison officers and OP personnel, were instructed to keep their maps free of marks showing friendly installations. As far as is known, none of their maps were lost or compromised, but the precaution is believed to be a wise one.

(f) Public Relations.

(1) The Regimental combat correspondent and a public relations photographer temporarily attached from Division were embarked with one of the direct support battalions. They landed early in the afternoon of D-day with the reconnaissance party of that battalion. During the operation ashore, they visited the battalions of the regiment daily and picked up stories of the activities and deeds of individuals for publication. A total of 95 stories were filed by the combat correspondent and the public relations photographer took 150 pictures.

(2) The combat correspondent stated that cooperation from all officers and enlisted men left nothing to be desired, and had no suggestions for improvement of the present public relations system.

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(g) The Enemy.

This report will be confined to the enemy's utilization of artillery and heavy weapons.

(1) Enemy artillery.

a. The Japanese artillery on IWO JIMA was organized as an artillery group under the command of Colonel GAIDO. This group consisted of artillery and mortar units of the army forces only. It did not include Army AA units, Naval Guard Force AA and CD units, or Army or Navy rocket units. These units were under separate commands, or assigned as subordinate units to the various island sector commands. Infantry battalion and regimental guns were assigned in accordance with standard T/O, to infantry gun companies, and added to the enemy artillery strength but not to the artillery organization.

b. Units and portions of units of the artillery group which were in the 4th Division Z/A are listed below:

2nd Mixed Brigade Artillery Battalion:

2 or 3	75mm Batteries (75mm Mtn. Hows., or 75mm guns.)
1	105mm Howitzer Battery.
1	120mm Howitzer Battery.

3rd Medium Mortar Battalion:

3	15cm Mortar Cos. (4 Mortars each).
1	90mm Mortar Co. (3 or 4 Mortars).

20th Independent Mortar Battalion:

Portions of this unit were emplaced in the 4th Division Z/A. The entire battalion had 12-32cm (spigot type) mortars, probably organized as 3 companies. One company was

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

(1) (Continued).

b. (Continued) located between Airfields No. 1 and No. 2 and another along the coastal road, TA 202-219.

c. Army and Navy rocket units are known to have been located in the 4th Division Z/A; but information on the organization of these units is so meager that no analysis of them can be made at present.

d. The Naval Guard Force of IWO JIMA had a large number of artillery type weapons in the sector defense organizations. Their weapons were AA, DP, and CD types and many were sited for secondary missions of firing on our ground troops and beaches both by direct and indirect fire methods.

Naval guns and organizations believed to have been in the 4th Division Z/A are listed below:

Northern Sector CD Battery Group:

2 15cm. CD guns.
4 12cm. "short" guns.

Northern Sector AA Battery Group:

6 12cm. AA guns.

Mt. Tamana Land Force:

12 Light (81mm or 90mm) mortars.
400 #6 (Probably 20cm) Rockets.

Eastern Sector AA Battery Group:

10 12cm. AA guns.

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

(1) (Continued).

d. (Continued).

Southern Sector CD Battery Group:

(Note Only a portion of this group was in the 4th Division Z/A, but all its artillery weapons are listed)

6 12cm. CD guns.
2 12cm. "short" guns.
1 8cm. DP gun.
6 Light (81mm or 90mm) Mortars.

Southern Sector AA Battery Group:

(Note Only a portion of this group was in the 4th Division Z/A, but all its artillery weapons are listed)

3 12cm. AA guns.

(2) Tactical use of Artillery, Mortars and Rockets.

a. Enemy artillery was emplaced in well constructed covered fortifications of reinforced concrete. Any guns in the open without cover, or in lightly constructed field fortifications, were knocked out by the pre-D-day bombardment and by post-D-day artillery and naval firing.

b. Even though the covered fortifications were invulnerable except when taken under direct attack by infantry and assault engineers, [illegible] deliberate attack by medium artillery, they were so con[illegible]te that emplaced guns

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

(2) (Continued).

b. (Continued) had extremely limited traverse, and dispersal of the artillery fortifications broke up normal artillery functioning and massing of fires. Even so, a number of positions were set up with observation, fire control, and communications to adjust, and deliver accurate fires on areas and installations occupied by our troops. Many reports indicated that the fires of two guns were massed on one target. Very seldom were three or more guns used on one target. Ordinarily, only one gun fired on a target at any one time.

c. On D/7 and D/8 enemy artillery became almost completely silent, but mortar activity increased markedly. This shift in fires later proved to be caused by the movement of one or two batteries to the vicinity of TA235-219, the mortars taking over the fires and covering the displacement. In the new positions these guns were emplaced in shacks and houses with little cover, and were taken under counterbattery fire as soon as they were definitely located. Artillery fire was light and sporadic from that time on, but mortars fired very much and with good effect.

d. Mortars were emplaced in deep draws and gullies, with open emplacements, but with deep dugouts and caves immediately adjoining the positions for protection of personnel. In some of these caves as many as six spare mortar tubes were found, apparently placed there to replace damaged materiel left out in the open during shellings. 15 cm. artillery mortars were used with positions well behind the enemy lines (but not as far back as field artillery) in positions smaller than, but similar to artillery positions. They were in defilade, with mortars in deep open emplacements. These positions were organized as companies (batteries) of 4 mortars each. Whenever the medium mortar positions drew our artillery fire they became silent, sometimes for a period of two or three days. It was estimated

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

(2) (Continued)

d. (Continued) but not confirmed, that the enemy had alternate positions for his 15 cm mortars that were occupied during these silent periods. It was noted that an "alternate position" became active shortly after a located position was fired on and silenced, and that when the first position became active again the alternate was silent.

e. Light (81mm and 90mm) mortars were used extremely close to the front lines. Sometimes they were so close that they could only fire on our OP's and CP's. These close-up mortars were covered by a few mortars to the enemy's rear that could fire on our front lines. Thus the mortars were used in an artillery as well as a mortar role.

f. Another interesting note on the enemy's technique in using mortars was the coordination of massed light and medium mortar fires. Enemy 81mm mortars would fire a concentration of time (air burst) fire on our front lines, and just prior to lifting their barrage would fire one or two high air bursts over the target. This air burst was probably a signal and aiming point for the medium mortars as they would then commence firing on the same area.

g. Heavy (32cm spigot type) mortars were used in the 4th Division Z/A and were at first thought to be rockets. The weight of the projectile is very great (about 675 lbs) and the mortar base is permanently emplaced. For these reasons the weapon must play a purely defensive role. The emplacements were found to be well built of concrete and offered adequate protection for personnel and the launcher, which is so simple that it is practically indestructable. This weapon, together with the 15cm mortar and the various rockets, were used to good effect by the enemy on both front lines and rear installations.

h. The Japanese had some experimental rockets which he used to good effect despite their ineffeciencies. One of the rockets consisted of a rocket motor

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

(2) (Continued).

h. (Continued) and tail assembly attached to a 63 Kg. aerial bomb. This rocket was observed at Saipan but was not used by the enemy there. Another rocket had a motor of similar outward appearance, but it was much larger in diameter, and the explosive body was specially designed to be used as a rocket. This rocket had exceptionally long range, and became known as the "buzz bomb" or "flying boxcar" due to its size and the terrifying noise it made in flight. A third type noted was adapted from an 8" (20cm) gun shell with a rocket motor of singular design permanently attached to the base of the shell. None of the rockets observed used liquid fuel, and as far as can be ascertained the rocket motors were simple gun powder jet motors.

i. The tactical principles followed by the enemy in the use of their rockets are fairly obscure. They were used for harrassing our rear areas for the most part but, since the weapons themselves are experimental, the tactical possibilities and uses are probably also experimental. In firing rockets the enemy would use a number of positions and fire from these at irregular intervals. These positions were ordinarily in deep draws or gullies and consisted of a series of rock and clay abutments or dams across the draws to minimize the effect of enfilading naval gunfire. In the walls of the gullies were caves and ammunition storage dugouts. The rocket launchers consisted both of long V-type troughs, and light two-wheeled metal tubes. The former were more or less permanent, but the latter were very mobile, and could be moved under cover or could change positions with ease. One drawback noted in the design of the mobile launcher was that they were constructed of very light metal and overheated upon expenditure of only three rounds, and required 45 minutes to 1 hour to cool off. The enemy could continue firing rockets throughout a long period only through the use of many launchers and positions. This technique at first gave our troops the impression that the enemy was using his launchers from position to position [illegible] improved

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

(2) (Continued)

i. (Continued) roads in his rear areas. Toward the end of the battle when the enemy rocket positions became too close to the front, and when he was preparing to abandon these positions, he would fire his rockets and other heavy ammunition with no apparent attempts to aim the rockets or to conserve his materiel. The singular fact about this "last gasp" expenditure of heavy ammunition was that the tighter his area was compressed the higher became his firing angle, until at the very end he was firing rockets very nearly straight up in the air.

j. The effect of rockets and large mortar shells on rear areas was slight. Whenever large mortars and rockets fired on our front lines they seemed to have effect and cause casualties. The terrific blast and concussion would shake up and neutralize troops within a 50 to 100 yard radius of the point of impact. The sound of these large projectiles in flight is loud and terrifying when approaching and this noise coupled with the terrific blast, had a demoralizing effect on troops in the vicinity of the impact area.

(h) Recommendations.

(1) To improve the functioning of intelligence in combat, it is recommended that all schools stress training of officers in intelligence work as much as training for any other staff section duties is stressed. Energetic and constent effort by intelligence minded officers of all arms should bring excellent results in the amount of information gained of the enemy in combat. The training of artillery officers in stateside artillery schools should equally stress standardized artillery intelligence methods, and the importance of intelligence work in combat, with the training in other staff functions.

(2) It has been recommended, as a result of experience in previous operations, t[illegible] Bn-2

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(h) (Continued).

(2) (Continued) sections consist of two enlisted men, instead of the one authorized by the present T/O. This recommendation is repeated; the artillery Bn-2 sections should consist of one sergeant, intelligence clerk and one corporal, intelligence clerk. It is further recommended that these men be given elementary training in artillery instruments and in scouting in order to be of aid to the Bn-2 on reconnaissance.

(3) In the discussion of maps and aerial photographs it was recommended that the enemy situation be left off the Air and Gunnery Target Maps because the symbols are confusing to detail, and the early date at which the plates for these maps are made up places an erroneous situation on them by the time of the invasion.

(4) It is recommended that the number of sorties given widespread distribution be decreased in favor of an increased distribution of the best unobstructed large scale sorties down to include artillery battalions.

(5) Oblique photographs made in the field from OY-1 planes should have greater and more rapid reproduction and distribution. It is further recommended that the target area grid be transposed and printed on the oblique photos prior to distribution. The most desirable distribution of these and other low altitude photographs would be sufficient copies to reach all echelons including artillery forward observers.

(i) Conclusions.

(1) The only conclusions that can be drawn as the result of the intelligence work of this operation are, that no matter how much is known of the enemy, there are always many more facts not known, and many more riddles about his actions as yet unsolved, and that as we continue our attacks on enemy held bases, he seems to learn more and more defensive tactics. Through more complete intelligence

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2. Intelligence (Continued).

(i) (Continued).

(1) (Continued) training, through more efficient intelligence methods, we should enable our forces to learn enough about his defenses and methods to completely nullify his efforts, and reduce the cost of strategic bases.

3. Operations and Training.

(a) Preparation.

(1) Due to limited reorganization following the Marianas Operation it was necessary to start the training period with individual basic training and progress rapidly into battery training. Due to time limitations, only two weeks were devoted to each of these periods.

(2) The three week period allotted to battalion training was utilized in tactical firing field problems. The battalions stressed control and organization of observation and individual and organizational camouflage, while maintaining the same high standard in conduct of fire, fire direction and survey.

(3) A five day regimental tactical firing field problem, stressing massing of fires, use of sound and flash ranging and displacement of the regiment, completed the first half of the training period.

(4) The battalions, during the next phase, conducted field problems with the infantry regiment that they normally supported. Regimental and Division CPX's and one Corps CPX, all stressing coordination of fire support, were held.

(5) Prior to embarkation for rehearsal, 4th MarDiv made available to the 14th Mar three (3) LSTs for two (2) periods of three days each during which time the regiment experimented with and perfected the landing proceedure to be followed in the ensuing operation. [illegible] the first three

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(a) (Continued).

(5) (Continued) (3) day period the 3rd and 4th Battalions and H&S Btry, 14th Mar conducted exercises using the 476th Amphib Trk Co (Army). During the second period the 1st and 2nd Battalions and H&S Btry, 14th Mar conducted exercises using the 4th Amphib Trk Co (USMC). This period of training just prior to rehearsal was invaluable in that all personnel immediately concerned with the landing were thoroughly indoctrinated in landing procedure and control.

(b) Planning.

(1) Upon receipt of the tentative operation order for the IWO JIMA attack, a Quonsett Hut was fitted as a Planning Room. Initially the Regimental Commander, Executive Officer, Operations, Intelligence, and Supply Officer, Battalion Commanders and Operations Officers had access to this room. As planning progressed, additional regimental and battalion staff officers were admitted as they were found needed and necessary. Maps, photos, orders, and all available intelligence pertaining to the operation were made available in the room. An NCO guard was maintained 24 hours a day.

(2) Information and orders were received sufficiently early to permit a well organized planning phase. A rough draft of the Regimental Operation Plan was circulated to battalion commanders and certain regimental staff officers for comments and recommendations. A copy of Regimental Operation Plan No. 1-45 was issued to Battalion Commanders on 2 Jan 45, to facilitate planning. Regimental Operation Plan No. 2-45, the alternate plan, was similarly issued on 10 Jan 45. All other copies of the plan were packaged, and distribution effected during rehabilitation at Pearl Harbor, with instructions to open after departure from Pearl Harbor.

(3) The rehearsal exercise at Maui on 15-16 January, 1945, were carried out as planned with no difficulties experienced in procedure or control. All DUKWs (less ammunition carriers) were embarked [illegible] successfully;

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(b) (Continued).

(3) (Continued) Reembarkation after rehearsal was not satisfactory as the DUKWs were required to make a long haul over water to the LSTs and did not reembark dry, although the rehearsal plan called for dry reembarkation. This factor contributed to the difficulties experienced in the landing on IWO JIMA (see Appendix 5 to Annex Item).

(4) Twenty-four (24) hours prior to the departure of the tractor group all artillery and DUKW officers aboard were briefed in the operation plan by the artillery regimental operations, intelligence, and communications officers. Twenty-four (24) hours prior to departure of APAs from Pearl Harbor and Honolulu all battalion commanders and staffs were similarly briefed. Enroute to the target, all personnel were briefed thoroughly in the operation plan, summary of the enemy situation, and topography of the objective. Relief maps, 1:5,000 and 1:10,000 Special Air and Gunnery Target maps and large scale photos were particularly useful in this respect.

(5) During the rehabilitation period at Pearl Harbor, 25% of the officers and men were granted liberty daily and 50% of those remaining were permitted to leave the ship on organized recreational parties. The personnel on the LSTs at KANEOHE were unable to take full advantage of the period devoted to rehabilitation due to lack of transportation to move personnel to recreational facilities and the lack of those facilities near KANEOHE.

(6) During rehearsal exercises at staging area on 13 Feb 45, only battalion reconnaissance parties, forward observer, and liaison parties physically participated. These groups boated, proceeded to LD and then returned to their ships. Due to lack of boats regimental headquarters did not physically participate in the rehearsal. Radio communication with Division was checked and found to be adequate. Regimental Voice Command was also checked.

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(c) Loading.

(1) This regiment was embarked aboard five (5) LSTs with overflow cargo and personnel embarked on APAs. The battalion headquarters and overflow personnel were embarked in the same transport division as 4th Marine Division headquarters. Each battalion was allocated an LST. The fifth LST was utilized to load H&S Battery, 14th Marines, and additional ammunition.

(2) Headquarters of regiment and battalions were split between LSTs and APAs.

(3) Forward Observer and liaison parties were embarked with the infantry organization that they were to support. Four air observers were embarked on battleships and cruisers for pre-D-day and subsequent naval gunfire spotting. Three air observers were embarked on CVEs to provide carrier based air observation for artillery prior to operation of OY-1s. Two air observers were embarked with five (5) OY-1 planes on LST 776 fitted with Brodie device.

(4) Detailed Loading.

a. 1/14 LST carried a tank deck load of 5 U/F 75mm ammunition. 2/14, 3/14 4/14 and H&S, 14th LSTs each carried a tank deck load of 3 U/F of 105mm and 1/2 U/F of 75mm ammunition. Dunnage was placed over the ammunition and the preloaded DUKWs were run in on top of the dunnage.

b. LST 726 embarked the 1st Bn, 14th Mar (75mm Pack Howitzer) in twenty-two (22) DUKWs of the 4th Amphibian Truck Co.

c. LST 764 embarked the 2d Bn, 14th Mar (105mm Howitzer) in eighteen (18) DUKWs of the 4th Amphibian Truck Co. In addition two (2) LVT(4)s were allocated this battalion to land radio ¼ ton vehicles.

d. LST 1031 embarked [illegible] 14th Mar (105mm Howitzer) in twenty (20) DUKWs of the 4th Amphib-

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(c) (Continued)

(4) (Continued)

d. (Continued) ian Truck Co. This LST was damaged during rehearsal, necessitating transfer of personnel and equipment of 3/14 to LST 648 at Pearl prior to departure for the target.

e. LST 1032 embarked the 4th Bn, 14th Mar (105mm Howitzer) in twenty-two (22) DUKWs of the 476th Amphibian Truck Co.

f. LST 763 embarked H&S Btry, 14th Mar plus ammunition handling details from each of the 105mm How bns. Eight (8) DUKWs from the 476th Amphib. Truck Co. were embarked to land the personnel and equipment of H&S Btry, 14th Mar. Ten (10) DUKWs of the 4th Amphib. Truck Co. were embarked preloaded with 105mm ammunition. Two LVT(4)s were embarked, preloaded with radio ¼-ton vehicles of H&S Battery, 14th Mar.

g. Equipment was preloaded as follows:

75mm Howitzer Battalion-See Appendix 1, Page 1-
105mm Howitzer Battalion

Dukw Numbers

1st Firing Btry	1	2	3	4	5
2nd Firing Btry	6	7	8	9	10
3rd Firing Btry	11	12	13	14	15
Personnel embarked in DUKWs	20	6	6	6	6

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(c) (Continued)

(4) (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

EQUIPMENT:					
Howitzer		1	1	1	1
Section Chest w/contents		1	1	1	1
Camouflage Nets and Poles	1	1	1	1	1
Tarpaulin		1	1	1	1
Ammunition 21 rounds		21	21	21	21
610 Radio	1	1			
DR 4's	2	2	2	2	2
EE 8 A or B	2	2	2	2	2
Water Can, 5 Gal.	1				
Oil Can, 5 Gal.	1				
Howitzer Sling		1	1	1	1
Buckets	2	2	2	2	2
Sand Bags.	100	100	100	100	100
Aiming Stakes, spares				1	1
M.G. .50 Cal. complete		w/ground mount	w/ground mount	w/light AAmount	w/light AA mount
Spare .50 cal barrels		2	2	2	2
.50 cal ammo chests		3/chests w/ammo	3/reels w/ammo	3/reels w/ammo	3/reels w/ammo
.50 cal ammo	1200rd	1200rds	1200rds	1200rds	1200rds
M.G. Camouflage Nets		1	1	1	1
Spare Part M.G. Box		1	1	1	1
Bazooka, w/ammo, box	1				
Switchboard w/contents	1				
Wire, 130 miles.	4				
Aiming Circle	1	1			
Ordnance Chest (Section Chest)	2				
Artillery Chest (Instrument Gear)	1				
First Aid Chest, Unit 4	1				
Chest (Spare sight mount and Range Quadrant Mount	1				
Howitzer Cleaning Chest		1	1	1	1
Pioneer Tools					
Chest, Chemical		1			

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3. Operation and Training (Continued)

(c) (Continued).

(4) (Continued)

(g) (Continued).

Battery	Dukw Numbers				
Hq&Serv Battery	16	17	18	19	20
Personnel	20	20	10	20	20
EQUIPMENT.					
Radio Jeep (608)			1		
M.G. .50 Cal.		1 w/ground mount	1 w/ground mount	1/w light AA mount	1 w/light AA mount
M. G. .30 cal.	2			1	1
.50 Cal Ammo Chests		3 chests w/ammo	3 reels w/ammo	3 reels w/ammo	3 reels w/ammo
Camouflage Nets		1	1	1	1
Spare Parts, M.G. Box		1	1	1	1
Wire (DR4)	4	4	4	4	4
Telephones (EE 8 A or B)		5	5	5	5
5 Gal Water Cans	1	1	1	1	1
Shovels	3	3	3	3	3
Sand Bags	50	50	50	50	50
Switchboard		1 (72)		1 (71)	1(71)
Radio Batteries (Sets)				2	2
Aiming Circle					1
Small Arms AMMO	1 box carbine	1 box carbine	1 box carbine	1 box carbine	1 box M-1.
Ordnane Chest		1			
.50 Cal Ammo		1200 rds	1200 rds	1200 rds	1200 rds
Bazooka				1	1
Rockets				1 box	1 box
Picks	3	3	3	3	3
Axes	1	1	1	1	1
610 Radio				1	2
TBX Radio				1	1
Radio Chest		1	1	1	1
Plotting Tables					2

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ANNEX ITEM TO DIVISION OPERATION ORDER - IWO JIMA (Continued)

3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(c) (Continued).

(4) (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

EQUIPMENT	Dukw Numbers.				
Wire w-130		3	3	3	3
Chest, Chemical	1				
Medical Units	6				

Note: Each firing battery lands 5 officers and 49 enlisted.
Hq&Serv Battery lands 6 officers and 54 enlisted.
This does not include the Reconnaissance Party of 4 officers and 28 enlisted who land in LCVP.

In general twelve (12) DUKWs on each battalion LST were preloaded with one (1) howitzer, personnel of howitzer section, twenty rounds of ammunition and section gear. Each firing battery headquarters was allocated one (1) DUKW. The remaining DUKWs were loaded with battalion headquarters, communication equipment, ammunition and local security personnel.

(h) Each LST carried an average of ten (10) officers and two hundred and forty (240) enlisted men from port of embarkation to the staging area. At the staging area total embarked personnel was increased to eighteen (18) officers and three hundred and ninety (390) enlisted men per LST. This increase was effected by shifting personnel from APAs to LSTs. Regimental and battalion command posts remained on APAs.

(d) Landing.

(1) On D-day battalion reconnaissance parties embarked in LCVPs from APAs at about H-hour (0900). The reconnaissance parties proceeded to Baker control vessel (4thMarDiv) to await orders from the Div Arty O, embarked thereon to proceed to the beach.

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(d) (Continued).

(2) Battalion reconnaissance parties landed between 1247 and 1438. (1st-1247, 2nd-1342, 3rd-1430, 4th-1438).

(3) Upon landing the reconnaissance parties found that the infantry had not advanced beyond preselected position areas. No routes of egress from the beaches had been prepared thus making it impossible for vehicles (DUKWs) to get off the beach. The beach was under heavy artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. It was impractical to land the artillery at this time.

(4) 4th Mar Div order to land 1st and 2nd Battalion, 14th Mar was received at 1405. Landing of 1/14 and 2/14 DUKWs commenced at 1500. Due to beach conditions the landing proceeded very slowly and with considerable difficulty. The 1st Bn had less difficulty moving the 75mm Pack Howitzer into position than did the 2nd Bn with the 105mm How. Each DUKW of the 2nd Bn had to be dragged onto the beach and into position with an angle dozer. The emplacing of the howitzers was an extremely difficult operation accomplished under heavy artillery and mortar fire. The 1st Bn was in position, registered and firing direct support missions for RCT 25 at 1740. The 2nd Bn was in position, registered and firing direct support mission for RCT 23 at 2130. The 3rd Bn was launched from the LST but was ordered to reembark late in the afternoon of D-day. The 4th Bn was not ordered to launch on D-day. The regimental recon party left APA at 1610 and was enroute to Baker control vessel when orders were received not to land. The recon party went aboard LST 763 and established the CP thereon.

(5) On D/1, the 3rd Bn was ordered ashore and commenced landing at 1500. The 4th Bn experienced a delay of about three hours in launching DUKWs due to the LST receiving orders to launch its LCT at the time the order was received to launch DUKWs. The 4th Bn commenced landing at 1725. 3/14 was in position and firing missions at 1728. 4/14 had five howitzers ashore and ready to fire by midnight.

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(d) (Continued).

(6) Regimental command group landed at 1705 and the advance CP was establihsed ashore at 1715. The remainder of the regimental staff landed on D/2 and the remainder of H&S Battery landed on D/3.

(e) Survey.

(1) Initial attempts to locate the Corps IP (intersection of unimproved road and railroad spur) were unsuccessful as the unimproved road was unrecognizable and the railroad spur non-existant. The 1st Bn registered by FO and set up an observed fire chart on D-day. On D/1 a position area survey was accomplished, batteries being located by resection. The battalion was registered by Air Observer.

(2) The 2nd Bn located its battery position by inspection and registered by high burst on D-day. On D/1 a position area survey was accomplished and registration completed on an identifiable base point.

(3) The 3rd Bn located its initial point by aligning the nearer with the farther of the Futatsu Rocks and using the point where this line intersected the shore line. Direction was taken from a line between the IP and the easternmost point of the Northern shore line visible from the IP.

(4) The 4th Bn ran a position area survey by a three point resection using as reference points, the shore line on the SE coast near Mt. SURIBACHI, the shoreline on the NE coast and a corner of Airfield No. 1.

(5) On D/3 regimental control was carried from Corps IP to battalion position areas. The Survey Officer, 13th Marines, furnished the 14th Marines Survey Officer with all available data and points located by each were sent to the other until 1st Prov FA Gp was established ashore. Thereafter, all survey information was sent to the 1st Prov FA Gp Survey Officer and disseminated by him.

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(f) Observation.

(1) Observation was very limited. Forward Observers seldom had observation more than 100 yards to their front. Air observers could locate very few targets due to enemy installations being under ground and expertly camouflaged. Enemy weapons could be observed and located only when active. Air observers and flash teams were particularly effective in the latter instance.

(g) Fire Adjustment.

(1) Forward observers and Air observers were the chief agencies utilized in fire adjustment. A regimental OP was established on MT. SURIBACHI at 1345 on D/4 and adjusted fire on targets of opportunity. A flash team, established on MT SURIBACHI at the same time, adjusted fire on counter-battery missions and located targets for the OP. Sound Ranging was established on D/3 and located enemy artillery and mortars and adjusted fire on these installations. Sound Ranging was especially effective at night.

(2) Night air observation was attempted but fire could not be successfully adjusted.

(3) In many instances lack of observation dictated that forward observers adjust by sound in placing defensive concentrations near our lines.

(4). Sound Ranging. This section first went into operation on D/3 on IWO JIMA and located their first target that evening. Six targets were located and fired on. At this time the setup consisted of two positions with a front of 800 yards and using a microphone base of 600 ft. On D/5 the base was extended to 1300 yards, using three positions instead of two. This facilitated location of targets and that evening twelve enemy targets were located and fired on. On all targets located by Sound Ranging, the Artillery was adjusted by Sound Ranging methods. On D/12, the microphone positions were moved forward to aid in the location of enemy mortars and smaller guns. In the new positions the overall front measured 2100 yards and the individual microphone bases

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

(4) (Continued) were cut down to 400 feet. These forward positions were occupied by the section until secured on D/21. The main source of trouble on this operation came directly from the use of long wire lines from the microphones to the instruments. These wire lines were continually being broken by bulldozers and other vehicles. This difficulty could be remedied by the more extensive use of overheads.

Several times the microphones were pulled out of the ground or covered up by bulldozers. When the Engineers were notified of the importance of microphone positions very little further trouble was experienced with engineer equipment. Later, when time was available, barbed wire enclosures were used to protect the microphones.

The DODARS were greatly effected by dampness and had to be dried in the sun after several days of constant operation. Dampness caused erratic readings due to a variance of capacitance in the instrument. The microphones functioned very well. The batteries had to be changed every 24 hours, and eleven diaphragms were replaced in 18 days of operation. Double set of microphones were installed in each position with lines laid by different routes. When a line or a microphone went out the lines were switched at the instrument and operation was not stopped. Some difficulty was experienced trying to operate in daylight hours; this was due largely to small arms fire, heavy traffic near the microphone positions, and a large volume of friendly artillery fire falling in enemy territory. At night when the front was quiet, and when artillery fire was reduced to harrassing fires, the best plots were obtained on enemy guns.

When small arms fire had moved far enough away not to disturb the microphones it became difficult to pick up enemy small mortars, though larger mortars and guns could still be located. It was necessary to displace microphones as soon as the front lines had moved more than 3,000 yards ahead of the microphone position because of the difficulty of locating enemy mortars at more than [illegible]

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(g) (Continued).

(4) (Continued) Some guns were located at 7000 yds, however. Because of the low frequency of a mortar discharge they are difficult to pick up at a very great range. A 10 to 15 mil error was noted in left deflection of all targets fired in TA's 184, 185, and 202. This was due to the map and was corrected on all targets fired in those areas. On this operation, Sound Ranging conditions were excellent and seventy-four targets were located. Sixty-seven of these were fired on by either the 14th Marines or Corps Artillery, 12th Marines or 13th Marines. Adjustment on targets was completed with an average of two or three shifts and fire for effect used was generally Battalion 3 volleys. Several targets were located which were believed to be roving pieces because of the inconsistency of their location. Sound Ranging was originally designed for use on a broader front than it was possible to use on IWO JIMA, but the restricted range balanced out with the short front and good results were obtained. Some further training in survey adjustment of fires on targets and care of equipment is needed. The Sound Ranging CP was located near the Regimental CP for security purposes and close liaison with the Regimental Two and Three Sections. In a fast moving situation it may be found necessary for the CP to be maintained closer to the microphone positions.

(h) Fire Direction.

(1) Regimental Hq. used Special Air and Gunnery Target Map 1:10,000 in exercising fire control. The battalion FDC's used Special Air and Gunnery Map 1:20,000 for fire direction. Normal fire direction procedure was used. Fire direction was flexible and the massing of fires effectively handled. Metro section was established ashore on D/3 and sent soundings to the battalions daily at 0730, 1130, 1630, 1930, and 2230. Surface readings were furnished sound ranging hourly from 1900 to 2400.

(i) Organization for combat.

(1) Normal organization for combat was one battalion supporting each assault [illegible] Regimental

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(i) (Continued).

(1) (Continued) 105mm Howitzers reinforcing the 1st Bn (75mm Howitzers) and one battalion in general support. With two RCTs on the line, each normally had two artillery battalions firing harrassing, defensive, and preparatory fires. 1st Prov FA Gp reinforced these fires on call.

(j) Liaison.

(1) Battalion liaison officers landed with infantry regiments and assisted in the control of all fires by continued close contact with infantry regimental COs and their staffs. Liaison officers at infantry battalions coordinated fires and observation of forward observers, supervised relief of observers and maintenance of communications.

(2) Reinforcing battalions established and maintained liaison with reinforced battalions.

(3) The 14th Marines established liaison with 13th Marines as soon as landed. Upon landing of the 12th Marines the 14th Marines liaison officer was transferred from the 13th to the 12th Marines as the latter was the adjacent regiment.

(k) Communications.

(1) Communication within the artillery regiment proved adequate and highly satisfactory. Wire lines to other units remained intact remarkably well except the long lines to 1st Prov FA Gp and 13th Marines. All lines were overheaded as soon as materials became available. Drivers of tracked vehicles particularly LVTs, appeared to be much more cognizant of the importance of not destroying wire lines. (The fact that LVTs stayed on roads to avoid mine fields may have accounted for this).

(2) The radio SCR610 proved to be a dependable set but it was not a satisfactory radio for use by forward observers. This set was not satisfactory

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(k) (Continued).

(2) (Continued).

a. There is no means of maintaining communications while moving on foot.

b. The weight of this radio is so great that additional men are needed in each forward observer section to act as carriers.

c. The radio is not flexible enough for field artillery use. With only two pre-set channels immediately available for communications, employment of this set is seriously limited.

d. The set is so bulky it is easily spotted by the enemy and operators were subjected to heavy fire of all types.

(3) Very little frequency interference was encountered during the operation. No enemy interference of any kind was heard on any nets although a fire support destroyer operating on a nearby frequency caused some interference on our air spot net on one occasion due to its being 30 Kcs. off assigned frequency.

(4) The basic system of radio nets was adequate.

(l) Maps and Photos.

(1) Adequate for artillery needs. (See paragraph 2, subparagraph (a) and (b)).

(m) Personnel.

(1) (See paragraph 1, subparagraph (a)). All personnel of the regiment were highly trained in their duties with adequate replacements available for key positions. Replacement officers were received late in the training period. Field artillery replacement officers performed their duties very satisfactorily during the operation. Officer replacements

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(m) (Continued).

(1) (Continued) without previous field artillery training received insufficient training to perform general field artillery duties, due to lack of time, but performed assigned duties satisfactorily.

(2) Morale and efficiency of troops was high throughout the operation. Battalion personnel emplaced their howitzers under the most difficult circumstances possible, but accomplished their mission rapidly and effectively. Personnel worked willingly night and day to keep the howitzers supplied and firing.

(n) Motor Transport.

(1) Due to the nature of this operation, motor transportation was adequate but operational only where roads had been constructed.

(2) The carrier M-29-C (Weasel) was excellent for wire laying and could traverse successfully any of the terrain encountered.

(o) Training Deficiencies.

(1) The last training period was sufficient to bring the regiment to a high state of proficiency. It was and is felt that this regiment was ready for combat when committed.

(p) Ammunition Expenditures.

(1) Ammunition expenditures by item:

M48 Fuze	M54 Fuze	M57 Fuze	M62 Fuze	Total
		75mm Pack Howitzer		
31,524	19,873	7,819	3,617	62,833
		105mm Howitzer		
46,113	42,155	5,474	23	93,765
				156,598.

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(p) (Continued).

(2) Ammunition expenditures by type of fire missions:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. OF MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counter battery	640	22,653
Harrassing & Defensive	3843	28,447
Targets of Opportunity	774	31,033
Preparation	508	62,851
Registration	159	1,614
TOTAL	5924	156,598

(q) Enemy Artillery.

(1) Methods used to locate enemy artillery. See paragraph 2 subparagraph (b) (6).

FO, Air Observers, Flash Ranging, OP's, API, interpretation of shelling reports and sound ranging were used to locate artillery targets. Of these agencies, soundranging and air observers were the most effective.

(2) Enemy action against our artillery.

The only enemy action against our artillery was counterbattery fire. Rockets, artillery and mortars were used by the enemy to effect counterbattery. This action was not particularly effective as personnel casualties were light, and materiel casualties negligible. This ineffectiveness is contributed to inaccuracies of fire received and the slight fragmentation effects of the heavy rockets. The concussion effect of rockets was considerable, however. This regiment encountered fire from shrapnel for the first time. Effect from this was nil, as adjustments were poor. Due to emplacements of enemy artillery their deflection was limited.

(3) Tactical employment of enemy artillery. (See paragraph 2 subparagraph (

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3. Operation and Training (Continued).

(q) (Continued).

(3) (Continued).

Enemy artillery was usually fired by a single gun or by a battery firing one gun at a time. Rocket and mortar fire fell in barrages, however, during the early stages of the operation. Enemy artillery fire was not accurate, a fact which indicated that adjustments were not being made and that predetermined data was being fired.

(4) Effectiveness of enemy artillery. (See paragraph 2 subparagraph (h) (2)).

Enemy artillery was not effective in deep support or counterbattery fire. However, artillery, rockets and mortars inflicted heavy casualties on front line personnel, forward OP's and CP's.

(r) Effectiveness of Our Artillery.

(1) The effectiveness of our artillery varied with the types of emplacements and targets encountered. Targets in the open were quickly and effectively destroyed.



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Cruiser to fire naval gunfire prior to "D" Day and as long thereafter as was necessary. The other embarked on a CVE to fire artillery. He was to remain on the CVE until it was possible for spotter planes to land ashore. When the first artillery battalion landed, an aerial observer was to be sent up, and was to be used for registration if Forward Observers could not be used.

(7) Maps and Photos:

The battalion was furnished one hundred fifty-six (156) maps and sixty (60) aerial photographs, plus various beach studies, intelligence bulletins, and diagrams. It was planned to use the gridded 1/20,000 map as a firing chart. Since the infantry was using the gridded 1/10,000 map, the Forward Observers were issued this type. Vertical and oblique photographs were used for briefing and for preliminary selection of positions.

B. TRAINING

(1) Preliminary Phase:

Since the battalion had undergone extensive re-organization after the previous operation, preliminary training was routine and elementary. Greatest stress was laid on section training, including gun drills (at night as well as during the day), FDC and survey schools, and physical training. Extensive use was made of training films during this phase.

After the howitzers were calibrated, the battalion began conducting field exercises. Initially, each firing battery held battery RSOP's to correct individual errors. Battalion RSOP's, which followed, stressed forward observation and fire direction.

(2) Advanced Phase:

Advanced training consisted of combat team exercises, a Regimental RSOP, several CPX's, and ship-to-shore exercises in DUKW's. Throughout this phase, battalion positions were selected in areas that were barren and free of cover, and camouflage installations and discipline were stressed. Forward Observer teams, whenever possible, operated with their infantry battalions.

During both the preliminary and advanced phases, officer and NCO schools were conducted several times weekly.

C. REHEARSAL

(1) Embarkation:

Troops embarked aboard the APA on 28 December, 1944.

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Beginning 6 January, 1945, after a period of rehabilitation, all troops participated in debarkation drills to train the ship's personnel.

Personnel embarked aboard the LST on 10 January, 1945 and proceeded to the rehearsal area.

(2) Maneuvers:

This battalion did not participate in the division maneuvers conducted daily from 12 January, 1945 to 14 January, 1945. On 15 January, 1945, the Reconnaissance Party and personnel from the LST participated in the rehearsal. Landings were made according to plan, troops remained ashore overnight and reembarked the morning of 16 January, 1945.

One purpose of the rehearsal was to check all communication facilities. Accordingly, all "610" radios were set up and found to be in good working condition.

SECTION II. REHABILITATION, SHIP-BOARD TRAINING, AND FORWARD AREA REHEARSAL

A. REHABILITATION - 19 January, 1945 to 26 January, 1945:

(1) This period was spent in conferences with the Forward Observers who were billetted aboard other ships, and with officers from our LST. This period also included a conference with Regimental Headquarters on 26 January, 1945, at which officers were briefed on the forthcoming operation.

B. SHIP-BOARD TRAINING - 27 January, 1945 to 11 February, 1945:

(1) APA

(a) First Phase - A general briefing was given by Lt. Col. Mustain to all officers.
(b) Second Phase - A general briefing was given by Major Edgar and staff officers to all officers and NCO's of the First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines.
(c) Third Phase - Specific briefing was given by Battery Commanders and junior officers to battery personnel.
(d) Daily schooling was combined with briefing for Fire Direction Center personnel, Survey personnel, Communication personnel, etc.
(e) A final conference with all Forward Observers was held at Eniwetok aboard the APA on 6 February, 1945.

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(2) LST - 23 January, 1945 to 11 February, 1945:

(a) The same plan as used by the Battalion Commander was followed by the Battalion Executive Officer aboard the LST.
(b) The second string Fire Direction Center, as well as the gun sections, held school daily.

C. FORWARD AREA REHEARSAL - 12 February, 1945 to 14 February, 1945:

(a) The Reconnaissance Party boated on 13 February, 1945 and proceeded to the Line of Departure. There were no other troops participating.

(b) As the main purpose of the rehearsal was to check communications, all the battalion's radios were set-up and proved to be in excellent working condition.

SECTION III. SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

A. TACTICAL PLAN FOR LANDING:

It was planned to have the Reconnaissance Party boat at H-30 on "D"-Day and proceed to the Division Control Boat. There they were to await orders from the Regimental Commander who was on the control boat. As soon as it was feasible for the party to go in to the beach, he was to order it to the Blue Beach Control Boat. From there the Reconnaissance Party was to clear as soon as possible and hit the beach. The personnel aboard the LST were to launch on order from the Regimental Commander. This was to be done to insure that the DUKW's would not be launched too soon before they could land so that they would not run out of gasoline circling in the water. Upon launching and as soon as they were organized by the Battalion Executive-Officer, the DUKW's were to proceed to the Division Control Boat. There the Regimental Commander was to send the battalion to the Blue Beach Control Boat. The plan called for the batteries to land in the order Able, Baker, Charlie, "H&S", with an interval of ten (10) minutes between batteries. The first battery was to leave the Line of Departure on order of the Battalion Commander. After the DUKW's had discharged their personnel and equipment, they were to return to the LST to pick up additional men and ammunition.

B. CONTROL PLAN:

In order to carry out the above plan, the following communications arrangement was put into effect. The Reconnaissance Party had two (2) "610" radios with it. One radio was set up on the Regimental frequency and one on the battalion net. The Battalion Executive Officer also had two (2) radios set

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up exactly like the Reconnaissance Party's. In this manner both the Battalion Commander and the Battalion Executive Officer could contact Regiment and the various batteries of the battalion. After the batteries left the line of departure, the Battalion Commander directed each battery to the exact spot on the beach where he desired it to land.

C. DESCRIPTION OF LANDING:

At 0830, the Reconnaissance Party boated and proceeded to the Baker Control Boat to await orders to land. At 1200 the order was given by the Regimental Commander and the Reconnaissance Party proceeded to the Blue Beach Control Boat where it was ordered to stand by to land after the Reserve Infantry Battalion. At 1220 the order to land was issued and the Reconnaissance Party proceeded to the beach, landing at 1247.

After making his reconnaissance, the Battalion Commander at 1330 advised the Regimental Commander that DUKW's could be launched, but, due to the rough terrain, DUKW's would have to unload at the beach. At 1500 the Battalion Commander ordered Able Battery to land, with Baker Battery coming in on call instead of on time schedule in order to see first if Able could get into position. At 1600 Able Battery landed and managed well enough for Baker Battery to be called. While Baker was coming in, the Battalion Commander decided to bring in "H&S" Battery next instead of Charlie because the fire was so heavy and the beach so crowded it was still debatable whether or not three batteries could get into the position. At 1615, Baker Battery landed, followed by "H&S" Battery at 1630. By the time "H&S" Battery had come ashore, conditions were such that Charlie Battery could be called. At 1645 Charlie Battery landed.

In the meantime, contact had been made with the Forward Observers and although no point could be found on the ground that was also on the map, we started registering the Battalion at 1715 in front of the Third Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines. This necessitated using an Observed Firing Chart for the first period, but this method proved satisfactory until we were registered by an aerial observer the following day.

SECTION IV. NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

A. "D" DAY:

After all elements of the Battalion landed and reported ready to fire, we started to register at 1715 and completed registration at 1740. We then fired targets of opportunity in support of the Twenty-fifth Marines. We fired defensive missions throughout the night on call from the Forward Observers.

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B. "D" PLUS ONE - 20 February, 1945:

Forward Observers reported a counter-attack in the Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines' zone of action at 0315, which we took under fire. The results were reported as excellent. At 0840 we fired a preparation in support of the Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines, which attacked in the central sector of the Regimental zone of action. By 1500 troops had advanced as far as the "O-A" line all along the Regimental zone of action. Reported as of 1500, there was a total of thirty-three (33) casualties, of which two (2) were killed and thirty-one (31) wounded. We had expended one thousand four hundred ninety (1490) rounds of ammunition during this period. Survey had been completed and batteries given place mark on orienting line. As no control points could be located in our area, the batteries were surveyed in by resection. When control was brought down by regiment, it was found that the survey had been excellent. Air observer registered us on a base point in 185-H by 1500. Forward Observers registered in their defensive fires for the night at approximately 1700, and we prepared to harass the enemy throughout the night.

C. "D" PLUS TWO - 21 February, 1945:

Fired a preparation at 0800 in support of Twenty-fifth Marines, but no advance was made in their zone of action. Total number of casualties for the twenty-four (24) hour period, as of 1500, was thirty (30), of which one (1) was killed and twenty-nine (29) wounded. Two thousand nine hundred ninety-seven (2997) rounds of ammunition were expended during the same period. We fired eighty (80) missions, thirty-nine (39) of which were in harassing, twenty (20) on targets of opportunity, four (4) for preparation, and fifteen (15) miscellaneous. Forward Observers fired in their defensive concentrations at 1700, and we harassed during the night. A counter-attack was repulsed in Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines' zone of action. The first report concerning the enemy rockets was at 2350.

D. "D" PLUS THREE - 22 February, 1945:

We fired a preparation at 0925 for Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines, and continued to fire targets of opportunity in their zone of action. Aerial observer reported enemy artillery position at 1010, which we took under fire. At 1135, fired preparation for First Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines. Assigned mission of supporting First Battalion, Twenty-fourth Marines at 1400. Reported as of 1500 that the infantry had advanced five hundred (500) yards in the central sector, while the flanks had moved up about one hundred (100) yards in the Regiment's zone of action. Twelve (12) casualties, one (1) killed, and eleven (11) wounded, were reported at 1500. Report on ammunition expended as of 1500 was three thousand seven hundred twenty-five (3725) rounds, with seventy-nine (79) missions accomplished, of which thirty-nine (39) were harassing,

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thirty-eight (38) targets of opportunity, and two (2) in preparation. Started firing defensive fires at 1625 and prepared to harass during the night.

E. "D" PLUS FOUR - 23 February, 1945:

Orders arrived at 0625 placing us in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-four. Fired approximately two thousand (2000) rounds of ammunition on a counter-attack, results were reported that the enemy was completely routed. Fired counter-battery mission at 0825 and received reports of mission accomplished. At 0920, fired attack preparation for Twenty-fourth Marines.

At 1300, the Battalion Commander was asked by Regiment as to the advisability of displacing our battalion further inland. The Battalion Commander pointed out that we were firing urgent missions for the infantry and that to displace would mean rendering us incapable of giving the desired support. It was, therefore, decided not to have us displace. It was reported at 1500 that we had suffered fourteen (14) casualties during the period, all wounded.

During this period, we fired five thousand four hundred fifty (5450) rounds of ammunition, a total of one hundred thirty-five (135) missions, ninety-seven (97) of which were harassing, thirty-five (35) targets of opportunity, one (1) for preparation, and two (2) miscellaneous.

At 1700 it was reported the left flank of the Twenty-fifth Marines had moved up about one hundred (100) yards.

Our next mission thereafter was to fire a smoke screen for the Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines to aid the evacuation of casualties from the front lines (1753). At 1808 we started adjusting in defensive fires and prepared schedule for harassing missions for the night.

F. "D" PLUS FIVE - 24 February, 1945:

At 0700 orders were received from Regiment putting us in direct support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-four plus Fox Company of the Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines. The order also called for a preparation which we fired at 0844. By 1300 the infantry was reported to have advanced about two hundred (200) yards. At 1331 we were requested to fire a preparation for a tank attack. Battalion complied with a five hundred (500) round preparation. It was reported at 1500 that for the period the battalion had suffered eighteen (18) casualties, of which one (1) was killed and seventeen (17) wounded. For the

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period we had fired three thousand five hundred eighty-eight (3588) rounds of ammunition, one hundred twenty-five (125) missions, ninety-five (95) of which were harassing, twenty-six (26) targets of opportunity, one (1) preparation and four (4) miscellaneous. We started adjusting in our defensive fires at 1955 and at about the same time began setting up our Flash Team for the first time. The first flash they reported was at 2245, which the Battalion took under fire. At 2105 we fired on enemy personnel massing for counter-attack with good results reported.

G. "D" PLUS SIX - 25 February, 1945:

At 0130 received Operation Order No. 4-1945 from Third Marine Division putting us in direct support of Regimental Combat Team Nine with Fourth Battalion, Thirteenth Marines reenforcing our fires. At 0500 we received the Fourteenth Marines' operation order giving us the mission of reenforcing Third Battalion, Fourteenth Marines' fires. At 0900 these contradictory orders were cleared by verbal orders from Regiment assigning us to Third Division. In the meantime we had been registered in on front of Third Division's zone of action by their Forward Observers. At 0910 we fired preparation for Ninth Marines' attack. At 1104, 1206, 1247, Fourth Battalion, Thirteenth Marines reenforced our fires on targets of opportunity. By 1300 Regimental Combat Team Nine had advanced four hundred (400) yards in their zone of action. For the period we fired three thousand two hundred twenty-nine (3229) rounds, accomplishing one hundred forty-two (142) missions; one hundred seven (107) harassing; twenty-five (25) on targets of opportunity; and ten (10) on preparation fires.

Word was received at 1350 that there would be a tank attack, so at 1356 battalion fired preparation. Also fired another preparation for an infantry attack at 1537. After the attack we adjusted in defensive fires, completed at 1750, gave harassing missions to Fourth Battalion, Thirteenth Marines, to supplement ours.

H. "D" PLUS SEVEN - 26 February, 1945:

At 0630 Battalion received oral order from Regiment to revert to direct support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five as of 0700. At that time we re-registered in front of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five's zone of action. For preparation to be fired at 0735, we were reenforced by Third Battalion and Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, plus Corps Artillery. At 0903, we fired another preparation for the infantry's attack, followed by a smoke screen at 0937 on left flank of Regimental zone to cover the advance. It was reported at 1235 that the infantry had advanced four hundred (400) yards on the right but had failed to gain in the left sector. We fired seven thousand six hundred twenty-five (7625) rounds during the period, the maximum for any one day.

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One hundred twenty-six (126) missions were accomplished, ninety-five (95) of which were harassing, twenty-nine (29) targets of opportunity and four (4) for preparation. No casualties were reported for the period. At 1700 we began defensive fires and made preparations for harassing missions.

I. "D" PLUS EIGHT - 27 February, 1945:

Continuing in direct support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five, Battalion fired preparation at 0755, then again at 0800, 0825, 0910. At 1100, we fired the first HEAT ammunition to determine its accuracy for indirect fire. Adjustment had excellent results, and it was decided to use it for harassing fires and emergency close-in fires. Received word of another attack scheduled for 1215 and were requested to fire short preparation. At 1212 we fired the preparation. It was reported that troops, as of 1300, had advanced one hundred (100) yards on left but held to no gain on right. No casualties were reported for the period. We expended three thousand seventy-four (3074) rounds in ninety-nine (99) missions, of which fifty-eight (58) were harassing, twenty-four (24) targets of opportunity, six (6) preparation, and eleven (11) miscellaneous. On call of Forward Observers, we began adjusting in defensive fires and harassed throughout the night.

J. "D" PLUS NINE - 28 February, 1945:

Continued in direct support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five with Third Battalion, Fourteenth Marines reenforcing our fires. Started preparation at 0730 in front of regimental zone and infantry started attack thereafter. At 0850 on request of Forward Observers, Battalion fired on left flank of zone of action to protect advance of troops. We continued this fire until 1105. 1100, Battalion Executive Officer left for Twenty-fifth Marines' CP on reconnaissance of direct fire mission requested by the Twenty-fifth Marines. 1100, Assistant Bn-2 left for reconnaissance for direct fire mission requested by Division through Fourteenth Marine Regiment. 1330, one (1) gun (75MM Pack Howitzer) went forward on a direct fire mission in Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines' zone of action. Returned to Battalion area at 2100 after accomplishing mission.

Front line reports at 1300 showed that troops on left were four hundred (400) yards behind previous day's reported positions while troops on right had advanced approximately four hundred (400) yards. We fired two thousand six hundred eighty-three (2683) rounds during the period, one hundred forty (140) missions, of which one hundred six (106) were harassing, twenty-three (23) targets of opportunity, and eleven (11) preparational. Three men were wounded during the period. We were given mission at 1650 to fire smoke screen for evacuation of troops and again at 1830. Started defensive fires at 1900.

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K. "D" PLUS TEN - 1 March, 1945:

Continued in direct support of twenty-fifth Marines, Reinforced, by Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, for preparation fires. Started preparation at 0820, continued until 0850, after which infantry started attack. As of 1300 troops were reported advanced about four hundred (400) yards in left sector with no advance in right. At 1300 again fired smoke screen for evacuation of casualties suffered in morning's attack. During the period we suffered six (6) casualties, all wounded. The Battalion fired four thousand six hundred forty (4640) rounds for one hundred thirty-five (135) missions, of which ninety-four (94) were harassing, thirty-one (31) targets of opportunity, six (6) preparation and four (4) miscellaneous. Battalion started defensive fires at 1640 and made preparation for harassing throughout night. Received message from Sound Ranging at 2000 that enemy artillery had been located. Battalion was then adjusted on target by Sound Ranging with good results.

L. "D" PLUS ELEVEN - 2 March, 1945:

We continued in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five and our fires were reenforced by Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines. The infantry attacked at 0820 and we fired a preparation. The 1300 report of front lines showed that the troops on the left of the Regimental zone of action had been reported incorrectly the preceding day. There were no casualties for the period. Total number of missions for the period as of 1500 were one hundred eight (108) harassing, fifty-two (52) targets of opportunity, one (1) prearranged preparation fire, and two (2) miscellaneous, making a total of one hundred sixty-three (163) missions for the day. We expended two thousand eight hundred nineteen (2819) rounds of ammunition on these fires.

M. "D" PLUS TWELVE - 3 March, 1945:

Started early preparation for Twenty-fifth Marines at 0637, and continued in support of their advance. Liaison Officer reported a number of known mortar positions, and we harassed them from 0931-0938. This proved helpful to the advance of the troops. By 1300 the troops had gained four hundred (400) yards in the center and right flank sectors, while the left flank made no advance. The casualties for the day ending at 1500 were one (1) wounded. Fires for the period consisted of eighty-seven (87) harassing, eighteen (18) targets of opportunity, and six (6) preparation fires, making a total of one hundred eleven (111) missions. On one (1) we used two thousand seven hundred twelve (2712 rounds of ammunition. Defensive fires were adjusted in at 1652 and we harassed throughout the night and morning.

N. "D" PLUS THIRTEEN - 4 March, 1945:

We received operation orders stating that Regimental

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Combat Team Twenty-three would replace Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five on the line, using one battalion of the Twenty-third Marines and two from the Twenty-fifth Marines. There was no change in zones of action. An attack was scheduled at 0730, and we fired a fifteen (15) minute preparation for it. Regimental Combat Team Twenty-four was advancing rapidly, and we were assigned the mission of covering their exposed flank from 1034-1245. This proved to be an important factor in their advance. As of 1300, there were no changes in the regimental zone of action. There were no casualties during this period. We expended three thousand seventy-five (3075) rounds of ammunition on the following types of fires: One hundred sixty-three (163) harassing, twenty (20) targets of opportunity, four (4) preparation, and eleven (11) miscellaneous, for a total of one hundred ninety-eight (198) missions. Defensive fires for the night were light and were adjusted in at 1650 by Forward Observers. We harassed throughout the night.

O. "D" PLUS FOURTEEN - 5 March, 1945:

We reverted back to direct support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five at 0700, as specified in operation order. There was no preparation, but we registered the battalion in front of each infantry battalion on the line. This was for security reasons, as the infantry regiment's orders were to hold until units on their left came abreast. At the request of the infantry battalions, we harassed in front of their "lines" from 0945 throughout the day and used the same fires for the night. There was no change in the front lines as of 1300. There were no casualties during this period. Ammunition expended as of 1300 was eleven hundred ninety-two (1192) rounds, fired on one hundred thirty-two (132) harassing missions, six (6) targets of opportunity, one (1) preparation, and four (4) miscellaneous, for a total of one hundred forty-three (143) missions.

P. "D" PLUS FIFTEEN - 6 March, 1945:

We continued in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five, and, since they were holding in their zone of action, we were assigned to fire a preparation on Hill 362 using smoke from 0615 to 0715. This was in the Third Division's zone of action. Then at 0840 we fired a general preparation over the entire Fourth Division's zone of action. There was no change in front lines as of 1300 and no casualties in this period. The fires consisted of two hundred sixty-six (266) harassing, twenty-one (21) targets of opportunity, one (1) preparation, and seven (7) miscellaneous, making a total of two hundred ninety-five (295) missions using three thousand four hundred seventy-nine (3479) rounds of ammunition. At the infantry's request a smoke screen for the evacuation of casualties was fired at 1308, and again at 1355. We adjusted in defensive fires and prepared to harass throughout the night. At 1825 we received a Corps order stating that we were limited to fifteen hundred (1500) rounds of ammunition from 1800 this date to 1800, 7 March, 1945.

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Q. "D" PLUS SIXTEEN - 7 March, 1945:

We were still in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five during this period and at 0800 fired a neuteralization preparation in support of their attack. Fired a five (5) minute preparation for Regimental Combat Team Twenty-four at 1225, and the same for Regimental Combat Team Twenty-three at 1240. These were requested by Division via Fourteenth Marines. There was no advance reported along Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five's zone of action, as of 1500. During this period there were no casualties. The total expenditure of ammunition amounted to one thousand four hundred fifty-two (1452) rounds, and our missions were one hundred seventy-three (173) harassing, eighteen (18) targets of opportunity, seven (7) preparations, and twelve (12) miscellaneous making a total of two hundred ten (210).

Issued one hundred fifty (150) rounds of ammunition to Amptracs' at 1530. Adjusted in our defensive concentrations at 1630 and prepared to harass during the night and morning.

R. "D" PLUS SEVENTEEN - 8 March, 1945:

We remained in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five and at 0620 fired a preparation in support of an early attack. There was no change in front lines as of the 1300 report, and there were no casualties. We expended two thousand sixty-four (2064) rounds of ammunition. Our fires were one hundred eight (108) harassing, nine (9) targets of opportunity, three (3) preparation, making a total of one hundred twenty (120) missions for the period. Forward Observers registered in their defensive fires at 2007, and we prepared to harass throughout the night. It was a very quiet night.

S. "D" PLUS EIGHTEEN - 9 March, 1945:

During this period we were in support of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five less Third Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines with Second Battalion, Twenty-fourth Marines replacing them. Fourteenth Marines ordered that we fire a preparation for Regimental Combat Team Twenty-three which we complied with by firing one (1) battery from 0700 to 0748. At the same time, we fired a preparation using two (2) batteries from 0700 to 0730 in Regimental Combat Team Twenty-four's zone of action. The 1300 report failed to show any advance in Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five's zone of action. There were no casualties for this period. We fired one hundred ten (110) harassing, twenty-six (26) targets of opportunity, four (4) preparation, making a total of one hundred forty (140) missions, expending one thousand eight hundred fifty-five (1855) rounds of ammunition upon them. At 1350 we issued one hundred fifty (150) rounds of ammunition to the Amphtracs'. Forward Observers adjusted in defensive fires for the night. We harassed throughout the night.

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T. "D" PLUS NINETEEN - 10 March, 1945:

Still in support of the Regimental Combat Team Twenty-fifth Marines, the operation order for this period called for a general preparation over the entire Division's zone of action, with which we complied from 0735 to 0825. We fired targets of opportunity during the morning for both Air Spot and Forward Observers. At 0950 Air Spot was ordered to secure for the operation. By 1300 troops on the left flank had advanced five hundred (500) yards in a southeasterly direction while the center and right sectors had orders to hold. No casualties reported in 1300 reports from batteries. Our fires consisted of one hundred twenty-five (125) harassing, fifteen (15) targets of opportunity, five (5) preparation and eight (8) miscellaneous, making a total of one hundred fifty-three (153) missions in which we expended two thousand six hundred sixty-seven (2667) rounds of ammunition. We returned one thousand seven hundred eighty-five (1785) rounds of HEAT ammunition to Division upon Regiment's order.

Registered in defensive fires at 1850 and prepared to harass during the night.

U. "D" PLUS TWENTY - 11 March, 1945:

Our orders were the same as the preceding period and no preparation was fired due to the fact that zones of action were so small that it did not permit the use of artillery. At 1220, Forward Observers were ordered to return to the battalion area. At 1300 there was no change in the front lines, and no casualties during this period. We expended one hundred sixty-nine (169) rounds of ammunition in our fires, which consisted of five (5) harassing, and six (6) targets of opportunity, making a total of eleven (11) missions. There were no harassing missions for the night.

V. "D" PLUS TWENTY-ONE - 12 March, 1945:

Ordered by Fourteenth Marines to fire preparation in Fifth Division's zone of action, which we complied with by firing two hundred seventy-seven (277) rounds of ammunition. We returned all W.P. shells to Division on order of Fourteenth Marines, total amount returned one thousand forty-two (1042) rounds. There were no casualties during this period and only one (1) preparation fired.

W. "D" PLUS TWENTY-TWO - 13 March, 1945:

Received oral order from Fourteenth Marines that there would be no preparation, but to be prepared to fire on call. At 0810, given order

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to secure Fire Direction Center but leave guns in firing position. Also to secure from firing in Fifth Division's zone of action. No casualties or ammunition expended during this period.

X. "D" PLUS TWENTY-THREE - 14 March, 1945:

At 0800 given orders to start loading equipment aboard ship.

Y. "D" PLUS TWENTY-FOUR - 15 March, 1945:

At 1330 order to prepare to board ship at 1400. At 1730 embarked aboard APA-172.

Z. SUMMARY OF FIRES:

This battalion fired a total of sixty-two thousand eight hundred thirty-three (62,833) rounds during the operation. The expenditure according to types of ammunition is as follows:

TYPE	AMOUNT	PERCENT
HE, M48	31,524	50
HE, M54	19,873	31
WP, M57	7,819	13
AT, M62	3,617	6
TOTAL:	62,833	100

The expenditure according to types of fire is as follows:

TYPE	MISSIONS
Defensive and Harassing	2007
Targets of opportunity	444
Preparations	79
*Miscellaneous	80
TOTAL:	2610

* - Miscellaneous fires include registrations, marking concentrations, testing ammunition, etc.

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SECTION V. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. LOADING:

The ammunition, as loaded at Pearl Harbor, did not lend itself for maximum efficiency in unloading. It was loaded from Bow to Fantail to permit unloading by various types of fuze. This caused a mix-up of fuzes when the ammunition was piled against the bulkheads (See Diagram No. 1). In the future, it would greatly facilitate unloading if all H.E. were loaded onto the LST last (See Diagram No. 2). Ammunition should be loaded with aisle down the center of the Tank Deck, but in such a manner that when dunnage is removed it can be stacked against the bulkhead by fuze without mix-up. Piling ammunition in the center of the Tank Deck very often causes loaded DUKW's to wait until the damaged DUKW's are repaired. By piling ammunition against bulkheads, the damaged DUKW's can be maneuvered so that loaded vehicles may leave without delay.



DIAGRAM NO. 1



DIAGRAM NO. 2

B. COMMUNICATIONS:

It was found that the SCR 609-610 radio was unsuitable for an amphibious operation. Great difficulty was experienced in keeping the sets alligned. Also, because of its great weight, the Forward Observers could not give the set the care it required in handling. In addition, the long unflexible antenna was a constant menace to personnel in front line positions. It was imperative that they keep the antenna below a mask which resulted in poorer communications and the necessity, in many instances, of a relay station.

It was also found that, although we had two channels within our battalion, we were still hindered by not being able to contact other units. It is recommended that some set similiar to the "300" with variable tuning be used in the future.

C. PERSONNEL:

It is recommended that Forward Observer Teams be landed

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no sooner than the Infantry's fifth wave. Experience has shown that by the time artillery has landed and set-up, the Forward Observers have had plenty of time to locate their respective units.

D. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION:

The one (1) Carrier, M29-C provided the battalion for this operation proved invaluable. It is suggested that more be issued each unit.

E. MISCELLANEOUS:

DUKW's were constantly in need of repairs and fuel. The designated repair ship could not adequately handle the damaged vehicles. As a result, many sank for want of minor repairs or fuel. Bowser Boats could not always be found.

LST's housing DUKW's should be equipped with hoses for re-fueling the vehicles alongside, without being taken aboard. Provisions should also be made for emergency welding of DUKW's on the Tank Deck.

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APPENDIX TWO

TO

ANNEX ITEM

2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, Operation Report.

IWO JIMA

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SECTION V: Comments and Recommendations.

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Section I Planning and Preparation.

Organization:

The battalion was organized in accordance with the present tables of organization into three (3) 105MM howitzer firing batteries and a Headquarters and Service Battery. A rear echelon of one officer and 48 enlisted men was formed within the battalion and remained at the Base Camp. This battalion was assigned the mission of direct support to RCT 23, and the normal forward observer parties plus a liaison party was assigned to the RCT Headquarters. These parties traveled to the target area with their respective BLT's and with the RCT Headquarters.

The firing batteries were split into two groups for the movement to the target area. The battery executive officers and the howitzer sections of the firing batteries traveled aboard an LST with the howitzers and essential combat equipment preloaded in DUKW's. The remainder of the firing battery, officers and enlisted personnel travelled aboard the Headquarters APA of RCT 23.

Headquarters and Service Battery was also split into two groups. The battalion Commander and his staff, plus the majority of Headquarters and Service Battery personnel were aboard the Headquarters APA of RCT 23. The Battalion Executive Officer with an auxiliary staff and ordnance personnel, plus the remaining personnel of Headquarters and Service Battery, were embarked aboard the LST.

At the transfer area eight officers and one hundred and fifty (150) men from the firing batteries and Headquarters and Service Battery were transferred to the LST. In addition twenty men were transferred to the artillery regimental LST as an ammunition working party. Remaining aboard the APA were the Battalion Reconnaisance party, one hundred and six men and one officer from the batteries, and the unloading detail plus the vehicle drivers.

Planning:

Prior to leaving the base camp a regimental planning hut was established where maps, aerial photographs, and intelligence studies were made available to the Battalion Commanders, executive officers, operation officers, and intelligence officers. This material was carefully studied, and the assigned position areas were gone over in detail. The routes of approach, the nature of the beaches, and all possible obstacles that might be met were given careful attention. As the plans for the operation were made available, these were studied in detail, and the plan for the employment of the Division Artillery was formulated. The staff became thoroughly familiar with its mission, the mission and plan of the Division and that of RCT 23 in particular. All conceivable problems that might arise were discussed and, so far as possible, solutions worked out. As a result of this study a Battalion plan was formulated and was put into effect so far as conditions permitted during the rehearsal.

Training:

The Battalion had reached a high state of training prior to leaving for the Iwo Jima operation. Training had been completed in battery, battalion, and regimental firing exercises. This battalion had just recently been converted from 75MM pack howitzers to 105MM howitzers, but the personnel readily adapted themselves to the new weapons. In addition, training had been completed in small arms, local security, chemical warfare, first aid, field sanitation, and in landing operations. It was felt that the battalion was trained and ready for combat.

Rehearsal:

The Battalion participated in a rehearsal for the Iwo Jima operation on Maui Island, T.H., during the period 13 January 1945 to 17 January 1945. The battalion was landed only in the final phase of the rehearsal on 15 January 1945, where the artillery plan was put into effect.

The battalion reconnaisance party was boated at H-hour and proceeded to Baker control where it was ordered to land on beach Yellow 2 after checking in with the RCT 23 commander or Yellow control. The reconnaisance party landed at 1020 on beach Yellow 2 and proceeded to select a battalion position area and route of approach. The preloaded DUKW's were ordered launched from the LST by Baker control and were directed to land on beach Yellow 2. The firing batteries were dispatched from the line of departure by the Battalion Executive Officer at ten mimute intervals, and proceeded to the beach. The DUKW's were met by battery agents and guided to the position area. Communications were tested on the rehearsal and found to be satisfactory. The battalion remained in position overnight and reembarked the following morning.

The plan as executed followed in detail that drawn up prior to the rehearsal, and no difficulties were encountered.

Section II: Movement to the Objective.

Rehabilitation:

Following the rehearsal the battalion underwent a rehabilitation period at Pearl Harbor, T.H., from 18 January 1945 to 27 January 1945, with the exception of the personnel aboard the LST who were at Kaneohe Bay from 18 January 1945 to 22 January 1945 for the same purpose. During this period the officers aboard the LST were briefed for the Iwo Jima operation by the artillery regimental staff and a similar conference was held in Pearl Harbor for the battalion staffs aboard the Artillery Headquarters APA. Other conferences were also held during this period by the Regimental Commander.

While at the rehabilitation area liberty was granted to the troops, and organized recreation parties conducted for troops not on liberty.

Shortages of clothing and individual equipment were drawn while at Pearl Harbor, and the battalion sailed for the target area well equipped.

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Upon leaving the rehabilitation area daily briefing was held for all troops and officers. These conferences began with the overall plans being presented by various staff members to all personnel of the battalion. The briefing was then broken down to battery discussion and then to section discussion. Every attempt was made to assure every individual's knowledge of the minutest details of the operation. Each individual was thoroughly briefed as to his own job. (what he was to do, where he was to go, how he was to get there, and what he was to do when he arrived there.) Each man was also thoroughly briefed as to his sections mission, his battery's mission, and his battalion's mission. All available maps and photographs were used extensively in these briefings, and these same maps and photographs were available for individual use at all times. A set of maps and photos was also displayed on the bulkhead in the troop compartment. All artillery officers embarked aboard the APA attended daily conferences conducted by the RCT 23 staff and thus became familiar with the infantry's plans.

The battalion staff had access to the late aerial photographs received by the RCT, and these were of great advantage in preselecting base points and check points.

In addition to the briefing, classes were held in local security, care and use of individual weapons, anti parachute attack proceedure, system for marking of mine fields, first aid, and chemical warfare. Also, daily periods of physical drill and weapons and equipment inspection were conducted.

Foreward Area Rehearsal:

The only participation by this battalion in the rehearsal conducted at the forward area was to boat the battalion reconnaissance party, proceed to the line of departure and return to the ship. The forward observer parties and liaison parties were also boated but did not land.

During this period a conference was held with the forward observers and liaison personnel to go over all plans for the landing and to identify preselected base points and check points on the lates aerial photographs. A conference was also held aboard the LST where the final plans for the operation were coordinated.

Communications were again checked at this time and found to be satisfactory.

Section III: Ship to shore movement.

Tactical plan for landing:

The following tactical plan was devised for landing this battalion.

The forward observers were to land with their respective BLT's, one party landing with the reserve company and the other party plus the liaison personnel with the Battalion Commander. The Battalion liaison

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party was to land with the headquarters group of the RCT. Accompanying the battalion liaison officer was a group consisting of a Fire Direction team and survey personnel whose mission was to survey in a position for the tanks and conduct fire on defensive fire missions in the event the artillery did not land on D-day.

The battalion reconaissance party (consisting of Bn-6, Bn-2, Bn-3, Bn-4, Ass't Bn-3, CommO, 3 firing battery commanders, each with one agent, Sergeant Major, Operation Sergeant, Wire Chief, Radio Chief, Survey Chief, Intelligence NCO, 3 CP's, 6 Survey personnel, one corpsman, and 4 BAR men.) was to be boated at H-hour and proceed to Baker control reportihg to the Artillery Regimental Commander. The reconnaissance party was to be ordered ashore via yellow control when the preselected position area had been cleared of the enemy by the infantry. This party was to reconnoiter the beach, locating routes of approach to the position area, pick battery positions, and CP location, start initial occupation of position, institute survey, and guide the remainder of the battalion to the position area. This party was also to report to the Artillery Regimental Commander and RCT 23 Commander if a route of approach was available, condition of position area, and recommend time of landing for remainder of the battalion.

The firing battery personnel and equipment preloaded aboard DUKW's on the LST were to be prepared to launch at H+60, on order, and to proceed to the line of departure reporting in to yellow control for orders to land.

The batteries were to be dispatched from the line of departure by the Battalion Executive Officer at ten minute intervals with Headquarters and Service Battery landing last. The remainder of the Headquarters and Service Battery and firing battery personnel aboard the APA (with the exception of the working party and vehicle drivers) were to boat at H+30 in two (2) LCM's (each containing 1 bulldozer and 1 water trailer) and three (3) LCVP's, proceed to the battalion's LST where they would join the DUKW's and accompany them ashore. The two LCM's were to leave the line of departure ahead of the DUKW's so as to make available the bulldozers for whatever pioneer work might be necessary on the beach. The LCVP's were to land with the firing battery DUKW's.

Vehicle drivers were to land with their vehicles when ordered, and the working party was to land with the battalion equipment as it was unloaded.

The remainder of the personnel aboard the LST were to be landed on subsequent trips of the DUKW's.

Control Plan:

The landing of the artillery was to be controlled in accordance with the following plan. The Battalion Commander and his reconnaissance party were ordered to land by the Artillery Regimental Commander, with [illegible] instructions to report to Yellow control before proceeding to the beach.

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The [illegible] party was to report to RCT 23 Commander and the [illegible]rtillery Regimental Commander when conditions were satisfactory to land the DUKW's. The DUKW's were to be launched on order of Baker control. (Artillery Commander aboard) The Artillery Regimental Commander was to order the DUKW's to land through Yellow control (RCT 23 Commander aboard) The actual landing of the DUKW's was controlled by the Battalion Executive Officer. The two LCM's and the three LCVP's were in the charge of an [illegible] officer aboard one of the LCM's, and landed under the control of the Battalion Executive Officer.

Intra battalion control was maintained by SCR-610 radio during the ship to shore movement. During the ship to shore movement, contact with the artillery regiment was also maintained by SCR-610 radio. Contact was also maintained with RCT 23 by means of one SCR-300 radio with the Battalion Commander. SCR-536 radios were carried as a secondary means of communication in the event of failure of the battalion SCR-610 set. One SCR-610 was carried by the Battalion Commander and was on the artillery regimental net and also on the Battalion Commander net. The Battalion Executive Officer also had an SCR-610 on the artillery regiment net and on the Battalion Command net. Each Battery Executive Officer (who was in charge of the firing battery's DUKW's) had an SCR-610 on the Battalion Command net. The officer in charge of the two LCM's and three LCVP's had an SCR-610 on the Battalion Command net. There was an SCR-808 set up on the APA on the Battalion Command net, and the DUKW platoon maintained contact with the LST by means of SCR-610 radio (one on the beach and one on the LST).

Description of landing:

Debarkation of troops from APA's proceeded according to plan. The forward observer parties and liaison parties landed with their infantry units as planned. The LCM and LCVP personnel boated at 0830 and proceeded to the LST where they reported to the Battalion Executive Officer. The reconnaissance party boated at 0922 and proceeded to Baker control boat and reported to the Artillery Regimental Commander. At 1254 the reconnaissance party was ordered to land on Yellow Beach 1 checking in at Yellow control. The reconnaissance party arrived at Yellow control at 1324 and departed for the beach at 1328. At 1342 the reconnaissance party landed on Yellow Beach 1.

The situation on landing of the reconnaissance party was as follows: The infantry had not advanced beyond our preselected position area, the reserve infantry battalion was in the process of landing, no route off the beach had been cut through the terraces, there were vehicles on the beach that had bogged down in the soft sand, the nature of the beach and the high terraces made the movement of DUKW's inland doubtful, the beach was under heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. As a result of the above no inland reconnaissance was made at this time, and it was recommended that the landing of the artillery be delayed until conditions improved.

At 1415 the DUKW's were ordered to disembark and to proceed to Yellow control. At 1500 all DUKW's were launched and proceeded to Yellow [illegible] with the two LCM's and the three LCVP's. At 1530 the DUKW's were

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ordered to land on Yellow Beach 1.

When the DUKW's were ordered to land, the reconnaissance party selected positions for the firing batteries on the first terrace and for the command post, as further inland progress of the DUKW's was not feasable at this time. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was still heavy and machine gun fire on the beach was sporadic.

1700 the two LCM's landed on Yellow Beach 1.
1730 "D" Battery DUKW's and LCVP arrived at Yellow Beach 1.
1745 "E" Battery DUKW's and LCVP arrived at Yellow Beach 1.
1810 "F" Battery DUKW's and LCVP arrived at Yellow Beach 1.
2125 H&S Battery DUKW's and LVT4's arrived at Yellow Beach 1.
2245 the last DUKW landed on Yellow Beach 1.

From the time of the first DUKW's arrival on the beach at 1730 until the landing of the last DUKW at 2245 considerable difficulty was encountered in landing the DUKW's. Only one DUKW was able to land at a time due to the condition of the surf and beach, and it was necessary to pull each DUKW ashore with a bulldozer. Enemy artillery and mortar fire also slowed up the operation. No DUKW's were hit by enemy fire, but some personnel casualties were suffered due to near misses. There was also a Condition Red during the landing and all DUKW's still afloat were ordered to the line of departure. Due to the conditions of the beach it was necessary for several DUKW's to make two or three runs to the beach before they were able to reach dry land.

Ten howitzers wer in position, laid, and ready to fire, and registration completed by 2130. The two remaining howitzers were ashore by 2245.

Section IV: Narrative of operation.

This battalion in direct support of RCT 23, was registered in position on the right flank of Yellow Beach 1, and ready to fire by 2130 on D-night. The battalion fired in the RCT zone of action during the first night and continued at this mission firing harrassing fire, call missions, (both unobserved and missions observed by forward observers and air spot) defensive fires, preparation fires, and registration fires until the morning of 22 February when the 21st Marines passed through the 23rd Marines. The battalion's mission was then changed to direct support of the 21st Marines.

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continued in direct support of the 21st Marines from the morning of 22 February until the morning of 26 February when the battalion reverted back to direct support of RCT 23. During this period forward observers from the 12th Marines fired the battalion on targets of opportunity, preparation fires, defensive fires, harrassing fires, and base point registrations. Air spot also fired missions on targets of opportunity. From the morning of 26 February until 1 March the battalion was in direct support of RCT 23 and carried out its mission in the RCT zone of action. Air spot missions were also fired.

On 1 March RCT 23 reverted to Division reserve and this battalion was assigned the mission of general support, reinforcing the fires of the 3rd Battalion, 14th Marines. From 1 March until 6 March the battalion fired general support missions for air spot and reinforcing missions for 3rd Battalion forward observers and unobserved missions assigned by the 3rd Battalion, 14th Marines.

On 6 March RCT 23 was again placed in assault and the battalion reverted back to direct support of the RCT. From 6 March until the morning of 11 March when RCT 23 reach the ocean in their zone of action this battalion fired observed and unobserved missions for the forward observers, harrassing fires, defensive fires, preparation fires, and missions for air spot.

When RCT 23 reached the ocean the battalion was withdrawn from direct support and placed in general support of the 5th Marine Division. From 11 March to 13 March the battalion continued in general support of the 5th Marine Division and fired preparation fires and harrassing fires in the 5th Marine Division zone of action.

Survey:

Prior to the loading a detailed plan of survey was formulated. It was planned to run a position area survey, tying it in with the map by the use of preselected control points. From the map aerial photographs of the battalion's position area and zone of action, control points were selected that could be readily identified on the map and on the ground. One control point was selected in the vicinity of the battalion's preselected position area as an initial point and other control points were selected that could be seen from the initial point as a means of establishing direction. A series of possible base points were selected and the battalion was to be registered by forward observers or air observers on any of the preselected base points or any point in the battalions zone of action identifiable on the map and on the ground. A map K would thus be obtained and by laying the batteries on the base point as a result of registration, the map errors in deflection would be corrected. Later, when metro data was available, a K-change and deflection change could be determined thus increasing the accuracy of unobserved fires.

Since the battalion did not occupy its preselected position, and since no control points were available in or around the vicinity of the position occupied, the above plan was not put into effect. The tactical situation [illegible] possibility of taking control from one of the preselected

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control points. As a result, the battery positions were located on the map by inspection, an orienting line established, and stations set up for a high burst adjustment. One station was inspected on the map directly in rear of the number two piece of the registering battery and the other station surveyed in. The high burst registration was fired, and the other two batteries laid by target offset. Registration on an identifiable base point was not possible due to lack of observation by the observers.

Little firing was done D-night due to lack of activity in the zone of action. However, the forward observers had limited observation to their front and conducted some fire missions with satisfactory results.

On the morning of 20 February the coordinates of the two beached enemy ships were taken from the intelligence map, and a more accurate position area survey was run. Registration was also completed on an identifiable base point. When control was brought to the battalion area by the regimental survey team it was found that the second survey was out forty yards in the lateral location of the battery positions.

The 1:20,000 map was used as the firing chart.

Fire adjustment:

Adjustment of fire on targets was conducted by forward observers and air observers using standard forward observer methods. In some cases, due to lack of observation, forward observers adjusted fire by sound. In addition some counter battery fire was adjusted by the sound ranging unit. No O.P. methods were used. However, precision fires were adjusted on point targets using forward observer methods with satisfactory results.

In general, observation was poor, and considerable unobserved fire was delivered on suspected mortar, artillery, and rocket positions with the forward observers exercising general surveilance where possible.

Fire direction:

The Fire Direction Center was established on D-day and functioned throughout the operation using standard Marine Corps procedure so far as possible. The battalion was used in fire for effect on the majority of targets. Center right was used as the normal method of fire for adjustment. In precision fire single pieces were used for adjustment and fire for effect on point targets. At times two missions were conducted simultaneously using one and two batteries in effect in accordance with the nature of the targets.

Defensive fires were registered by the forward observers using the battalion for effect when called. The defensive concentrations were also used by the forward observers as a point from which to shift fires throughout the night thereby giving complete coverage to their fromt.

Data for harrassing fires and preparation fires were prepared in advance and sent to the batteries.

Reinforcing batteries were utilized in all types of fires.

Metro data was available and used. However the V change was often so small as to be negligable.

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[redacted] situation was such that only a few changes in the base [redacted], and frequent reregistration was accomplished.

The 1:20,000 map used as a firing chart was generally satisfactory. However errors appeared in topographical features in the north eastern portion of the island resulting in faulty vertical control.

Enemy action against our artillery.

On D-day and D-night enemy mortar and artillery fire was very heavy on the beach. However it is doubtful if the enemy knew that they were shelling artillery positions. Their fire seemed to cover the beach systematically with the intention of searching out any Blue troops or positions.

After the battalion had opened fire it did receive counter battery fire in varying degrees of intensity. Around noon of D+1sl the battalion position area underwent a heavy shelling. In a space of ten minutes 138 rounds were counted falling in the immediate vicinity of the command post. This shelling continued for the better part of an hour and a half with the first half hour being the most intense. This seemed to be the height of enemy artillery action in the battalion area. From this time on there was a noticeable decline in enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket fire in this area. Fire still fell in the area, sporadically, day and night, but most of the fire was directed against landing craft that were beaching to unload supplies.

All possible methods available were used in attempts to locate and destroy enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket launchers. Forward observers adjusted fire on known or suspected positions. Air spot did the same. Missions were fired for sound and flash ranging teams of the regiment. At times individual pieces were called out to fire direct fire on flashes that could be seen directly from the howitzer positions, and on one occassio one battery was called out to fire direct fire at enemy guns shelling our position, the flashes of which could be observed. The ensuing artillery duel resulted in the silencing of the enemy guns.

The results of the majority of our counter battery fire were not fully known. Forward observers credited the battalion with destroying several gun positions, mortar positions, and rocket launchers. But, since most of the enemy positions were located in caves, pillboxes or blockhouses, destruction was difficult. However, neutrilization was effected and enemy fire was reduced.

The enemy also used his old trick of dropping mortar fire into our front lines during our artillery barrages, but the infantry was aware of this trick and it was not too effective. Only slight time fire was encountered by this battalion, and the enemy did not mass any great quantities of artillery fire. The enemy's plan of fire, other than on front line units, appeared to be to cover preselected areas with individual pieces and batteries, thickening their fires with mortars and rockets. [redacted] fire seemed to be prearranged on previously surveyed areas

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however there was some fire, especially by one or two guns that fired on boats and artillery positions, that was obviously observed and adjusted.

The enemy fire was surprisingly ineffective. This seemed to be due to several reasons. One of the contributing factors was the nature of the soil which was loose sand. This prevented ideal fragmentation, and instead of the fragmentation being flat it was thrown into the air, thus preventing many casualties. It took a direct hit or a near miss to cause personnel casualties in even the shallowest of foxholes.

Several of the individual gun pits suffered direct hits or near misses that caused but little damage and very low casualties to personnel. The howitzers suffered little damage from shelling. At no time during the operation was any howitzer called out of action because of damage from enemy shelling except for the short time required by the gun crews to effect repairs to the gun pit or minor damage to the howitzer.

Effectiveness of our Artillery:

The effect of our artillery fire against enemy artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers varied with the emplacements used by the enemy. Open positions offered no problems and were destroyed whenever located and fire could be observed. Positions in caves, pillboxes and blockhouses could be generally neutralized. In a few isolated cases direct hits using fuze delay were observed to severely damage pollboxes and blockhouses.

Fire placed on enemy troops proved to be very effective and in at least two instances the battalion was responsible for breaking up counter attacks before they could be effectively launched.

Artillery fire against tanks also proved effective. No reports have been received that the fire of this battalion was observed to have destroyed enemy tanks. However, the artillery did keep enemy troops from moving in the open with tanks, thus forcing the tanks to withdraw. Some tanks probably were destroyed or at least heavily damaged by artillery fire.

Time fire placed upon enemy troops in the open and in open emplacements also proved very effective, and was used whenever possible.

Smoke was used extensively in adjustment as a means of aiding the observation of the observers. Smoke was also used to screen the evacuation of casualties and the straightening of infantry lines.

Communications:

Message Center:

Functioned satisfactorily on this operation.

Radio:

TBX - Three sets were carried on this operation but situations requiring their use did not arise.

TCS - This set performed in a highly satisfactory manner for air-ground communications.

[redacted]

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SCR 193 - Proved to be dependable set and was used where the tactical situation permitted the operation of the jeep.

SCR 610 - Considerable difficulty was experienced with this radio as a means of communication for the forward observers. The disadvantages of this set for this type of operation are:

1. It is a two man load, and if one man is seperated from the team the set is useless. The SCR 610 is too heavy to be made into a one man load.
2. The antenna when fully extended, due to its size, draws considerable enemy fire thus interfering with fire missions. If the antenna is not fully extended the working range is greatly reduced.
3. When the set is being moved about over rough terrain, the tuning adjustments are moved, thus setting it off frequency.
4. No communication is available with this set when the forward observer is moving on foot. Occasionally serious delays in fire missions were caused by the time required in setting up the radio.
5. The short life of the batteries and fuses also work to disadvantage on this set as a forward observer radio.

Telephone:

In this operation telephone communication was the outstanding feature of this battalion's ability to deliver fire at all times. A forward switchboard was maintained at the RCT23 command post continuously. Two trunk lines were overheaded to the forward boards facilitating two channels for fire commands coming from forward observers to the FDC. In the event our trunk lines were knocked out a lateral line was laid between our forward board and the RCT 23 board. This lateral guaranteed a means for carrying on fire missions. From the forward board lines were laid to our battalion liaison officers and the forward observers. Whenever possible the FO lines were laid through the battery liaison officers position where the liaison officers were partied in enabling them to monitor any fire mission from their forward observers. If the line to the forward observers could not be advantageously laid through the liaison officers position, a separate line was laid to him from the forward board where he was made a party to all his forward observer's calls. In addition to this net each night all the forward observers were tied in by lateral lines which was advantageous during mortar barrages or when the enemy cut our lines. At night all our forward observers were cross plugged at the forward board so each forward observer would know what the other one was doing during the night. It also was a good means of checking fire missions.

At all times our radio with the liaison officer at RCT 23 maintained a 24 hour watch. All forward observers were instructed to come up on their SCR 610's when wire communications went out.

Our forward board and wire lines were an aid to the infantry and their lines aided us as well. The infantry battalion laid locals to our liaison officers who could always contact their forward observers if necessary through the infantry phone. To keep up with the reserve battalions when they moved forward, a line was laid to the rest area. When about to move, [illegible] the battalion, went to their new position, laid line

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[illegible] board with W-130; then it was relaid with W-110 to both liaison officers and the forward observers.

We also maintained a supply dump of signal gear at our forward board for both radio and wire work.

Telegraph:

Not used on this operation.

Air Warning:

Completely satisfactory.

Signal Supply:

Satisfactory.

Signal Repair:

Initially all signal repair was carried on within the battalion, and satisfactory results obtained. Whenever possible this plan was preferred as it reduced the time that equipment was out of action.

Intelligence:

The following maps and photographs were supplied to this battalion prior to departure from the rehabilitation area:

1/20,000 w/grid	40
1/20,000 w/o grid	6
1/10,000 w/grid	32
1/5,000 w/grid	10
1/5,000 w/o grid	4
1/5,000 Assault map	26
1/10,000 Mosaic	35
1/20,000 Mosaic	21
1/10,000 Situation G-2 map	6
H.O. Chart	1
1/10,000 Beach map "A"	1
Map - 2 inches= 1 nautical mile	4
1/10,000 East Beaches	1
1/10,000 West Beaches	1
Beach Diagram East	1
Beach Diagram West	1
Beach profile	1
1/7,000 Mosaic	1
Oblique "Blowups"	3

In addition to the above, all photographs and maps received by the RCT 23 aboard ship were made available to the battalion enroute to the target.

All maps and photographs were used for briefing with the exception of the H.O. Chart and Nautical map. The 1/5,000 gridded map proved exceptionally useful for briefing large groups. The 1/20,000 maps were used for survey and as firing charts by the Fire Direction Center and

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Battery firing charts. The 1/10,000 maps were used by the Forward Observers Liaison Officers, Operation Sergeants and Intelligence Section.

The photos that were made available to the forward observers and liaison officers during the operation were not sufficient.

The 1/20,000 and 1/10,000 maps of Iwo Jima were inaccurate in certain portions, especially in the northern portion of the island. That part of the map could not be used for firing by the forward observers except in conjunction with aerial photos due to the inaccuracy of topographical features.

The supply of maps issued was not sufficient. The 1/10,000 type should be increased to 42 instead of 32. The 1/20,000 type increased to 60 instead of 40.

Only one set of photos was received after D-day by the battalion. This set was received late in the operation and was not of particular value in locating targets for unobserved fire. One map was received after D-day, the G-2 reproduced enemy map, and was used in conjunction with the situation map.

Ammunition Supply:

The initial supply of ammunition was preloaded in the DUKW's. The total amount of ammunition landed with the first trip of DUKW's was 456 rounds of H.E. Resupply of ammunition was by the battalion DUKW's unloading from the LST and by Regimental DUKW's unloading from the Regimental LST. No ammunition was received during the night of D-day. However, four LVT4's were loaded but landed on the wrong beach and did not arrive at the position until dawn of Dolusl. By noon of Dolusl, 1112 additional rounds had been received. From the afternoon of Dolusl until the initial supply of seven units of fire had been unloaded, the ammunition supply was satisfactory, but at no time during the heat of the operation was a reserve built up. The resupply of ammunition was extremely slow in being landed. The delay appeared to be in the ship to shore movement, as once the ammunition was on the beach it was rapidly distributed. During the latter period, the ammunition reached dangerously low levels. Toward the end of the operation the supply increased and it was only at this time that the battalion had a reserve supply on hand.

Ammunition expended by type of fuze:
M-54.....19,469 rounds
M-48.....14,376 rounds
M-57..... 2,760 rounds
Total Expended: 36,605 rounds.

Ammunition expended by type of missions:
Preparation.....15,987 rounds.....290 missions
Targets of opportunity 7,079 rounds.....247 missions
Defensive fire.....1,867 rounds..... 79 missions
Registration..... 590 rounds..... 58 missions

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Unobserved and Harrassing fires..4,554 rounds.....828 missions
Counter battery.....5,528 rounds.....258 missions
Total 30,605 rounds.....1767 missions

No problems of storage of ammunition were encountered.

No changes are recommended for the unit of fire in view of the new unit of fire which appears to be entirely satisfactory.

Supply:

All types of mounting out supplies were adequate. The resupply of all classes of supplies was adequate. However, the rate of resupply of 105mm howitzer ammunition was not satisfactory.

Except for the resupply of ammunition, the battalion had no supply problems. In general, supply on this operation was extremely satisfactory.

Ordnance:

Twelve 105mm howitzers were used for a period of twenty three days. No howitzers were lost during the operation. It was necessary to replace one tube as the lands and grooves sheared out eight inches from the forcing cone at six o' clock. The tube was replaced by the Division Ordnance, and the howitzer was out of action for approximately one hour. The lower purging plug on one howitzer was replaced, and the piece was out of action one half hour. Five sights were replaced due to dampness.

One howitzer was observed to fire continuously three hundred yards short. A "K" was applied to the sight to correct for this error, and the piece was examined by Division Ordnance with no defects observed.

The battalion's howitzers stood up exceptionally well throughout the operation, and one reason for the lack of malfunction was the fact that low charges were used.

Spare parts and accessories were adequate.

Motor Transportation:

The battalion carried nine 1/4 ton 4x4 trucks (radio equipped), two 1/4 ton 4x4 cargo trucks, two 1 ton 4x4 trucks, two TD-9 tractors with angle dozers, one carrier M-29, two water trailers, and one 1/4 tone 4x4 ambulance. One TD-9 tractor received a direct artillery hit and was rendered unserviceable.

The attached DUKW's were used for moving supplies.

No motor transportation problems were encountered on this operation.

Administration:

The method used during this operation for reporting casualties and [illegible] of casualty cards in reporting KIA and WIA proved to be satisfactory

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No administration problems were encountered.

The morale of the troops of this battalion was at a high level throughout the operation. The landing and occupation of position was accomplished under the most difficult of conditions, but all hands carried out their assigned jobs with determination and ability. At no time and under no conditions was there a slacking in the will of the troops to deliver the maximum amount of supporting fire to the infantry with speed and accuracy.

As an aid to maintaining morale the troops were kept informed of the situation, and the nature of targets fired on, and the results obtained were passed down to the howitzer sections. The early landing of ten-in-one rations and the new type C-rations also aided the morale of the troops.

Training Deficiencies:

No training deficiencies were encountered on the operation with the exception of the fact that the battalion has several officers that are not artillery school graduates. Time permitted training these officers only in forward observers and liaison duties. The performance of duty of these officers as forward observers and liaison officers was entirely satisfactory.

Personnel:

The only personnel problem encountered on this operation was in keeping the forward observer and liaison parties up to strength due to casualties.

Loading:

The battalion's equipment was combat loaded aboard three ships, the LST, the headquarters APA of RCT 23 and the RCT 23 AKA. All essential combat equipment, three units of fire of artillery ammunition, two units of fire of small arms ammunition, and an initial supply of water and rations were loaded aboard the LST. General cargo equipment such as chemical warfare and camp equipment plus vehicles were loaded aboard the APA. Three units of fire of artillery ammunition plus vehicles were loaded aboard the AKA. One unit of fire of the battalion's initial supply of seven units was loaded aboard the artillery regimental LST. In addition, one half unit of fire of 75mm pack howitzer ammunition was loaded aboard the battalion's LST.

The battalion had attached for this operation eighteen DUKW's and two LVT4's which were carried aboard the LST. Five DUKW's were assigned to each firing battery and were preloaded with the howitzers, ammunition, and essential equipment. Two DUKW's were assigned to H&S Battery and were preloaded with essential equipment. One DUKW was equipped as a maintainence DUKW and was of no use in unloading supplies or equipment. The two LVT4's were assigned to H&S Battery and were preloaded with one 1/4-ton 4x4 truck (radio) each, plus essential equipment.

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The combat loading of this battalion proved to be satisfactory, and the priority of unloading assigned the vehicles was satisfactory. The two TD-9 tractors with angle dozer were made available for unloading by H plus 30 which made the subsequent landing of the DUKW's possible.

Transport Quartermaster:

The battalion's transport quartermaster worked in conjunction with the RCT 23 transport quartermaster and the following report covers the broad scheme.

Loadings:

(1) APA: The total time required to load the RCT plus supporting units involved 34 hours. One major delay was encountered in #4 hold due to ship's regulations, which required the reloading of gasoline drums comprising approximately one half of the cargo space in that hold. This reloading necessitated the altering of the organizational gear distribution for that hold. This delay involved about 2 hours. Otherwise loading went according to plan and was very efficient.

(2) LST: Loading of this ship consumed 12 hours. The only difficulty encountered was the method of loading ammunition. The 105mm ammunition was loaded behind 75mm ammunition which made the 105mm ammunition difficult to unload until the 75mm ammunition was cleared from the ship.

Unloading:

(1) APA: The time involved to unload RCT plus supporting units consumed a total of 221 hours. High priority cargo was unloaded according to schedule and dispatched to the beach control boat. High priority unloading consumed 3 days and involved approximately 26 working hours. Delays encountered during this unloading were due to air raid alarms and the ship retiring at night. After the high priority gear was dispatched, general unloading did not begin until Dplus7 and was accomplished by Dplus9. The delay between Dplu2 and Dplus7 was a result of waiting for the general unloading order to be given by higher echelon. Any delay from Dplu7 to Dplu9 was from the unavailibility of landing ships. Total working hours consumed for general unloading consumed approximately 30 hours.

(2) LST: The time involved to unload the LST consumed 30 hours. One major delay was for 12 hours due to a mechanical defficiency in the ship's ramp and doors. Other delays were due to the lack of DUKW's (due to operational casualties, and the retirement of the ship during raids).

Difficulties encountered in unloading were largely due to weather and beach conditions. The majority of the time, craft smaller than an LCM would not be accepted at the beach. During air raids the ship did not have sufficient personnel to man both their general quarters stations and their unloading stations. Due to rough weather and beach conditions only landing ships and LCE's were being used for unloading and there was a decided shortage of this type of craft. If possible more LCT's and [illegible] be available for the AKA's and the APA's for unloading their gear.

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Standard APA rigging, slings and nets were used, all of which were adequate. No changes are suggested.

SECTION V: Comments and Recommendations.

The chief problems encountered by this battalion on operation were the direct result of the peculiar nature of the island itself, and the majority of comments made elsewhere in this report are of value only in so far as operations of this particular nature are concerned. The exceptionally long period of time required to land the DUKW's was due chiefly to the nature of the beach and the fact that no pioneering work had been done on the beaches or terraces prior to the landing of the battalion. The battalion's angle dozers proved invaluable in beaching the DUKW's and it is essential that for any future operations of this type that the full TBA allowance of angle dozers be landed ahead of the firing batteries.

The SCR 610 radio did not prove to be too satisfactory for use by the forward observers on this particular operation. However, in an operation where the tactical situation permits, the use by the forward observer of the SCR 610 mounted in a 1/4 ton 4x4 truck, it should prove to be a satisfactory set. Where the SCR 610 mounted in a vehicle is used, the SCR 536 would be advantageous for communication between the forward observer and his radio station.

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APPENDIX THREE

TO

ANNEX ITEM

3rd Battalion, 14th Marines, Operation Report,

IWO JIMA

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APPENDIX THREE

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Section I - Planning and Preparation.

Organization.

At the time of the Iwo Jima operation this Battalion was organized, in accordance with the T/O, into three Firing Batteries and a Headquarters and Service Battery. The only change from the T/O made by the Battalion was the grouping of machine gun and Engineer personnel of all the Batteries into a Battalion Security Platoon in order to insure coordinated all-round security.

For the purpose of the operation itself the Battalion was divided into tactical groups. The Battalion Commander selected a reconnaissance party from the Staff and firing batteries. The party included the Bn-2, Bn-3 with Operations Sergeant, Survey Officer with Survey Team, Communications Officer with two radio teams, Security Officer with BAR men and engineer personnel, and the three Firing Battery Commanders with their agents. Forward Observer parties were detailed, two to each infantry battalion of the Twenty-fourth Marine Regiment, to which the Battalion was to give direct artillery support. These forward observers were to be employed as the Battalion Commander of infantry dictated. A liaison party was detailed from the Battalion to the supported Regiment. The remainder of the Battalion was split into two groups, an LST group and a Transport group.

Since the Howitzers of the Battalion were preloaded in DUKW'S loaded aboard the LST, the LST group was composed largely of firing battery personnel and such headquarters personnel as were necessary to the massing of fires of the battalion. The Battalion Executive Officer was placed in command of this group. The transport group consisted of all other personnel of the Battalion, less a rear echelon of one officer and 49 men left at the Base Camp. Nine Officers and one hundred fifty men were transferred from the Transport Group to the LST at the forward staging area. An additional twenty men were transferred at this time to the Regimental ammunition LST for unloading howitzer ammunition.

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Plans and Training.

The Battalion began to plan and train for the Iwo Jima operation in early November, 1944 on receipt of Division Operations Order 4A-44 (Training). The Battalion in problems with the Battalions of the Twenty-fourth Marines immediately set to work to prepare itself for operation in completely bare terrain, and to develop a system of close liaison with infantry battalions.

It was decided that Battery Commanders should act as liaison officers to the infantry Battalion Commanders, thus providing for a third artillery party with each infantry battalion.

In amphibious exercises the battalion undertook additional work on the technique of DUKW control in the Ship to Shore movement.

Division CPX's provided opportunity for testing liaison agencies, and establishing a communication plan with the newly received SCR 610 and 808 radios.

With the establishment of the Regimental Planning Hut, open to the Battalion Commander, the Battalion Executive Officer, the Battalion 2, and the Battalion 3, plans and training, specifically for the Iwo Jima operation, went hand in hand.

Excellent photographic coverage made possible an early estimate of the terrain difficulties, presented by the beach, craters, and terraces.

By the loading date the Battalion had attained a high state of training for this specific operation. The early promulgation of orders was a definite aid in this respect.

Loading.

Battalion loading commenced on 31 December, 1944 with the loading of ammunition aboard the LST at Pearl Harbor under supervision on the Battalion Ordnance Officer. This was complete by 1 January, 1945. On 2 January, 1945 loading of vehicles and gear on board transports commenced under supervision of the Battalion T.Q.M. This was complete by the afternoon of 3 January, 1945 when Forward Observer Parties, The Battalion Liaision Party, The Battalion Reconnaissance Party and personnel of the Transport Group embarked on their respective transports: Battalion Headquarters aboard PA 206,

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the remainder of the Transport Group aboard PA 118. Battalion loading was completed when on 10 January, 1945, under supervision of the Battalion Executive Officer, DUKWS with preloaded howitzers were loaded aboard the LST 1031 at Maui, T.H., and personnel on the LST Group embarked on the LST 1031.

At this time an additional 1800 rounds of 75mm Pack Howitzer ammunition, and 20 rounds of 105mm yellow smoke were loaded on the LST, plus small arms ammunition, concertinas, and some additional water in five gallon cans.

Rehearsal.

From 13 January, 1945 to 17 January, 1945 the Battalion participated in a rehearsal in Maalea Bay, Maui, T.H. On 13, 14, and 17, January, 1945 Forward Observer parties participated in small boat exercises with the companies of the Twenty-fourth Marines. On 15 January, 1945 the Reconnaissance Party and sixteen DUKWS were disembarked and landed on Yellow 2 Beach.

Forward Observer Parties landed with their units. The Reconnaissance Party proceeded to Baker Control and on order of the Regimental Commander proceeded on to the beach. A reconnaissance for position was made, positions selected and agents posted on the beach to guide the DUKWS into position. On order the DUKWS were launched, and after clearing Baker and Yellow control's proceeded to the beach by batteries at ten minute intervals.

Control by the SCR 610 radios was good. The batteries landed and were guided to the position area where they spent the night. On the following day the Reconnaissance Party and Batteries reembarked aboard their ships. Due to the fact that conditions were limited during the rehearsal-all DUKWS were not launched, beach and terrain conditions were dissimilar to those of the objective - the value of the rehearsal to the Battalion was limited. The most valuable feature was the additional opportunity to test and practice DUKW control.

Section II - Movement to Objective.

Rehabilitation.

Following the rehearsal in Maalea Bay there was a period of rehabilitation on Oahu, T.H. for all personnel going into the operation.

Personnel embarked aboard transports had 25% liberty and 50% of personnel not on liberty went ashore in organized recreation parties.

Personnel of the Battalion embarked aboard the LST were not able to take advantage of this. A broken bearing on the LST 1031 on which they were embarked necessitated complete unloading and reloading aboard LST 648. This was accomplished 20, 21 January, 1945. The LST sailed from Honolulu 22 January, 1945. The Transport group sailed from Pearl Harbor 27 January, 1945.

Shipboard Training.

In transit to Iwo Jima all troops were thoroughly briefed on the nature of the target, the overall plan, and their specific duties in enabling this Battalion to perform its mission.

They were also kept informed when late intelligence reports and photographs were received aboard ship. In addition, section drill, physical drill, and weapon and clothing inspections were conducted.

Forward Area Rehearsal.

Upon arriving at the forward area and after designated personnel had been transferred from the transports to the LST, the Battalion took part to a limited extent in the final rehearsal. Forward Observer parties and the Battalion Liaison party took part in small boat exercises. The Battalion Reconnaissance Party disembarked in an LCVP and proceeded to Baker Control. All communications functioned satisfactorily.

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Section III - Ship to Shore Movement.

Tactical Plan.

The Battalion was organized to land tactically as a direct support battalion. Forward Observer parties landed with companies of the Twenty-fourth Marines. The Battalion Liaison Party landed with Regimental Headquarters, Twenty-fourth Marines. Firing Battery Commanders landed with the Reconnaissance Party of the Battalion, in order to supervise the emplacement of their batteries. They were to report as liaison officers to Battalion Commanders of the Twenty-fourth Marines when those battalions were committed.

The Battalion Reconnaissance Party was to boat up at H-hour, reach Baker control by H plus 1 hour. On order of the Regimental Commander, and following the reserve battalions of the assault regiments, the Reconnaissance Party was to proceed to Yellow 2 beach, clearing Yellow control, prepared to land by H plus 2 hours. Upon landing the Battalion Commander was to select a position area off Yellow 2 beach, and reconnoiter a route of approach. Battery Commanders were to select positions for the howitzers, dispatch agents to the beach to act as guides for their respective batteries. The Battalion 2 and Battalion 3 were to assist the Battalion Commander. The Survey Officer with Survey team was to commence position area survey immediately, tying it in by traverse to the Corps IP if possible. The Communication Officer was to institute his wire plan, and pick CP installations. Two radio teams with two SCR 610 radios, on the Regimental Command and Battalion Command Nets were to provide contact with the Regimental Commander and battalion landing control. The Security Officer with demolition and security personnel was to clear the route of approach from the beach and the position area itself. An angle dozer was to be loaded in LCM as soon after H-hour as possible, prepared to go in with the Reconnaissance Party, to prepare gun pits and pull DUKWS off beach if it should prove necessary.

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The LST group, under the Battalion Executive Officer, with howitzers preloaded in DUKWS, was to be launched from the LST on order after H plus 2 hours. This group was to proceed to Baker Control, and on further order and after clearing Yellow Control proceed to the beach by batteries at ten minute intervals. Each battery was to be met by an agent from the Reconnaissance Party who would guide that battery into position.

After unloading, the DUKWS were to return to the LST making as many trips as would be necessary to unload the ship completely.

The Battalion TQM was to supervise unloading of personnel and gear from the transport. This was to be accomplished in accordance with needs ashore and as boats became available.

Control Plan.

A simple control plan was adequate to meet the requirements of the tactical plan. Since both the Reconnaissance Party and the LST group were to land on order of the Regimental Commander, the Battalion Commander and the Battalion Executive Officer were provided with SCR 610 radios preset on the Regimental Command Net. The Reconnaissance Party was to have communication with the Regimental Commander via the Beach Party as an alternate means. Ship to Ship radio between Baker Control and the LST provided an alternate means of communication for the Battalion Executive Officer.

For intra Battalion Control the Battalion Commander, the Battalion Executive Officer, and the Battery Executive Officers in command of the DUKWS of each of the batteries were provided with SCR 610 radios preset on the Battalion's ABLE and BAKER channels. Control was established on the ABLE channel. Communication between the DUKWS and the LST was maintained at all times by the DUKW company's SCR 610 normal radio control.

The Battalion Commander utilized an RBZ radio on the Division Reconnaissance Net to keep abreast of the situation ashore.

One means of visual communication was employed: each of the battery agents was provided with a blue flag in order to indicate to the incoming DUKWS the best landing beach.

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Description of Landing.

Assault waves having landed on schedule the Battalion Reconnaissance Party boated up in LCVP at 0930 (H plus 30 minutes) on 19 February, 1945 (Dog day). At 1000 it reached Baker Control and checked in with the Regimental Commander. On instruction it laid off and stood by. At 1410 the LCVP was ordered alongside Baker Control and the Reconnaissance Party was ordered to check in with Yellow Control, then proceed in and land on the right edge of Yellow 1 beach. It was suggested that the best route of approach to the Battalion position area off Yellow 2 would be found on Yellow 1. The Reconnaissance Party proceeded to Yellow Control, was told that Yellow 1 was under sporadic heavy fire, proceeded to the beach and landed on Yellow 1 at 1430. As soon as the Party disembarked from the north end of the beach. At 1445 the Battalion Commander was wounded. He turned over the command of the Reconnaissance Party to the Battery Commander, "H" Battery. A few minutes later the Battalion Commander was evacuated.

The Reconnaissance Party moved off the beach but was held down about ten yards inland. A message was sent to the Regimental Commander informing him that the Battalion Commander had been wounded and evacuated, and that the Reconnaissance Party was held down by heavy artillery fire. While the Party was thus held down just off the beach four more casualties were suffered, two killed, two wounded. One SCR 610 radio was knocked out by shrapnel. The antenna was blown off the other but it continued to function. The continuous shell fire lasted until about 1545. During this time a reconnaissance was impossible. A message was received from the Regimental Commander instructing the Party to come off the beach and report back to Baker Control. Shellfire was such that no boats were landing. It was impossible at the time to evacuate the wounded. The Regimental Commander was so informed.

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Aboard the LST an order to launch the DUKWS was received from the Regimental Commander at 1505. At 1510 the first DUKW was launched and at 1620 launching was complete. The unusual delay in launching was caused by the failure of several DUKWS to start, thus blocking all in the line behind them. At 1630 all DUKWS were in the water, but the command DUKW, occupied by the Battalion Executive Officer, failed to start when word was given to proceed to Baker Control boat. The Battalion Executive and two radio operators transferred to another DUKW, but at 1645 orders were received to reembark on the LST. This was completed at 1805, one DUKW of How Battery being lost in the process when its engine failed on the ramp of the LST. All others reembarked safely. During the night of 19 February, 1945 the army DUKW personnel drained the gas tanks of the vehicles that had been giving trouble and refilled them with clean gasoline. General maintenance was done, as far as the crowded conditions of the LST tank deck would permit.

The Reconnaissance Party took advantage of the first break in the shelling to move into the area about two thirds of the distance from Yellow 1 beach to Airfield No. 1, which area seemed relatively free of shellfire. The CP Twenty-third Marines was located. The Commander Reconnaissance Party called Battalion Commander, Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, informed him of the situation, and since it did not seem practicable to land the Battalion, asked him if he needed any of the Battalion Reconnaissance Party's personnel. The reply being negative, Commander Reconnaissance Party informed Battalion Commander Second Battalion of the approximate location where Reconnaissance Party would dig in for the night. The Commander Reconnaissance Party selected a position in a trench line, and the party dug in. A line was laid from CP Twenty-third Marines to this position. The remaining radio when it was set up in this position failed to transmit. At 2400 intense artillery fire was received from the northeast. At 0200 20 February, 1945 intense mortar fire was received from Mount Suribachi. At about 0515 intense and prolonged artillery fire was received again from the northeast.

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At daybreak the beach area being under only sporadic fire, the Reconnaissance Party undertook selection of position. An area on the second terrace was selected generally 150 yards off Yellow 2 beach. A suitable route of approach was discovered. The disadvantages to the position were that there were several anti-tank mines in the area, and this area as well as any other on the second terrace seemed to have been zeroed in by enemy artillery. Any passage of vehicles through the area attracted fires. The Battalion 3, using First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines radio, reported the above to the Regimental Commander and to the Battalion Executive Officer.

An order to relaunch DUKWS was received aboard the LST. The first DUKW was launched at 0917. Launching was complete at 1012. DUKWS proceeded to Baker Control, arrived there at 1055, were ordered to land on Yellow 2 at a point designated by the Reconnaissance Party.

The Reconnaissance Party meanwhile received a message from the Regimental 3 to the effect that Yellow 1 and Red beaches, and areas off them seemed at the time most clear of enemy fire, and suggested that an attempt be made to select a position there without respect of preassigned areas. If a position there could be found, an attempt if necessary would be made to get permission to land on Red Beaches. Reconnaissance for positions was immediately begun, as the position off Yellow 2 was under sporadic heavy and apparently observed fire, and a message was sent to the Regimental Commander asking him to hold the DUKWS at Baker Control. A position was selected on the first terrace 50 yeards off Red 2 beach. Angle dozers which had been dispatched to and landed on the beach together with an angle dozer borrowed from the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines were set to work preparing gun pits. Permission to land the Battalion on Red 2 Beach was requested via Regiment, and the Battalion Executive Officer, who with the first battery's DUKWS had crossed the line of departure on the way to Yellow 2 beach, was advised to delay landing until reply to the request was received.

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At 1225 the Reconnaissance Party received word on a Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines radio that request to land on Red 2 beach had been rejected. A message was sent to the Battalion Executive Officer asking him to delay landing of DUKWS for thirty minutes, until angle dozers could move to the previously selected area off Yellow 2 and begin work on gun pits. Request was also made to land batteries at 30 minute intervals.

The Reconnaissance Party then went to the area off Yellow 2 in order to commence work on gun positions. As soon as it reached the area it was pinned down by intense and accurate artillery fire from the north. The Battalion Executive Officer who was informed of the situation landed in the lead DUKW, checked the area selected off Red 2 beach, decided to put the Battalion into a compressed part of this area which lay generally between Yellow 1 and Red 2. At 1500 the lead DUKW left Yellow 2 beach, proceeded to the left edge of Yellow 1 and landed at 1527. Batteries then landed in order, the last DUKW landing at 1700. One Battalion Headquarters DUKW was swamped due to heavy surf, and lost just off the beach. The howitzers were unloaded and put into preprepared gun pits. The first round was fired at 1728.

Of the Battalion vehicles, one angle dozer in LCM with an officer in charge was loaded soon after H-hour on D-Day, reached Baker Control by noon, on order followed the Reconnaissance LCVP to Yellow 1 beach. When the Battalion Commander saw the situation ashore he ordered the LCM to stand off. The LCM reported back to Baker Control and was sent back to the PA 118 from which it had been unloaded. Seven radio jeeps and an ambulance jeep loaded in LCVP's were sent as a wave to Baker Control during the afternoon of D-Day. These were ordered back to PA 118. The LCVP with ambulance jeep became separated from the wave, reported back to Baker Control, was dispatched to the beach and landed on Yellow 1 beach at about 1700 on D-Day.

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LCM's and LCVP's loaded with the angle dozers and the seven radio jeeps proceeded to Baker Control on the morning of D plus 1, were dispatched, and landed on Yellow 1 beach at about 1000.

One cargo jeep was unloaded from the PA 118 on D plus 1 because the Navy Unloading Officer "had orders to unload the ship as fast as possible". The LCVP carrying this jeep reported to Baker control, was told to stand off. It remained in the water off Baker control for more than twenty-four hours. On D plus 2 at about 1300 it was dispatched and landed on Blue 1 beach. The remaining vehicles were landed on Blue 1 beach on D plus 3.

Section IV - Narrative of Operation.

Missions and Daily Operation.

This Battalion commenced registration at 1728, 20 February, 1945. The first mission assigned was reinforceing the First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines which mission continued until 0700, 23 February, 1945 excepting the period 1300 to 1730 22 February, 1945 when it reinforced the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines. At this time the Battalion went into direct support of the Twenty-fourth Marines and later during the day displaced by battery echelon to a new position at 165 V and Q. At 1715 26 February, 1945 the Battalion again reinforced the First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines and retained this mission until 0800 1 March, 1945 when it again went into direct support of the Twenty-fourth Marines. The Battalion assisted in a preparation for the Third Division the morning of 6 March, 1945, but remained in direct support of the Twenty-fourth Marines until 0730 10 March, 1945 when it assumed reinforcement of the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines. It continued in this mission until 0630 11 March, 1945. From this time until it secured from firing at 0800 13 March, 1945, the Battalion fired in the zone of the Fifth Division.

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Tactical Employment and Effectiveness of Artillery.

The Battalion for the most part functioned as direct support artillery for the Twenty-fourth Marines in the line. When the Twenty-fourth Marines was not in the line the Battalion was normally reinforcing the fires of another artillery battalion. In carrying out both of these missions normal direct support fires were given. Two factors however limited the employment and effectiveness of the Battalion. The first of these was lack of good observation, which had the effect of converting almost every target of opportunity into an area for neutralization. The second factor was the extent and thoroughness of the enemy's prepared defences, which seriously limited the destructive effect of the 105mm howitzer. These two factors gave a definite stamp to the firing. In only a few cases was observed enemy personnel or an observed enemy installation the target. The predominant part of all observed fire was delivered either on areas where, from counter fire, large concentrations of enemy troops were known to exist, or on areas where there were known installations of enemy weapons apparently so emplaced as not to be subject to destruction by 105mm shells. Where such concentrations were a sufficient distance forward of the front lines, reinforcement by Corps artillery was utilized.

In spite of the limitations artillery support given the infantry by the Battalion was closer and more effective than ever before. This was made possible largely by pre-operation training with the Regiment which the Battalion supported, by the establishment of liaison parties to the supported battalions, by the establishment of a radio plan such that any reinforcing battalion could on short notice contact forward observers directly, and by the coordination and cooperation between FDC's of the Regiment. All close in fires were registered in, often with surveillance of forward observers of adjacent units, so that casualties among our own troops did not result from possible map errors and incorrect front line reports.

While it is impossible within the Battalion to estimate the effectiveness of the Battalion's fire, support given to the Twenty-fourth Marines, within the limitation of the weapon and ammunition supply, was

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substantially what was wanted by the Twenty-fourth Marines. Forward Observers attest to the fact that the Battalion fire had a distinct neutralizing effect on enemy mortars, artillery, and rockets, and attest also to the great number of shrapnel cases among enemy dead.

Summary of Ammunition Expenditure by Types of Firing.

	No.of Missions.	No.of Rounds.
Preparation	158	13,569
Defensive Fire	162	2,614
Targets of Opportunity	301	10,978
Counter Battery	39	1,424
Harrassing Fire	956	4,861
Registration	15	307
	1631 missions	33,753 rounds

Survey.

The survey problem presented by the Iwo Jima operation was not a very difficult one. This Battalion occupied only two positions during the operation and in each case it was a simple matter to locate the batteries with reference to a point identifiable on the map. The initial position was about four hundred yards from the Corps Initial Point, so an attempt was made to locate it and use it for a starting point. However at the time the survey was begun no unit had yet located the point. The Survey Information Center had not been established and a through search failed to reveal the point on the terrain. The Survey team therefore located its own initial point by aligning the nearer with the farther of the Futatsu Rocks and using the point where this line intersected the shore line. From this point traverse to the center of each battery was comparatively short. Direction was taken from a line between the Initial Point and the easternmost point visable from it along the shore line to the north. An orienting line was put in and the batteries laid by base angle. Directional error of the survey proved small. Map error was not checked by survey methods, but was determined by

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by registration of the center battery. The survey team was later shown the Corps Initial Point and given its coordinates and a direction from it. A recheck of the survey using the initial point showed a negligible difference in coordinates of batteries, so that this correction was not applied. The Battalion was never called upon by sound or flash units for coordinates of a station for their use, so none was established.

The magnetic needle of the aiming circle was never used, so no check on declination constants was had. Survey in the second position presented similar problems which were handled in much the same way.

Fire Direction and Fire Adjustment.

Batteries upon coming into position were laid by compass, registration was conducted by a Forward Observer, and guns recorded a base deflection. Upon completion of survey adjusted base angles were measured in order to check the registration against the survey.

When the Battalion displaced and at all times thereafter due to superior observation registration was by air observer. At the completion of each registration adjusted base angles were measured to determine corrections

The K - change and the deflection correction change were determined from metros taken at the time of registration. Subsequent weather changes were applied. Three fire direction teams were employed in a normal battalion Fire Direction Center organization.

It is considered that three teams is a minimum requirement for consistent effective operation. Normal duties were performed by all personnel. Ammunition was controlled by weight of projectile. Registrations were checked whenever the adjustment of a Battery was in question. A single battery with converged sheaf was employed on point targets and on all missions where imperfect battalion massing would have endangered our own troops.

Fire adjustment was in accordance with Corps SOP. A modification of procedure was necessitated by the fact that Forward Observers, unable to identify a Base Point consistently used previous concentrations as a reference point. A replot from the adjusted data of the registering battery was found necessary to the effective massing of the Battalion's fire.

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Liaison.

The liaison system of this battalion on the operation proved to be the most satisfactory yet employed. Once the battalion was emplaced, the Battalion Liaison Officer who had landed with the Infantry Regiment support groups, assisted in control of all fires by continued close contact with the Regimental Infantry Commanding Officer and his staff.

This along with Battery Commanding Officers at the Battalion CP's continued throughout the entire operation.

Intelligence information of every nature was passed along to the Battalion 2 and F.D.C. as accurately and swiftly as possible. Close liasion was also carried on with NGF and air so that the greatest effect possible could be gotten from the three supporting agencies.

The very close contact with the Infantry Regimental Commanding Officer and his staff kept the artillery very closely informed of the situation at all times, and the excellent communication system employed afforded a high degree of efficiency. The very close cooperation shown by Liaison Officers with all echelons of Infantry was commended by Infantry personnel.

The use of the Battery Commander for liaison with the Infantry Battalion Commanders supplementing the normal forward observer parties with assault companies, provided a valuable additional link in both the liaison and the communication system. The normal Battery Commander's liaison party consisted of one radio operator, two line men, and one experienced instrument NCO, usually the Chief of Detail or Instrument Sergeant. The party was equipped with an SCR 610 radio and at least two telephones.

An extensive communications system, with some duplication to insure constant communication, was therefore possible. The Battery Liaison Party was netted with the Forward Observers as well as the Battalion Liaison Party, and the Battalion FDC on the normal Battalion radio channels. It was thus possible, and occasionally become necessary, for this party to act as a radio relay station

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between Forward Observers and the Battalion FDC. During most of the operation the Infantry Battalion command post was far enough forward to enable wire communications to be kept in from the Party to the Forward Observers.

Although difficult, this proved highly desirable in that it afforded easy consultation between the Battery Commander and his Forward Observers, and enabled him to advise them and coordinate preparations and defensive fires without clogging the radio channels. It was not found practicable to extend these lines to provide direct wire communications from Forward Observers to Battalion FDC. The Liaison Party was on the infantry wire net and could contact the Battalion FDC by infantry communications.

The line from infantry battalion to infantry regiment was simplexed to provide direct communication with the Battalion Liaison Party. With these varied communications the Liaison Party and the Forward Observers were never out of communication with each other at the FDC, and could work closely together. The principal functions which the Battery Commander's Party was able to perform were the following:

1. Advise Infantry Battalion Commander on artillery fires and transmit his request to artillery battalions.
2. Coordinate Infantry Companies' defensive and preparation fire requests into a plan for the Infantry Battalion.
3. Assist in coordination of artillery fires with air strikes. Air and Naval gun fire liaison parties were always nearby in the command post.
4. Advise inexperienced Forward Observers, and correct errors in fire commands and procedure.
5. Act as relay station for fire commands and messages when necessary.
6. Transmit artillery fire plans originating in higher echelon to Infantry Battalion Commander and to Forward Observers.
7. Submit Battalion Commander's requests for 155mm harassing fires to Battalion Liaison Officer.
8. Act as supply center for wire, radio replacements, and batteries for Forward Observers.

The Battery Commander's Party reported to the Infantry Battalion as soon as the Artillery Battalion was emplaced ashore, and remained there continuously until artillery was secured in the Division sector.

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Infantry Battalion Officers were highly pleased at the additional evidence of artillery cooperation. The Battalion Commander was able to consult his artillery without ruling out his Forward Observers, while the Forward Observers were able to remain at their OP's without being called away to consult with the Battalion Commander. While not indispensible, it is felt that this liaison was valuable, and it is recommended that it be continued during subsequent operations, using either the Battery Commander or Reconnaissance Officer. The chief obstacle is that it constitutes an additional drain on communications and officer personnel. Unless or until rendered impracticable by casualties, however, results justify continuance of a liaison officer at the infantry battalion CP.

Communication.

For the Iwo Jima operation, the Battalion's initial mission was to reinforce the First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, second to revert to direct support of the Twenty-fourth Marine Regiment upon committment; third, be prepared to take over the Fourteenth Marines Regimental communications in case that unit became a casualty. The communication plan was therefore designed to comply with those missions.

Radio was to be the primary means of communication initially. It was also planned that radio should be the primary means at all times for communication to the forward areas, wire the primary means for rear areas. In all cases there was to be dual means as soon as possible.

Wire.

The first lines laid were direct lines running from the firing batteries executives' positions to FDC. The Battalion switchboard was established and trunk lines were laid to each firing battery, to the

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First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, Second Battalion, and Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines.

Each trunk line was paralleled by a direct line laid over an alternate route, running from the Battalion FDC to the FDC of the other Battalion, Normal local installations were also established.

In functioning the direct lines enabled a direct and fast means of communication between FDC's. They were used principally as fire command lines, the trunk lines for administration.

The only simplexing was one Regimental line with the simplex ending in FDC. For communication with the infantry, Liaison Officers, and Forward Observers, two lines were laid forward from the Battalion switchboard, one to the Twenty-fourth Regiment and one to the forward switching central (BD-71) established at the Artillery Battalion Liaison Officer's position. The Liaison Officer at the switching central, and the Forward Observers laid wire to the Liaison Officer with the Infantry Battalion. This provided a very flexible and centralized forward wire net, and gave the Battalion Liaison Officer direct wire contact and control of the forward personnel. The forward personnel had contact with any unit connected with the switchboard. Wire to the Forward Observers was maintained fifty per cent of the time, and to the Liaison Officers with the Infantry Battalions at all times.

As alternate wire system the infantry lines could be used.

Radio.

The following radios were available to this Battalion.

15	-------SCR-------610's
8	-------SCR-------808's
3	-------TBX's
1	-------TCS
5	-------SCR-------536's
2	-------RBZ's

The above radio's were used as follows. Thirteen SCR 610's were preset on the Battalion fire direction channel (A) and the Battalion command (B). Of this number three were alloted to each battery, one

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to each Forward Observer, one to the Battery Commander who was employed as Liaison Officer at the Infantry Battalion CP, one to the Artillery Battalion Liaison Officer with the Infantry Regiment.

Two were employed at the FDC, one on Able channel, one on Baker Channel. This left one spare for replacement, and proved to be inadequate because of losses suffered in landing and enemy action. On the fire command net four Forward Observers operated on Able channel and two on Baker channel. The Able channel for assault, Baker for reserve and for administrative traffic.

The 808's were preset as follows. Six 808's or two per firing battery on Regimental Command, Division Command, Battalion Fire Direction, Battalion Command. They were to be used at battery positions on command channel to parallel wire. They were not available until D plus 2. Of the six, three were lost to enemy fire in landing. Two H&S 808 radios: one was preset on First Battalion Fire Direction, Second Battalion Fire Direction, Division Command, Regimental Command. This was available on D-day for use in reinforcing missions. Second was preset on Fourth Battalion Fire Direction, Battalion Able channel and Baker channel and Regimental command, available on D plus 2. These 808 jeeps were used for reinforcing missions. For example if the Battalion was in direct support with the First Battalion reinforcing, the Battalion would contact four forward observers on Baker channel. The First would contact the other two on Able channel. The 808's provide good communication, and are very flexible as the channels can be changed without difficulty. The 610's provide good communication but do not permit a flexible radio net. The 610's are not suitable for assault troops because of their bulk. The TCS was used for air-ground and was available on D-day. The TBX was used as an alternate and also on the Infantry Regimental Command.

The SCR 536's were used by the Survey section and beach party. The RBZ's were used by the Intelligence

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section to monitor the Division Reconnaissance net, the other was used by the Battalion, to monitor the landing Force SAO net. Two SCR 610's were used in the Reconnaissance Party and were set up as follows: one on Able channel and Regimental Command, the other on Baker channel and Regimental Command. In such an operation it was found that there were insufficient radio personnel to operate at top efficiency after five days.

Observation.

There were two general types of observation by Battalion Agencies, Forward Observer observation and air observation. While there are a few cases of employment of OP's the terrain strictly limited their establishment. All observation was limited. Generally speaking observation by Forward Observers was limited to the front from one to two hundred yards and on the flanks to about the same. This was due to a series of small ridges usually from 75 to 200 yards apart with small valleys intervening. As each ridge was topped another would appear, cutting off the observation past it. The terrain was an enemy in itself. In some instances fire could be carried on by watching the rising smoke from the shell burst and adjusting from that. Creeping was necessary. Toward the end of the operation, about two days before the artillery fire ceased, the terrain sloped down toward the ocean an observation was much better. Some observers could see up to five and six hundred yards. Proper defensive fires were necessarily brought in close and could be observed as the enemy troops were always very close to front lines.

Air observation was of limited value but was of great assistance in obtaining base and check point adjustments.

Targets which could be viewed from the air were few in number and mostly of a nature which could not be knocked out by artillery. (blockhouses, pill boxes, caves.)

Targets fired on by air observer consisted mainly of neutralizing an area in which enemy activity had been reported, and firing in areas from which gun flashes were observed. Several instances occurred in which personnel were fired on, but the groups were small.

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Administration.

1. Casualty reports and reports of KIA and WIA were as follows:

	OFFICERS	WRNT OFFICERS	ENLISTED	TOTAL
KIA	3		13	16
DOW		1		1
Lost at Sea			1	1
W&Ev	4		29	33
W&NEv		1	27	28
Ret to duty			2	2
Sk&Ev			2	2

2. The morale of troops throughout the operation was high. The rehabilitation period in this respect was a great aid. During actual combat the excellent supply of ten-in-one rations, fruit juices and water did much toward maintaining high morale.

Motor Transport.

The few vehicles taken on this operation proved adequate, since a DUKW platoon was attached to the Battalion. Some difficulty was encountered in getting the trucks and jeeps across the beach and it was discovered that vehicles without chains on the tires come across the beach as well as those with chains. However only one vehicle not disabled by enemy fire failed to pull itself from the landing craft to the Battalion position. This vehicle was later recovered. The light cargo carrier (weasel) was especially efficient in the type of soil and terrain encountered.

Training Deficiencies.

There was no serious training deficiency in the Battalion. At the same time not every element of the command had been fully and completely trained. New Forward Observer Officers who had joined the Battalion

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in December, 1944, while they did a competent job, showed at times lack of training and lack of experience. It was soon discovered that a system must be developed for registering in close-in fires according to which a Forward Observer will automatically check with Forward Observers of adjacent units. This would greatly reduce traffic on the fire command net at the busiest time of the day. Since the SCR 610 and 808 radio's were received late in the pre-operation training period, and since several radio operators were joined just before the embarkation of the Battalion there was a lack of fully trained radio operators who had the ability to assume net control of the Battalion Fire Command Net.

Intelligence.

1. Listed below are the types of maps and photo's furnished before the operation.

(a) 1/10000 gridded and ungridded
(b) 1/20000 gridded and ungridded
(c) 1/5000 gridded
(d) Beach Study maps
(e) 1/20000 photo maps
(f) Obliques and verticals of target
(g) 1/5000 Terrain Map (rubber)

There was an abundant number of photos and maps before and during the operation. The 1/20000 gridded map proved to be a good chart. The 1/10000 map used by the Forward Observers was fair, but the map as far as showing the relief in the northern sector was of no aid. The 1/20000 photographs issued before the operation were very poor. Clouds obscured the target area to a great extent.

2. No additional maps were furnished during the operation. Photos were received near the end of the operation. They were good enough to be used as firing charts, but were never needed.

Enemy Action Against Our Artillery.

This Battalion encountered no infiltration from the enemy. The enemy soon located the Battalion position and for the first week shelled the area frequently, principally at night. As the battle progressed the shellings became less frequent and lighter until they ceased shortly before the Island was secured.

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Employment of Enemy Artillery.

(a) Tactical Employment:

The Jap artillery was well concealed and dug in. Their guns were not massed but single guns were so placed as to cover the entire island. Their observation was excellent in noting the Battalion movements, and they could quickly open fire on any targets.

(b) Types of Material Used by Enemy Artillery:

This Battalion received very few air bursts but those were quite effective. Most of their shells were H.E. of 77mm and 81mm variety. The first three days the Battalion received 20mm fire. Sporadic 15cm mortars and rockets landed in the area throughout the operation but caused no damage.

(c) Effectiveness of Enemy Artillery:

Enemy artillery caused very little material damage to the Battalion. Casualties from it were fairly heavy in the early stages of the battle but later only direct hits caused any damage. Their shells harrassed personnel more than anything else. The few air bursts were effective, causing some casualties.

Supply.

All types of mounting out supplies were sufficient. Resupply of the mounting out gear was good. Due to the unfavorable conditions of the beach and surf palletized cargo could not be loaded but had to be broken down. No comment on Wilson Drums. The Battalion Supply dump was within the defenses of the Battalion Security Platoon, and a two man guard was on duty at all times. Ten thousand sand bags were loaded with the Battalion but a larger number could have been used. Dunnage from the LST was sent ashore with each load of ammunition and was used in the construction of fox holes and defensive positions.

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Transport Quartermaster.

One day was sufficient time to load the PA 118 completely. This battalion had only about one-fifth of the total gear aboard. Loading was especially fast and efficient. Embarkation proceeded well.

Loading LST.

(1) There are no major changes recommended for our LST loading plan. Although palletized ammunition does require more space than the same ammount loose, it is felt that this disadvantage is more than offset by the ease and speed of loading, especially when adequate loading equipment is available. The Sea Bee loading detachment on the Battalion LST used two finger lifts and two jitneys with 3 trailers each, finger lifts on the dock loading the trailers with two pallets each. Jitney trucks carried the ammunition into the tank deck where the other finger lift unloaded the trailer and set the pallet in position on deck.

In this way three units of fire (7200) rounds were loaded and stored up in less than twelve hours. A floating crane saved much time in storing our W.P. top side. This crane was also used to great advantage in loading extra water and gasoline drums. On 20-21 January, 1945 the first LST (1031) had to be completely unloaded at Kewalo Basin, Honolulu, and the procedure as outlined above was repeated. About 16 hours were required for the reloading.

Four days were necessary for unloading PA 118 except for the initial waves. After that the unloading proceeded at the Navy's order which was to unload as fast as possible with no regard for the needs ashore or the desires of the units aboard. Some gear was dispatched without the approval or even knowledge of the TQM's and units concerned. Galley gear, GI cans, etc, were dispatched and unloaded on Blue Beach on D plus 3 and casualties were suffered by unloading details. Control boats seemed to have too little information about the loacation of units ashore and their needs. The initial unloading of the LST 648 was done by DUKW's manned by colored army troops. The LST launched thevehicles at some distance from the beach, at times from six to ten miles, this placing a heavy demand on the fuel supply of

the DUKW's. The drivers did not perform satisfactorily, as valuable ammunition was lost which could have been saved by more competent drivers. In several cases drivers abandoned their vehicles when they failed to start after "conking out".

After the DUKW's had been launched from the LST, a strip was cleared down the center of the tank deck wide enough to accomadate a DUKW. This permitted seven DUKW's to enter the LST and be filled simultaneously from both sides. This system worked as at no time were there more than five vehicles on board ready to be loaded. The two finger lifts of the LST were employed advantageously in loading the ammunition. The pallets were carried to the DUKW's and raised. From this position the bands were broken and the ammunition was loaded into the vehicle. The Palletized 105mm ammunition could not be landed as such due to the unfavorable conditions of the beach and surf. The pallets had to be broken down and the individual boxes landed by DUKW's and LVT's. The DUKW's on the subsequent trips to thebeach carried seven personnel, sixty rounds of ammunition, twenty gallons of water and five boxes of rations. After all personnel were landed the vehicles carried seventy rounds of ammunition, fifty gallons of water and seven boxes of rations. The Army DUKW officer placed the capacity load at 5000 pounds. The LST beached on D plus 3 at which time the unloading was greatly accelerated, and LVT 4's were employed.

Organizational gear was sent ashore at this time from the PA 118. Unloading at the beach was much easier from LCM's rather than LCVP's the reason seemed to be in the twin screw rig of the LCM's. LCVP's tended to swing around and broach more than LCM's. On such a steep beach it is recommended that more LCM's be used if available. The rigging and slings seemed adequate.

In a slightly rough sea much time was lost because of the pounding PA's took from LSM's and LST's alongside.

A superior fender would have given us more time to concentrate on unloading.

Ordnance:

1. Weapons:-

-A- This Battalion was equipped with twelve 105mm Howitzers M2A1. Ten Howitzers were on carriage M2A1 the other two were on carriage M2A2. These Howitzers had been issued with combat tires, but were modified with short hubs to fit inside the body of DUKW's. After Saipan it became necessary to reinforce the trail spades to prevent bending or buckling especially in stony or coral positions. All spades had been reinforced by Division Ordnance prior to departure.

Individual equipment included approximately 200 rifles, cal .30 M1, and 300 carbines. Although T.B.A. lists 105mm Howitzer Battalion personnel to be armed exclusively with carbines, 30% preferred, and were armed with, M1's. Pistols are in great demand, but as auxiliary weapons only.

Calibre .30 machine guns were employed in maintaining a perimeter defense for the Battalion in each position. In addition to 16 cal. 30 HB machine guns, 22 BAR's and 8 Rocket launchers were included in the Battalion security plan. 8 cal. 50 machine guns with A.A. mount M-6, were to be used in the A.A. defense, but were lost during unloading operations.

-B- Howitzers listed in -A- above were employed 21 days, from D plus 1 to D plus 22.

-C- One Howitzer was lost on D day when DUKW's were launched on afternoon of D day.

Drivers had considerable trouble keeping their motors running. One DUKW carrying "H" Btry's second section developed motor trouble and began shipping in water faster that it could be pumped out by hand. An attempt was made to tow the DUKW back to the LST but was unsuccessful.

8 cal .50 machine guns were lost in sunken DUKW's.

-D- Mal functions were extremely limited. The Battalion replaced two breech block operating handle [illegible]h plungers, two cross heads, one operating handle latch catch screw, several lanyards.

Before leaving the Island Division Ordnance replaced six tubes. Division Ordnance repaired one broken level bubble on telescope mount M21, also replaced one clouded panoramic telescope. All other optical equipment held up extremely well.

-E- Spare parts and accessories as listed in T.B.A. are very adequate when available.

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-F- Recommendations.
1. All cross heads be made of bronze, cast steel does not work.
2. Brush, Bore M-12 should be issued with replaceable wire brush units. These units to be issued on same basis as cleaning materials.

2. Ammunition:-
-A- 33,753 total rounds expended on operation.
31,489 rounds of H.E.
2,264 rounds of W.P., (10 rd's H.C.)
-B- No comments on methods of supply.
-C- No problem of ammunition storage, never enough ammunition to present a problem.
-D- Ammunition of different fuzes should have a distinctive color for all markings; M48, box marking in yellow; M54, box markings white, etc, to eliminate confusion, especially at night.
-E- Unit of fire should be increased from 200 to 300 rounds per howitzer.

Firing tables should be issued so that shell H.E.A.T. can be used for indirect fire when needed.

Section V - Comments and Recommendations.

It is felt that the total time elapsed between embarkation and debarkation at objective was too long for troops and DUKW's on the LST. Some troops had opportunity for liberty at Pearl Harbor, others were employed in transferring the Battalion's gear from the LST 1031 to the 648 when the former was sent into drydock, and there was not sufficient time to grant liberty to all personnel. Troops on the PA had ample recreation during the rehabiliation period. It is recommended that equal opportunity be granted to LST and PA troops, insofar as practicable, in future rehabilitation periods before any operation.

DUKW's were too closely stowed on the LST tank deck to provide accessability for adequate maintenance

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after the Maui rehearsal. It is agreed by experienced DUKW officers that the vehicle should be thoroughly serviced after being water-borne, if it is to be idle as long as one month afterward; therefore it is recommended that, in future operations, DUKW personnel be given an opportunity to service thoroughly their vehicles after a water-borne rehearsal, and that they be re-embarked dry on the LST.

A lighter weight, more portable radio, such as the SCR 300 or 619 could be used by the Forward Observers Parties in lieu of the SCR 610.

Two cast steel cross heads in the breech blocks of the 105mm howitzers were broken in the operation. It is recommended that all cross heads be made of bronze instead of cast steel and installed at the factory. The brush, bore M-12 should be issued with replaceable wire brush units and issued on the same basis as cleaning material.

It was found that three complete teams (HCO, VCO, 3 computers) in the FDC worked very satisfactorily and allowed the personnel to stand watches without undue fatigue and subsequent loss of accuracy.

Battery Commanders were used for liaison with Infantry Battalion Commanders. This worked satisfactorily but left the batteries with too few officers. Battery Reconnaissance Officers should be the liaison officers with Infantry Battalions.

It is recommended that a firing table for H.E.A.T. ammunition be put on the reverse of the high angle GFT slide.

Harvey A. Feehan
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APPENDIX FOUR

TO

ANNEX ITEM

4th Battalion, 14th Marines, Operation Report.

IWO JIMA

APPENDIX FOUR

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SECTION I - PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Plans and Training

The Fourth Battalion returned from the Marianas Campaign and accomplished about three (3) months training before leaving for Iwo Jima. During this period normal battalion problems, both firing and non-firing were carried out as well as intensive specialist training such as the training of demolitions people, machine gunners, and others. Near the end of this period two (2) days were spent in carrying out ship-to-shore movements, practicing the method to be used to control the movement and landing of the dukws. The battalion was then loaded aboard the LST 1032. From Maui, T.H., to the staging area (Saipan) the personnel aboard the LST was as follows.

Marine Personnel	-	Officers:	6
		Enlisted:	174
Army Dukw Personnel	-	Officers:	2
		Enlisted:	61
		TOTAL	233

Loading

The equipment loaded consisted of twenty-two (22) dukws, twelve (12) of which were carrying 105 mm howitzers. One (1) dukw carried a preloaded radio jeep. Each dukw that carried a gun had twenty-four (24) rounds of ammunition preloaded and each "A" frame was to carry twnety-four (24) rounds of smoke (W.P.) in it. The remainder of the dukws carried various items such as communications equipment, machine guns, etc. The LST was loaded with three (3) units of 105 mm ammunition on the tank deck with dunnage on it to permit the dukws to rest on top of it. Before the dukws were put aboard one thousand and eight hundred (1800) rounds of 75 mm pack howitzer ammunition had to be loaded aboard which necessitated tearing up the ramp made of dunnage and placing all the 75 mm ammunition in front of the 105 mm ammunition. All the W.P., and yellow smoke was stored topside in two (2) bins aft of the LCT, as well as in the LCT. Because of the priority given to launching the LCT and the necessity for getting smoke in with the guns this made it necessary to shift the W.P., before

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that was impossible to carry out at Kaneohe. After spending two (2) days in this area the ships left for Saipan. Enroute to Saipan all personnel aboard the LST had their clothing impregnated and sprayed with DDT as instructed. At Saipan ten (10) officers and one-hundred and forty-nine (149) enlisted came aboard raising the total to eighteen (18) officers and three-hundred and eighty-three (383) enlisted. Since only one-hundred (100) cots were issued it was necessary to break out the extra stretchers that the LST was carrying.

Forward Area Rehearsal

During the stop at Saipan the final rehearsal was carried out. Only the reconnaissance party of the battalion participated. They boated in an LCVP at 0900 on 13 February 1945, and made a run to the line of departure and back. Final radio calibration was accomplished and latest intelligence was assimilated and given to all hands.

SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

Tactical Plan For Landing

It was planned that the battalion reconnaissance party of nine (9) officers and twenty-four (24) enlisted men (Battalion Commander, Battalion Plans and Training Officer, Battalion Supply Officer, Battalion Survey Officer, Battalion Communication Officer, Battalion Chemical Warfare Officer, three (3) firing battery Commanding Officers, and Fire Direction Center, Survey, Communication, and Medical Personnel) should be embarked from the APA 207 at H-hour. This party was to rendezvous off Baker control boat until ordered in to the beach by the Regimental Commander. Upon such order it was to proceed to Yellow Control Boat, secure permission to land, reconnoiter the battalion area, select positions, prepare installations, and guide the remainder of the battalion into position.

The remainder of the key personnel of the battalion was aboard the LST 1032, under command of the Battalion Executive Officer, with the howitzers and other essen-

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tial gear preloaded in twenty-two (22) dukws. This group was to remain aboard until ordered by the Regimental Commander to leave the LST. Upon such order it was to check in with Baker Control Boat then to proceed to Yellow Control Boat, remain there until ordered to proceed to the beach by the Battalion Commander. From the beach it was to be guided into position by the reconnaissance party.

Other personnel including drivers for two (2) TD 9's were aboard the APA 158 and APA 207. One LCM was to report to APA 158 at H plus 60 to load a TD 9 and personnel; four (4) LCM's were to report to APA 207 at H plus 90 to load a TD 9, an 808 Radio Jeep and personnel. These boats were then to report to the LST 1032 to load additional personnel and to accompany the dukws as far as Yellow Control Boat. From there, if practicable, they were to precede that party, reach the beach first, and assist the reconnaissance party until the LST group reached the beach.

Control Plan

Control during the landing phase was to be maintained by radio. The reconnaissance party had one (1) "610" radio set on the Regimental Command Net and one on the Battalion Fire Direction Net. The Battalion Executive Officer had one "610" radio set on the Battalion Fire Direction Net to maintain contact with the reconnaissance party. He also had a "610" radio set on the Regimental Command Net to receive Regimental orders. The Executive Officer and Assistant Executive Officer of each battery had a "610" radio set on the Battalion Fire Direction Net, and were thus able to keep contact with the Battalion Commander and the Battalion Executive Officer. Control over the remaining Dukws and over accompanying small boats was to be by voice and visual signals. The Battalion Executive Officer also had a "610" radio set on the Dukw Company Net enabling contact with the LST to be maintained.

Description of Landing

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The reconnaissance party aboard APA 207 boated at 0900, and left for Baker Control Boat at 0910, arriving there at 0955. It rendezvoused there until 1407 when it left for the line of departure. Crossing that line at 1419 it proceeded to the beach, arriving at 1438. Under intense mortar and artillery fire immediately the party attempted to carry out its mission, moving inland, seeking to reach the area assigned the battalion. The fire was so intense in the position area assigned the battalion, that the party could carry out only the barest reconnaissance before having to dig in for the night. One (1) officer was wounded and evacuated; one (1) officer and two (2) enlisted men were wounded but not evacuated.

The LST group remained aboard all of 19 February, and suffered six casualties (including one fatality) from enemy fire hitting in the transport area. At approximately 1230, 20 February 1945, this group was ordered to leave the LST, but at that time the ship was headed out to sea to discharge its LCT (1031). Having done that it returned to its area and the first dukw was discharged at 1511. By this time the wind and sea had picked up considerably so as to offer very adverse conditions. An "A" Frame Dukw sank immediately after becoming waterborn. The remainder left for Yellow Control at 1558 leaving one (1) unservicable dukw on the LST. Six (6) dukws failed to reach Yellow Control Boat due to engine failure. All of these reported back to the LST, but only one (1) was taken aboard before sinking. The dukws arrived at line of departure at 1615 and left at 1620. It proceeded to Yellow Control Boat which would not permit any landing at this time (1711) because of crowded beach conditions. At 1720 permission was granted to send dukws to the beach. In order not to offer a profitable target to the enemy who were still firing on the beaches and because of the crowded beach conditions, the H&S Battery "A" Frame Dukw was dispatched to lead number one of "M" Battery to the beach ahead of the other dukws, so that there might be a partial registration that night. The "A" Frame Dukw hit the beach at 1725, followed immediately by number one of "M" Battery. Darkness fell soon thereafter causing great difficulty in maintaining control of the remainder

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of the dukws that had no radio communications with the control dukw. The last dukw landed at 0005 on 21 February 1945.

During this phase, seven (7) howitzer bearing dukws sank and one (1) "A" frame dukw sank. One (1) "A" frame dukw was taken back into the LST 1032. Four (4) howitzer bearing dukws had returned to the LST, but only one (1) got aboard to avoid sinking. One (1) officer drowned during this period.

The personnel from the APAs' 158 and 207 proceeded according to plan on 19 February 1945, but when not permitted to land returned to their respective ships about 1600 on that date. On 20 February 1945, because the LST 1032 had left station, the small boats went directly to the Control Boats. One (1) LCVP from the APA 207 hit the beach at 1030. A second one reached the beach at 1230, a third at 1730. All others, having been ordered to return for the night to their APA's boated again on D plus 2 and landed around noon on D plus 2.

Ammunition resupply was to be from the LST to the beach by dukws. Due to the adverse conditions and lateness of the landing no ammunition was landed on D plus 1. On D plus 2 and D plus 2 ammunition was brought ashore in dukws. At 1500 on D plus 4 the LST was beached on Yellow 2, and the remaining five thousand and two-hundred (5200) rounds were taken off as well as all organizational equipment and personnel by 0330, D plus 5. Thereafter resupply of ammunition was from the ammunition ships direct to the battalion position. This was so slow that it often limited the firing the battalion could do.

All classes of supplies, except ammunition were plentiful throughout the operation. When the dukws were lost a large amount of medical gear and small arms were lost. Resupply was quickly accomplished by using the reserve supply the battalion took on the LST.

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CHART OF VEHICLES LANDING

	TYPE	LANDED IN	TIME ASHORE
1	One ton truck	LCM	D plus 5
1	Water trailer	LCM	D plus 5
4	808 radio jeeps	LSM	D plus 4
1	Cargo jeep	LSM	D plus 4
1	TD-9	LCM	D plus 2
1	One ton truck	LSM	D plus 5
1	Water trailer	LSM	D plus 5
2	808 Radio jeeps	LSM	D plus 5
1	TCS radio jeep	LCVP	D plus 3
1	Cargo jeep	LSM	D plus 5
1	M29c	LSM	D plus 5
1	TD-9	LSM	D plus 4
1	808 radio jeep	DUKW	D plus 1
1	Ambulance jeep	LCVP	D plus 4

SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

Missions and Daily Operations

The battalion suffered four (4) killed in action and twenty three (23) wounded in action and all reports were made by means of the casualty card system and that proved to be very excellent. The morale of the men throughout the operation was of the highest degree and was undoubtedly maintained at this standard by the rapid delivery of mail and the distribution of 10-1 rations as well as the new type "C" ration. The health of the battalion was excellent throughout the operation with no disease encountered. Sanitary measures were scrupulously observed and a daily inspection was conducted by the Battalion Medical Officer. Lieutenant Colonel YOUNGDALE was ordered by the Regimental Commander to assume command of the Third Battalion, Fourteenth Marines on 24 February 1945. Major SPRITZEN assumed command of the Fourth Battalion on 24 February 1945. Lieutenant Colonel YOUNGDALE returned on 11 March 1945, to resume command of the Fourth Battalion.

The reconnaissance party of the battalion landed on D-day, but was unable to make any reconnaissance of the

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designated position area until the morning of D plus 1 due to heavy shell fire and small arms fire that was constantly sweeping the area. During the morning of D plus 1, two (2) boat loads of battalion personnel landed and joined the reconnaissance party in the area that was to be occupied by the battalion. The dukws were launched in heavy weather at 1511 the afternoon of D plus 1. By midnight the battalion had five (5) guns ashore. On D plus 1 an attempt was made to locate the Corps I.P., as designated in the attack order, however, this was impossible since the unimproved road was unrecognizable and the railroad spur non-existent. A position area survey was put in then by a three point resection using as reference points, the shoreline on the south east coast near Mt. Suribachi, the shoreline on the north east coast and a corner of Airfield #1. The largest error in this survey, as later proven, was forty (40) yards. All guns were laid by base angle and the positions were plotted on the 1/20,000 Air and Gunnery Target Map that was to be the firing chart for the operation. At 1530 on D plus 2 registration was started by the air observer. Due to his need to fire other battalions at the same time, the registration was completed at 1728. On D plus 3 one (1) replacement howitzer was received from Division and put in position by 1130 that morning. Three (3) more replacement guns were given to the battalion, one on each of the following days; D plus 5, D plus 6, and D plus 7. The battalion thus consisted of three (3) batteries with three (3) guns each. The bulldozers were used quite extensively during the entire period to dig the guns in as well as the various dumps. Both bulldozers were knocked out by enemy shellfire at times, however, due to the proximity of an almost totally destroyed bulldozer parts were salvaged and they were kept in running condition. Late in the operation (D plus 20) a one ton 4x4 ran over a land mine and was damaged. This vehicle was also repaired by salvaging parts from other wrecked vehicles. One mechanical failure occurred on the guns when a gun in "L" Battery failed to return to battery. The reserve oil was refilled, a manometer test was conducted by Division Ordnance. The test failed to disclose anything wrong and the gun was put back in operation. It functioned perfectly from then on. While firing one (1)

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round per minute for ten minutes for our sound ranging, one (1) gun was suddenly put under fire and had two (2) shells hit in the gun pit (approximately 75 mm). It is thought that the enemy brought the gun under fire by means of flash ranging. No damage was suffered by the gun other than the burning of the camouflage net.

Throughout the operation this battalion had a general support mission, paying particular attention to counter battery fire. On several days it reinforced direct support battalions on preparatory, harassing and defensive fires. The operation order for each day was issued the previous night, generally between 2400 and 0600. Preparatory fires were arranged and registered when necessary; these fires were generally extended after K-hour until an F.O., lifted them.

During the day the battalion fired on targets of opportunity designated by air observers or forward observers. Occasionally it fired unobserved missions in areas where enemy activity had been noted. Often times it was difficult for the observer to note just how completely the mission was accomplished. If a particular gun was neutralized temporarily, a "Mission Accomplished" was given; still the gun, mortar, or rocket often fired again and again even though the concentration was frequently refired. Nevertheless direct hits were scored on some guns so that they were silenced permanently. Very few enemy troops were observed, very little enemy materiel noted in the open, therefore our fire was largely limited to neutralizing areas rather than to destroying particular targets.

Harassing fires for the night were assigned generally between 1800 and 1900, fired between 1930 and 0500. In addition the battalion fired many counter battery missions each night, being adjusted by the sound ranging team, by the flash ranging team, and by observers. The sound ranging team functioned very well, locating many targets. The flash team was seriously hampered by the poor O.P., for the base was too short to determine range accurately, therefore the team was seldom able to give more than a directional azimuth. If we located any targets (previously fired) along that azimuth, we took

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them under fire and had average success. On two occasions this method yielded excellent results, definitely silencing the enemy weapon.

This battalion also fired propaganda shells. No definite report on the effect of that fire was given. The battalion also fired several high angle fire missions, all with excellent results; battalion massing was reported very good on all such missions. It also fired several yellow smoke shells to designate target areas for air strikes. Apparently the dispersion in this firing was exceptionally great, it is highly probable that the individual cannisters were hurled some distance upon bursting of the shell thus creating the appearance of extensive dispersion. Also, the duplication of color, that is, using yellow smoke grenades and panels to designate front lines, and then using yellow smoke to designate targets, caused some confusion to the air observers of fire support ships.

Summary of Ammunition Expenditure

(a) Rounds expended by mission.

	No. of Missions	No. of Rounds
Registration fires	31	712
Counter battery fires	108	5,925
Preparation fires	122	8,758
Harassing fires	223	3,808
Defensive fires	14	564
Targets of opportunity	67	3,640
	565 missions	23,407 rounds

(b) Rounds expended by type.

M-48	13,480
M-54	8,819
M-57	1,083
Propaganda	10
Yellow Smoke	15
TOTAL	23,407

SECTION V - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Because of the slowness of dukws it is considered

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worth while to have some other type of craft, such as an LCVP to aid in controlling the formation. It would also be a great aid to have a "610" radio in each dukw.

Closer coordination should exist between the plans of the Navy and the Division to avoid any conflict as occurred when the LCT, which had a high launching priority, was due to be launched at the same time that the dukws were to be launched and resulted in delaying the departure of the dukws.

Some type of fire proofing material for camouflage nets should be made available. In one instance the nets caught fire readily as a result of enemy fire.

The use of the same colored smoke to mark targets and front lines is a hazardous practice and should not be done because of the possible confusion that may result.

This battalion was furnished with twenty (20) 1/10,000, thirty-five (35) 1/20,000 and ten (10) 1/5,000 maps. This supply was adequate.

The number of different types of ammunition used during the operation and the quantity often caused some confusion during darkness because of the similar packaging. It is suggested that some distinctive color marking system be adopted to aid in night handling.

It would also be a great aid if the resupply ammunition ships could be loaded with at least the same square ammunition if not the same lot.

It is recommended that the battalion be furnished with several light radios, such as the SCR 300, to be used by the landing party. The "610" is a two man load and too heavy for that purpose.

C. A. YOUNGDALE

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APPENDIX FIVE

TO

ANNEX ITEM

476th Amphibious Truck Company, Operation Report

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1. Organization and Loading for Combat.

(a) Organization: Fifty Amphibian Trucks and personnel of this organization were attached to the 14th Marine Regiment of the 4th Marine Division for this operation.

(1) Eight DUKW's, the company commander and enlisted personnel allocated to Regimental Headquarters, 14th Marine Regiment were combat loaded (dry) aboard LST 763 at Maui on 7 January, 1945.

(2) Twenty DUKW's, two company officers and enlisted personnel allocated to the 3rd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment were combat loaded (dry) aboard LST 1031 at Maui on 10 January, 1945.

(3) Twenty-two DUKW's, two company officers and enlisted personnel allocated to the 4th Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment were combat loaded (dry) aboard LST 1032 at Maui on 10 January, 1945.

(b) Loading.

(1) The eight Regimental Headquarters DUKW's aboard LST 763 were loaded with communication and survey gear, small arms and ammunition, rations, water, personnel and personal gear, etc., not in excess of 7,000 pounds.

(2) The twenty DUKW's, 3rd Battalion DUKW's aboard LST 648 were loaded with three batteries of 105mm Howitzers, ammunition, communications equipment, ordnance chests, cleaning and preserving materials, radio jeeps, water, sand bags, wire, miscellaneous battery gear plus personnel and personal gear.

(3) The twenty-two DUKW's, 4th Battalion DUKW's, aboard LST 1032 were loaded with three batteries of 105mm Howitzers, ammunition, communication equipment, ordnance chests, cleaning and preserving materials, radio jeeps, rations, water, sand bags, wire and miscellaneous battery gear plus personnel and personal gear.

2. Rehearsal.

(a) During rehearsal maneuvers off Maui, 13 January thru 17 January, 1945, eight DUKW's were launched and went

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2. Rehearsal (Continued).

(a) (Continued) ashore from LST 763, sixteen 3rd Battalion DUKW's were launched and went ashore from LST 1032. Personnel bivouaced until the following morning 16 January, 1945, when after a water run of approximately seven miles all DUKW's were reloaded (wet) aboard their respective LST's.

(1) During the above mentioned maneuvers LST 1031 was damaged to such an extent that all DUKW's, cargo and personnel were transferred to LST 648 at Pearl Harbor.

3. Enroute to target.

(a) During the period 16 January, 1945 to 19 February, 1945 the DUKW's were enroute to the target. While enroute maintenance of the DUKW's was performed about every third day. Motors were started, tires reinflated, gas, oil and water levels maintained, carburetors, air cleaners and filters maintained and repaired as necessary. However, complete maintenance considered advisable after wet loading due to long water run at Maui, was not possible due to crowded condition of Tank Decks and DUKW cargo compartments. Prior to D-day carburetors settlement bowls were cleaned and emptied of water sucked into the gas tanks during the Maui maneuvers.

(1) Enroute to the target each platoon officer oriented his platoon for the attack and also oriented himself with the artillery officers and the overall plan of attack. This was disseminated to the enlisted men concerned.

4. Ship to Shore.

(a) Landing.

(1) On D-day at H plus 6 hours, under favorable weather conditions but a moder te sea the twenty DUKW's aboard LST 648 were successfully launched. Enroute to the line of departure the Command DUKW had engine failure due to water in the gasoline. Two other DUKW's experienced similar trouble. By the time these DUKW's were repaired, information was received by radio that the proposed Battalion positions were under heavy enemy fire and the DUKW's were ordered back aboard the LST. During the reloading one DUKW, unable to pull its load up the ramp, sank. All personnel were saved, however, the DUKW and its cargo including 105mm Howitzer were lost. On D-night, after operation maintenance, including draining water from gas tanks and carburetor settlement bowls was performed, DUKW's were refueled.

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On D plus 1 at 0900 in a high wind and a rough sea, the nineteen DUKW's aboard LST 648, lying about 4000 yards of Beach Yellow 2, were again successfully launched. DUKW's rendezvoused at the line of departure until 1500 when ordered into Beach Red 2. Because of soft steep beach, high surf and heavy load about half these DUKW's had to be pulled on shore by bulldozers. One DUKW broached and was lost in this landing. All personnel and most of the cargo on this DUKW was saved. Remaining eleven guns and cargo of this Battalion were placed in position by the DUKW's and unloaded by DUKW A Frames.

(2) On D plus 1 at 1445 the twenty-two DUKW's aboard LST 1032, lying in the assigned launching area, were successfully launched. Within five minutes after launching, DUKW #4-6, sunk before sufficient water had entered the hull to activate the bilge pump. All personnel were saved. The motors of seven additional DUKW's, each one carrying a 105mm Howitzer failed within a few minutes after launching. The failure in each case was caused by water in the gasoline, a result of insufficient freeboard due to the extremely heavy loads. All seven of these were subsequently lost due to inability to get them back aboard the LST. In the attempt to haul one of them aboard, one Marine Officer was lost by drowning.

One additional DUKW loaded with battery gear and personnel experienced motor failure as did the seven above but this one was brought along side the LST, unloaded and then brought aboard. The remaining thirteen DUKW's proceeded to the line of departure. Their first landing attempt was thwarted by heavy enemy mortar fire on the beach. On their second attempt to land at 2230 two DUKW's containing battery gear broached and were lost. All personnel were saved. The remaining eleven got ashore, however, one of these was disabled by enemy shell fire and was abandoned.

(3) On D plus 2 days at 0830 three DUKW's aboard LST 763, containing Regimental Command Post gear were launched, went ashore, discharged cargo and returned to the LST.

(4) On D plus 3 days at 0830 all eight DUKW's aboard LST 763, containing Command Post gear and personnel were launched, went ashore, discharged their cargo and returned to the LST. The initial landings of these DUKW's were made under conditions identical to these encountered by the other DUKW's but with a much lighter load.

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4. Ship to Shore (Continued).

(b) Ashore.

(1) During D plus 2, 3, and 4 days the remaining DUKW's were used principally to unload ammunition and cargo from their respective LST's. This was a continuous 72 hour operation. During this period thirteen DUKW's were lost by sinking or broaching. Difficulties encountered during this phase of the operation and factors contributing to the loss of these thirteen DUKW's are as follows:

(a) Inability of LST's 648 and 1032 to maintain station resulting in water trips up to twelve and fourteen miles in high seas.

(b) Beach Control refused to permit DUKW's to land after dark because of reported Japanese counter landings. This left many DUKW's loaded with ammunition, adrift in the water throughout the night.

(c) Failure of Bowser Boats to supply gas to DUKW's as called for in the operation plan.

(d) Inability to maintain a landing for DUKW's clear of debris and beached vessels.

(e) Lack of shoring on LST ramps to hold them in position against a heavy sea.

(f) Weather and sea conditions during this period were extremely adverse.

(c) General.

(1) During this period D plus 6 days to D plus 16 days inclusive, all DUKW's of this organization were operated twenty-four hours daily, hauling ammunition and other cargo and evacuating casualties. During this period three additional DUKW's were lost. The performance of the DUKW in this phase of the operation was satisfactory despite lack of any maintenance beyond 1st echelon.

(2) Although materiel losses were heavy, personnel losses were light. One man was lost by drowning when his DUKW collided with a small boat. Ten other men were wounded or injured.

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Conclusions and Recommendations.

(a) That the manufacturers established load limit be made known to and strictly adhered to by all branches of the services using DUKW's.

(b) That some type of craft larger than an LCVP be used to fuel DUKW's during the assault phase of the operation, one sufficiently large for a DUKW to moor alongside.

(c) That every effort be made in future operations to designate and maintain a clear landing for DUKW's. Failure to do so on this operation has caused many shoreline accidents and the loss of some vehicles.

(d) That all DUKW rehearsal maneuvers be completed before final maintenance and combat loading. Land loading is strongly recommended. With this loading procedure the DUKW would then be fit for a long sea voyage where only limited maintenance is possible. We do recommend, however, that where possible the DUKW's be finally conditioned and combat loaded nearer the target.

(e) That LST's operate roving retriever boats to pick up disabled DUKW's.

(f) That LST's maintain station, thereby reducing the water run of DUKW's. This would greatly expedite the unloading procedure.

(g) The Medical authorities of both services participating in this operation have been lavish in praising the DUKW for the part it has played in the evacuation of casualties. DUKW's were not always readily available to them. It is therefore recommended that a sufficient number of DUKW's and operating personnel be assigned to each Field Hospital Unit for their sole use in future operations.

Jules Blaustein
JULES BLAUSTEIN,

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APPENDIX SIX

TO

ANNEX ITEM

4th Amphibious Truck Company, Operation Report.

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SECTION I - PLANNING AND PREPARATION

This company was activated on 21 October, 1944, and organized in accordance with current Table of Organization.

The majority of the personnel had joined by 1 December, 1944, though two officers joined about mid-December, and several enlisted men joined as late as 1 January, 1945. None of the personnel, either officers or enlisted men, had had prior training on DUKW's.

Training was as intensive as time and facilities permitted. Much valuable preliminary training was secured prior to arrival of equipment by arrangement with the 476th Amphibian Truck Company (USA), whose personnel were very cooperative at all times. This training was effected by sending as many observers, officers and men as possible on two separate maneuvers in which the Army company and 14th Marines were engaged. In addition, training films were used extensively.

All amphibian trucks were received on 1-2 December. All vehicles were first driven 300 miles on land to train drivers and break in equipment. A thorough check was then made under supervision of the maintenance officer and final ajustments made.

Arrangements were made for two LST's to be made available for training. Intensive training in embarking and launching at sea, coming alongside a ship, and entering and leaving water over beaches was effected. A two-day rehearsal with supported unit completed the training. All DUKW's were then thoroughly overhauled and serviced in preparation for the forthcoming operation.

Planning of necessity conformed to that of the supported unit. The first platoon supported the first battalion, the second platoon the second battalion, and the third, less detachments, supported regimental headquarters. To fit the requirements of the supported unit the first and second platoons were reinforced by elements of the third, prior to embarkation. One of the company headquarters DUKW's was fitted with special equipment and tools for maintenance.

SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE.

All units of the company were embarked dry aboard LST's at Kahului on 7-10 January, 1945. DUKW's were pre-loaded with guns, ammunition, personnel, etc., to approximately 7000 pounds, including crew. After a rehearsal at

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SECTION II (Continued).

Maui the LST's anchored at Kaneohe Bay, Oahu. There was no opportunity there to flush out the DUKW's with fresh water or to inspect and service them. Many items of vital equipment were procured while there. Personnel was granted liberty in accordance with instructions.

While enroute to the objective personnel were thoroughly instructed in details of the operation, using all available maps and material. Final plans, based on available intelligence were made and issued.

This unit did not participate in forward area rehearsal.

SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

Platoons were launched on order, first and second platoons at about 1430 on D-day. DUKW platoons went in in column with approximately 100 yards distance, and 10 minute inveral between DUKW's of each battery. One officer and a few enlisted men of each platoon were ordered to take their platoon in and establish a platoon CP on shore and function as a forward control station, the DUKW's to return to their ship to reload. An officer or senior NCO of each platoon, with the remainder of the control personnel, were to remain aboard the LST to function as a rear control station. DUKW's were to shuttle between the two stations. Company headquarters landed with the first platoon and established a CP ashore. Results obtained by this system of control were excellent. Several DUKW's were rescued on the beaches by assistance given by personnel ashore.

Better results could have been obtained if it had been possible to maintain radio communications between the different elements of the company.

A first platoon DUKW, carrying a gun, sank off the ramp of the LST. Reports indicate this to have been caused by the ship's failure to change their control light from green to red when the ship got underway. All other guns were landed safely. Both the first and second platoons completed landing at about 1730. The third platoon landed at about 2115 on D plus 1.

SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

This company's mission was to land and supply

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ed).

the first and second battalions of artillery. Landing was accomplished on D-day and the supply function was continued through 28 February. On 1 March the company was placed under operational control of VAC to unload ammunition ships. About 3 March the company began continuous around the clock operation. This continued for about ten days and imposed considerable strain on all personnel, particularly after one officer and twenty men were detached to a Provisional Battalion. Continuous operation over a long period of time would not be possible with full equipment. The company continued under Corps control until ordered to reembark on 15 March, fifteen DUKW's being released on 14 March to reembark the artillery regiment.

Throughout the operation DUKW's were employed to evacuate casualties, an average of four DUKW's being employed almost constantly for that purpose.

SECTION V - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

On the initial landing it was found in almost all cases that beaches were too steep and too soft for DUKW's to land. This was the cause of much maintenance as well as the loss of nine DUKW's which were broached and wrecked in the surf. The DUKW's could not get up the beach and had to be unloaded just clear of the surf. When tractors were immediately available the DUKW's could be towed out, but if there was as much as five minutes delay they settled in the sand and filled with water and nothing could pull them ou In one case two tractors and an LVT were hooked to a DUKW and only succeeded in pulling off the towing shackles.

When DUKW's had to unload in the surf they were unable to turn around and were forced to reenter the water stern first. As the surf was thick with debris and wreckage their rudders and propellers were fouled. Shafts and struts were torn out, and when the shafts ripped out large holes were torn in the hull. This condition contributed largely to the loss of many of the twelve DUKW's which were lost at sea.

Crippled DUKW's could not land on the beach, nor could they get back aboard the LST. They could only drift helplessly while maintenance men tried to effect repairs.

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SECTION V - (Continued).

Several were repaired and continued in service, but some sank. Had an LSD been available as a maintenance ship these cripples could easily have been towed aboard and saved.

The maintenance DUKW was lost on D plus 2 as explained in the preceding paragraphs. Its loss was a severe handicap to the company. It had been, and would have continued to be, invaluable in rescuing and assisting cripples, and had the equipment it carried reached the beach it would have greatly facilitated repair and salvage work.

LST's did not remain in the area, and in most cases closed their ramps at night and refused to permit DUKW's to embark. One DUKW was reported lost 30 miles at sea. The LST designated as maintenance ship, while cooperative in other respects, would not permit welding on the tank deck. Welding approximates 50 per cent of DUKW maintenance.

Bowser boats and gasoline barges often carried only 100 octane gas, which can not be used by DUKW's.

During the early stages drivers had difficulty finding landing points and sometimes landed at the wrong place. The beaches were littered with wrecked craft and vehicles of all types and there was no distinctive marker at landing points which the driver could recognize.

Salvage was vitally necessary in order to keep remaining DUKW's in operation. Salvage crews took every opportunity to salvage parts from wrecked equipment, even working in heavy surf on broached DUKW's. As a result all 29 remaining DUKW's were fully operative when turned over to Corps upon departure from IWO JIMA.

In general I consider that the personnel of this company proved themselves to be well trained and fully competent, and that an excellent performance - at least as creditable as that of any other similar unit present - was turned in by the company as a whole.

The following recomendations are submitted for future operations:

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SECTION V (Continued).

1. A distinctive, easily recognized beach marker for DUKW landing points. This marker to be carried ashore and set up at suitable landing points by artillery reconnaissance parties or by platoon leaders on initial landing.

2. Bulldozers be made available for towing or grading at initial DUKW landing, and as long thereafter as may be necessary.

3. DUKW landing points to be restricted to DUKW's only.

4. An LSD be designated as a DUKW maintenance ship for crippled DUKW's.

5. LST's to remain in the area and to permit DUKW's to embark at night.

6. Each LST to carry 50 drums of 80 octane gasoline for refueling DUKW's.

7. Bowser boats and fuel barges to maintain a supply of 80 octane gas to refuel DUKW's.

8. One 608 and six 610 radios, in serviceable condition, to be furnished for intra-company communication.

9. Fifty per cent replacement on propellers, propeller shafts, shaft struts, and shaft strut caps to be furnished.

10. No personnel to be detached from DUKW company during continuous around the clock operation.

W. W. ALFORD.

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APPENDIX EIGHT

TO

ANNEX ITEM

Fourteenth Marines Regimental War Diary.

IWO JIMA

APPENDIX EIGHT

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FOURTEENTH MARINE REGIMENT WAR DIARY
28 December, 1944 - 5 April, 1945.

This diary includes the loading of this regiment for the Iwo Jima operation, its movement to the objective, its operation as a part of the Fourth Marine Division at the objective, and its return to the base camp.

28 December, 1944 - 1/14 (APA Group) at 12:30 p.m. departed from Camp Maui, Maui, T. H., embarked aboard ship at Kahului, Maui, T. H.

29 December, 1944 - 1/14 (APA Group) at 9:00 a.m., sailed from Kahului, enroute Sand Island, Honolulu Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 5:00 p.m., arrived and anchored at Sand Island.

30 December, 1944 - 1/14 (APA Group) at anchor at Sand Island; granted 50% liberty to personnel.

31 December, 1944 - 2/14 at 12:10 the main body left Camp Maui, and embarked aboard the USS Logan, (APA 196).
Ordnance Officers of the regiment commenced loading of ammunition aboard LST's 726, 763, 764 and 1031 at Pearl Harbor.

1 January, 1945 - 1/14 (APA) at anchor Sand Island, granted personnel 50% liberty.
2/14 at 0815 ship got underway from Kahului, and the battalion completed shakedown aboard ship.
Loading of ammunition aboard LST's completed.
4/14 Units aboard USS Mifflin and Newberry sailed from Kahului, for Pearl Harbor.

2 January, 1945 - H&S Battery 1/14 (APA) at anchor; personnel participated in physical exercise.
2/14 at 0800 the Battalion Liaison Party was boated and participated in debarkation drill off Maui, and at 1700 the APA got underway for Pearl Harbor.
H&S-14 and 3/14 EQM's commenced loading vehicles and equipment aboard APA 118 at Kahului.

3 January, 1945 - 0800 Regimental CP closed Marine Camp Maui; 0900 Regimental CP opened aboard APA 118.
1/14 No change.
2/14 At 1206 the APA arrived at Pearl Harbor.
3/14 Loading of vehicles and equipment aboard APA 118 completed. Battalion Headquarters embarked aboard APA 206; the remainder of the Battalion Transport [illegible] boarding this ship and APA 118.

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(Cont'd)

3 January, 1945 - Battalion Liaison party and Forward Observer parties embarked with their respective units of the 24th Marine Regiment.

4 January, 1945 - H&S Battery-14th sailed from Kahului; 1600 arrived at Pearl Harbor.
1/14 No change.
2/14 Liberty to 50% of battalion and remainder of troops participated in organized recreation.
3/14 (APA 206) sailed from Maui.
4/14 No change.

6 January, 1945 - All units sailed from Oahu.

7 January, 1945 - Arrived Maalaea Bay.
LST Group started embarkation.

8 January, 1945 - APA Group participated in ship to shore exercises at Maalaea Bay.

9 January, 1945 - APA Group arrived Oahu, from ship to shore exercises.

10 January, 1945 - Liberty for percentage of APA Groups at Pearl Harbor.
Continued embarkation of LST Groups.

12 January, 1945 - Regiment sailed from Oahu.

13 January, 1945 - Arrived Maui.

14 January, 1945 - Established Regimental Communications net and completed plans for participation in corps ship to shore rehearsal.

15-16 January,1945- Participated in Corps ship to shore rehearsal.

18 January, 1945 - Arrived Oahu from rehearsal. Liberty granted to 50% of personnel. Remainder of personnel participated in organized athletics.

21 January, 1945 - Regimental Staff briefed battalion officers on LST's on forthcoming operation. LST 1031 broke down during maneuvers; this necessitated transfer of personnel and equipment of 3/14 to LST 648 at Honolulu.

22 January, 1945 - LST's sailed from Oahu for Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands, Central Pacific.

23-25 January [illegible] Rehabilitation period continued for (APA) [illegible]

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26 January, 1945 - Regimental Staff briefed Battalion Commanders and their staffs on forthcoming operation.

27 January, 1945 - (APA) Groups sailed from Oahu for Eniwetok.

28 January, 1945- No Change.
2 February, 1945 - Underway enroute Eniwetok Atoll, conducted briefing of personnel on forthcoming operation, and conducted drills and exercises.

3 February, 1945 - LST's arrived and anchored Eniwetok.

5 February, 1945 - (APA) Groups arrived and anchored Eniwetok. Regimental staff issued latest orders to all battalion staff sections. LST's sailed from Eniwetok enroute to Saipan Island, Marianas Islands, Central Pacific.

6 February, 1945 - LST's underway enroute Saipan.

7 February, 1945 - (APA) Groups sailed from Eniwetok enroute Saipan.

8-9 February, 1945- Underway enroute Saipan; conducted briefing; conducted drills and exercises.

10 February, 1945 - LST's arrived and anchored Saipan.

11 February, 1945 - (APA) Groups arrived and anchored at Saipan. All personnel except reconnaissance personnel and unloading details transferred to LST's.

12-14 February,1945- Conducted briefings, drills, and physical exercise. Final check on Regimental radio nets.

15 February, 1945 - LST's sailed from Saipan enroute Iwo Jima Island, Volcano Islands, Central Pacific.

16 February, 1945 - (APA) Groups sailed from Saipan enroute Iwo Jima.

17-18 February,1945- Underway enroute Iwo Jima, final briefing of personnel.

19 February, 1945 - D-Day. Weather clear and cool. Division commenced landing on beaches Yellow and Blue at 0900.

1. Infantry - RCT23 - 2 battalions abreast- 1-23 on left and 2-23 on right - landed at How hour on Yellow 1 and 2.

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19 February, 1945 - 1. Infantry (Cont'd) - RCT25 - 2 battalions abreast - 1-25 on left and 3-25 on right - landed at How hour on Blue 1.

RCT24 - Division Reserve. Landed by battalions complete at 1945.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25. In position and firing at 1715 (11 guns).

2/14 - D/S RCT23. In position and firing at 2200.

3-14 Not landed.

4-14 Not landed.

3. Ship-to-Shore - Reconnaissance parties boated at H-hour proceeded to Line of Departure and landed as shown below:

1220 - Reconnaissance party 1/14 left Line of Departure and landed Blue 1 at 1247.

1328 - Reconnaissance party 2/14 left Line of Departure and landed Yellow 1 at 1342.

1410 - Reconnaissance party 3/14 left Line of Departure and landed Yellow 1 at 1430.

1415 - Reconnaissance party 4/14 left line of Departure and landed Yellow 1 at 1438.

Reconnaissance parties experienced very heavy fire falling on beaches and in previously selected position areas. 3/14 requested to land battalion on beaches outside Division Zone of Action. Permission not granted.

At 1405 the Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division directed Fourteenth Marines to land 1/14 and 2/14 to support attack. DUKW's of 1/14, 2/14 and 3/14 were launched at 1430. 1/14 and 2/14 were ordered to land. The CP of 14th Marines closed aboard APA 118 at 1500, headed for the beach.

1/14 was in position and firing at 1715 in support of RCT25. Able Battery of 1/14 lost one howitzer as DUKW's were launched from LST. 2/14 sent following message at 1840: "We are experiencing difficulty with DUKW's on beach. So far have been able to get only two (2) DUKW's in. A road has been cleared to left of our position area and we are trying to get in there." By 2200 2/14 was in position and firing in support of RCT23.

The Commanding Officer, Fourteenth Marines ordered 3/14, 4/14 and H&S-14 not to land. This order was received and acted upon at 1630. 3/14 lost one DUKW and howitzer during embarkation. CP 14th Marines opened aboard LST 763. 3/14 and 4/14 were ordered to make reconnaissance at daylight and be prepared to land battalions on Regimental Order.

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3. Ship to Shore (Cont'd) - Condition Red was in effect from late afternoon throughout the hours of darkness.

20 February, 1945 - D/1 Day. Weather fair - rain during afternoon.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
3/14 - Reinforced - 2/14 after 1728.
4/14 - Not landed.
CP, 14th Marines opened ashore at 1715. The Division continued the attack at 0830. 1/14 and 2/14 fired a ten (10) minute preparation from K-10 to K-hour.

3. Ship to Shore - 3/14 and 4/14 received orders to land. 3/14 was in position and firing by 1728. 4/14 was unable to land. CP group, 14th Marines landed at 1705.

4. Type of fires fired from 1715, 19 February to 1500, 20 February.

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	11	195
Targets of Opportunity	23	345
Preparation	8	400
Harrassing & Defensive	25	1959
Registration	13	50
	80	2949

5. Casualties:- from 0900 D-day to 1500 D/1:

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
	10	11	67	1	3

6. Air observer from USS Wake Island fired first artillery air spot missions. Total of four missions fired.

21 February, 1945 - D/2. Weather clear and cool.

1. Infantry - No change.

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(Cont'd)

21 February, 1945 - 2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
3/14 - Reinforced 1/14.
4/14 - Five (5) guns ashore and firing by 0800. One not in firing condition.
The division continued the attack at 0810, 14th Marines fired coordinated preparation from K-15 to K-hour in support of attack.

3. Ship to Shore - 4/14 completed landing and was in position at 0638. Four (4) howitzers operative. One (1) howitzer out of action due to defective sight. Battalion in position and firing at 0800.

4. Type of fires fired from 1500, 20 February to 1500, 21 February.

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	18	552
Targets of Opportunity	74	2500
Preparation	23	1400
Harrassing & Defensive	86	1561
Registration	23	140
	224	6,153

5. Casualties:-

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
1	6	1	21		3

5. Miscellaneous - Regimental CP displaced inland from the beach.

6. Air observer from USS Wake Island fired a total of 7 missions.

22 February, 1945 - D/3. Weather, rain and cloudy.

1. Infantry - RCT21 passed to control of the 4th Marine Division and was ordered to pass through RCT23 prior to 0730.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23 prior to 0700. after 0700 D/S RCT21.
3/14 - Reinforced 1/14 prior to 1300. after 1300 reinforced 2/14.
4/14 - G/S. Six (6) howitzers in operation.
4/13 - G/S - 0700 until 1200.
The division continued the attack at 0835.

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22 February, 1945 - 14th Marines fired preparation from K-35 to K-hour in support of attack. 14th Marines and NGF dispersed counterattack in Division Zone of Action at 2340.

3. Types of fires fired from 1500, 21 February to 1500 22 February.

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	11	533
Targets of opportunity	72	2950
Preparation	13	1061
Harrassing & Defensive	109	1540
Registration	10	118
	215	6202

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
1	6	1	22		1

5. Air Observers from USS Wake Island fired a total of four (4) fire missions.

Sound Ranging - located one (1) target during the period.

6. Combat Efficiency - 80%.

23 February, 1945 - D/4. Weather - Cool and overcast.

1. Infantry - RCT 23 passed through RCT 25 on right flank prior to 0830. 2/25 remained on line.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - G/S
2/14 - D/S RCT21
3/14 - D/S RCT24
4/14 - G/S
3/13 - G/S

The division continued the attack at 0730. 14th Marines fired preparation from K-45 to K-hour in support of attack.

3. Types of fire fired from 1500, 22 February to 1500 23 February.

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	37	1863
Targets of opportunity	58	3558
Preparation	5	2902
Harrassing & Defensive	259	1696
	359	10,019

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23 February, 1945 - 4. Casualties -

KILLED OFF	KILLED ENL	WOUNDED OFF	WOUNDED ENL	MISSING OFF	MISSING ENL
	2	3	20		

5. Miscellaneous - 3/14 displaced two batteries from 148 E at 1150 to 165 Q. In position at 1400. OP and flash base opened at 1430 on Mt. Surbachi.

6. Air observer from USS Wake Island fired four(4) fire missions.

Sound Ranging - located and adjusted 14th Marines on six (6) enemy guns and mortar positions during the period.

7. Combat efficiency - 80%.

24 February, 1945 - D/5. Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT21.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
1/14 - G/S. Reinforced 2/14 on preparation and defensive fires and reinforced 13th Marines on preparation. Also fired in support of 5th Tank Battalion Attack.
4/14 - G/S. Reinforced 2/14 on preparation and defensive fires.
4/13 - Reinforced 2/14 from 1800, 23 February to 1200, 24 February.
The Division continued the attack at 0915. Preparation in Zone of Action 21st Marines fired from 0845 to 0930 and from 1330 to 1400.
(NOTE: 2/14 reinforced by 1/14, 4/14, 4/13 - as main effort of division attack on left flank).

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 23 February to 1500 24 February:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	31	1865
Targets of Opportunity	21	1500
Preparation	2	4285
Harrassing & Defensive	97	1970
Registration	8	62
	159	9,682

4. Casualties -

KILLED OFF	KILLED ENL	WOUNDED OFF	WOUNDED ENL	MISSING OFF	MISSING ENL
	6	1	36		1

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24 February, 1945 - 5. Miscellaneous - 3/14 completed displacement at 0945.

6. Air observer from USS Wake Island fired a total of twelve (12) fire missions.

Sound Ranging - located and adjusted 14th Marines upon seven (7) enemy gun and mortar positions during the period.

7. Combat efficiency - 85%.

25 February, 1945 - D/6. Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - RCT23 passed through RCT21 prior to 0700. RCT21 to 3rd Marine Division.

2. Artillery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
1/14 - D/S - RCT9.
4/13 - Reinforced 1/14 as of 0700.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.

The division continued the attack at 0930. Preparation from K-45 to K-hour. At K-hour barrage rolled forward until targets of opportunity were taken under fire.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 24 February to 25 February:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	48	1854
Targets of Opportunity	67	2982
Preparation	38	3400
Harrassing & Defensive	217	2398
Registration	5	117
	375	10,751

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
1		1	15		1

5. Miscellaneous - H&S Battery completely unloaded.

1/14 - completely unloaded.
2/14 - 95% unloaded.
3/14 - completely unloaded.
4/14 - completely unloaded.
Units of VMO-4 started coming ashore.

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25 February, 1945 - **6. Air observer from USS Wake Island fired fourteen (14) fire missions.**

7. Combat efficiency 85%.

26 February, 1945 - D/7. Weather, cool - rain throughout day, visibility limited.

1. Infantry - RCT25 on right passed through RCT24 at 0600.

2. Artillery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
1/14 - D/S - RCT25 as of 0700.
3/14 - Reinforced fires of 1/14 as of 0700.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforcing on call.
The division continued the attack at 0800. 14th Marines and NGF fired a coordinated preparation from K-45 to K-hour.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 25 February to 1500, 26 February:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	48	1780
Targets of Opportunity	38	2365
Preparation	78	8125
Harrassing & Defensive	301	1673
Registration	9	100
	474	14,043

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
			12		1

5. Miscellaneous - Two (2) planes of VMO-4 landed on Air Strip No. 1 at 1330. One (1) plane on station at 1430. Four (4) pilots and five (5) observers are now available for land based operations.

6. Air observer fired thirteen (13) fire missions.
Sound Ranging - four (4) targets located and fired upon.
Flash Ranging - one (1) target located and fired upon.

7. Combat efficiency 85%.

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27 February, 1945 - D/8. Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S of RCT25.
3/14 - Reinforced 1/14.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.
The division continued the attack at 0800. Preparation fired from K-45 to K-hour.

3. Types of fire fired from 1500, 26 February to 1500, 27 February:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	57	2070
Targets of Opportunity	60	2144
Preparation	61	4100
Harrassing & Defensive	158	1105
Registration	7	123
	343	9,542

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
	1		11		

5. Air observers operating from USS Wake Island and Iwo Jima Airstrip No. 1, fired a total of twenty four (24) fire missions.
Sound Ranging - Four (4) targets located and fired upon.
Flash Ranging - One (1) target located and fired upon.

6. Combat efficiency 80%.

28 February, 1945 - D/9. Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
3/14 - Reinforced 1/14.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.

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28 February, 1945 - 2. (Cont'd) The division continued the attack at 0815. Preparation fired from K-45 to K-hour. Coordinated preparation with Corps Artillery, NGF, and 12th Marines. At 1300, five (5) minute preparation fired for RCT23.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 27 February to 1500, 28 February:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	41	1056
Targets of Opportunity	55	1920
Preparation	30	2950
Harrassing & Defensive	219	734
Registration	8	76
Propaganda	1	10
	354	6,746

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
		1	9		

5. Air observer from USS Wake Island and Iwo Jima Airstrip No. 1 fired thirty five (35) missions. Sound Ranging - No targets reported during period.

6. Combat efficiency 85%.

1 March, 1945 - D/10. Weather, fair - visibility good.

1. Infantry - RCT23 in line, relief completed at 0630.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
2/14 - Reinforced 3/14.
4/14 - G/S. Reinforced 1/14 during preparation and on right. Harrassing and defensive fires.
Corps Artillery - G/S 14th Marines.
Corps Artillery was on call. Two (2) batteries attached in G/S.

The division continued the attack at 0830. Preparation K-10 to K/24 - fired at normal rate. D/S battalion fired close in to lines as observation permitted. G/S battalion fired medium range. Corps Artillery fired [illegible] concentrations.

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(Cont'd)

1 March, 1945 - 3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 28 February to 1500, 1 March.

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	46	3070
Targets of Opportunity	49	2726
Preparation	32	2500
Harrassing & Defensive	265	1887
Registration	5	84
	397	10,267

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
		2	8		

5. Air observer fired 33 fire missions operating from USS Wake Island and Iwo Jima Airstrip No. 1. Three (3) enemy large caliber guns spotted by air observer and knocked out by his adjustment of Corps Artillery upon them.

Sound Ranging - No targets reported during the period.

6. Combat efficiency 80%.

2 March, 1945 - D/11. Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S RCT25.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
2/14 - Reinforced 3/14.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.

The division continued the attack at 0800. Coordinated preparation from K-30 to K-15 and K-10 to K-hour by Corps Artillery, NGF, and 14th Marines.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 1 March to 1500, 2 March;

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS.	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	57	1615
Targets of Opportunity	36	1746
Preparation	16	1520
Harrassing & Defensive	193	952
Registration	4	47
	306	5,880

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2 March, 1945 - 4. Casualties -

KILLED OFF	KILLED ENL	WOUNDED OFF	WOUNDED ENL	MISSING OFF	MISSING ENL
			1		

5. Air observer fired a total of forty two (42) fire missions from USS Wake Island and Iwo Jima Airstrip No. 1. Observers used 14th Marine battalions, and when target required heavy artillery, Corps Artillery was fired.

Sound Ranging - Six (6) targets located and fired upon.

6. Combat efficiency 80%.

3 March, 1945 - D/12. Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - RCT23 passed through RCT25 on division right at 0600.

2. Artillery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT23 after 0630 - prior to 0630 reinforced 1/14.
1/14 - D/S - RCT25 prior to 0630 - after 0630, reinforced 2/14.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.
3/12 - Reinforced 14th Marines from K-75 to K-25.

Division continued the attack at 0745. Preparation - Corps Artillery, NGF, 3/12 and 14th Marines fired a coordinated preparation preparing to effect neutralization of known enemy mortar and artillery positions geginning at K-75 to K-30.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 2 March to 1500, 3 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	26	745
Targets of Opportunity	33	1060
Preparation	12	3340
Harrassing & Defensive	150	1006
Registration	10	81
	231	6,232

4. Casualties -

KILLED OFF	KILLED ENL	WOUNDED OFF	WOUNDED ENL	MISSING OFF	MISSING ENL
			1		

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3 March, 1945 - 5. Air observers from USS Wake Island and Iwo Jima Air Strip No. 1 fired a total of nineteen (19) fire missions.

Sound and Flash Ranging - No targets reported during period.

6. Combat efficiency 80%.

4 March, 1945 - D/13. Weather, rain and cloudy.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
1/14 - Reinforced 2/14.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.
The division continued the attack at 0730. Preparation - coordinated preparation by Corps Artillery, NGF, and 14th Marines from K-15 to K/15.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 3 March to 1500, 4 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	16	518
Targets of Opportunity	17	427
Preparation	50	4500
Harrassing & Defensive	389	2513
Registration	8	109
	480	8,067

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
			3		

5. Air observers - hindered by low ceiling during afternoon - 21 fire missions conducted.
Sound and Flash Ranging - One (1) target located by sound and fired upon. Flash Ranging closed due to poor visibility.

6. Combat efficiency 80%. Efficiency impaired by lack of ammunition.

5 March, 1945 - D/14. Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - RCT25 relieved RCT23 at 0600.

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5 March, 1945 - 2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23 prior to 0600, after 0600 G/S.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.
14th Marines registered check points in Zone of Action of 5th Marine Division.
13th Marines registered check points in Zone of action of 4th Marine Division.
No attack in Division Zone of Action.

3. Types of fire fired from 1500, 4 March to 1500, 5 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	7	717
Targets of Opportunity	48	717
Preparation	9	510
Harrassing & Defensive	226	1400
Registration	12	69
	302	3,413

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
			3		

5. Air observer from USS Wake Island and Iwo Jima Air Strip No. 1 fired seventeen (17) fire missions.
Sound Ranging - One (1) target located and fired upon.

6. Combat efficiency 80%.

6 March, 1945 - D/15 - Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - RCT23 relieved 3-24 prior to 0600.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - Reinforced 1/14 prior to 0600. After 0600 D/S RCT23.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.
The division continued the attack at 0800.
Preparation - 2/14, 3/14, 4/14, fired preparation for VACLF from K-10 to K/21. From K-10 to K-21, 1/14 G/S [illegible] Division. From K/45 to K/81, 1/14, 2/14, 3/14

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6 March, 1945 - 2. Artillery (Cont'd) - 4/14, and three (3) battalions from 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions and two (2) Corps Artillery battalions fired preparation in Zone of Action 4th Marine Division.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 5 March to 1500, 6 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	26	755
Targets of Opportunity	39	1572
Preparation	26	4280
Harrassing & Defensive	377	1445
Registration	4	57
	472	8,109

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
		1	2		

5. Air observer fired twenty (2) fire missions.

Sound Ranging - No targets reported during period.

6. Combat efficiency 85%.

7 March, 1945 - D/16 - Weather, cloudy with occasional showers.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.
The division continued the attack at 0730. 14th Marines neutralization fires from 0800 to 0830 on all known enemy mortar positions. Corps Artillery and 14th Marines fired coordinated, five (5) minute preparation for RCT23 at 1225 and RCT24 at 1240; each lasted five (5) minutes.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 6 March to 1500, 7 March:

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7 March, 1945 - 3. Type of Fires (Cont'd)

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	55	796
Targets of Opportunity	17	547
Preparation	40	2050
Harrassing & Defensive	40	856
Registration	7	45
	159	4,294

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
	2		2		

5. Air observer fired sixteen (16) fire missions. Corps Artillery fired by air observor on concrete blockhouse. Three (3) direct hits with concentrated penetrating fire. No apparent effect observed.

Sound Ranging - Three (3) targets located and fired upon by Corps Artillery.

6. Combat efficiency 80%.

8 March, 1945 - D/17. Weather, cool and clear.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
4/14 - G/S.

The division continued the attack at 0830. Corps Artillery and 14th Marines fired coordinated preparation on known artillery and mortar positions from K-90 to K-60.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 7 March to 1500, 8 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	45	716
Target of Opportunity	23	710
Preparation	14	4611
Harrassing & Defensive	216	900
Registration	5	57
	303	6,994

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
			5		

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8 March, 1945 - 5. Miscellaneous - Eighteen (18) rounds of yellow smoke fired to identify targets for support aircraft.

6. Air observer fired a total of nine (9) missions.

Sound Ranging - No targets reported during the period.

7. Combat efficiency 80%.

9 March, 1945 - D/18. Weather, cool and clear.

1. Infantry - No change.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.
The division continued the attack at 0700. Coordinated Corps and 14th Marines preparation for K-hour to K/10.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 8 March to 1500, 9 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	28	1467
Targets of Opportunity	50	1144
Preparation	31	2120
Harrassing & Defensive	230	1115
Registration	4	36
	343	5,882

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
1	2	2	6		

5. Air observer fired a total of seventeen (17) fire missions.
Sound Ranging - Six (6) targets located and fired upon.

6. Combat efficiency 85%.

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10 March, 1945 - D/19. Weather, clear and cool.

1. Infantry - RCT24 relieved by RCT25 and RCT23 prior to 0730.

2. Artillery - 1/14 - D/S - RCT25.
2/14 - D/S - RCT23.
3/14 - D/S - RCT24 prior to 0730, after 0730 reinforced 2/14.
4/14 - G/S.
Corps Artillery reinforced on call.
The Division continued the attack at 0800. Fourteenth Marines reinforced by Corps Artillery and two (2) battalions of 12th Marines fired preparation from K-25 to K-15 and from K-10 to K-hour. Preparatory fires rolled forward in successive concentrations of 100 yards at five (5) minute intervals from K-hour to K/15.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 9 March to 1500, 10 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	16	390
Targets of Opportunity	4	120
Preparation	8	5200
Harrassing & Defensive	291	1417
Registration	6	47
	325	7,174

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
			1		

5. Air observers fired one (1) mission.

6. Combat efficiency 85%.

11 March, 1945 - D/20. Weather, fair and cool.

1. Infantry - RCT25 and RCT23 over ran enemy resistance in Zone of Action of the 4th Marine Division, except pocket in Zone of Action RCT25.

2. Artillery - On corps order three 105mm battalions available to reinforce 13th Marines.
1/14 - D/S - 4th Marine Division [illegible] 1430. After 1430 reinforced 13th Marines.

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11 March, 1945 - 2. Artillery - (Cont'd)

2/14 - Reinforced 13th Marines as of 1600.

3/14 - Reinforced 13th Marines as of 1600.

4/14 - Reinforced 13th Marines as of 1600.

Preparation - 2/14, 3/14, 4/14 fired 30 minute preparation from K-10 to K/20 in Zone of Action of 5th Marine Division. 2504 rounds fired. No call missions.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 10 March to 1500, 11 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Counterbattery	6	76
Targets of Opportunity	-	--
Preparation	8	2504
Harrassing & Defensive	18	206
Registration	5	106
	37	2,892

4. Casualties -

KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
		2			

5. Air observer fired one (1) mission. Artillery air spot discontinued at 1145.

Sound Ranging - No targets reported during period.

6. Combat efficiency 85%.

12 March, 1945 - D/21. Weather, fair and cool.

1. Infantry - Continued mopping up. No artillery needed in Division Zone of Action.

2. Artillery - 14th Marines reinforced 13th Marines on call. 3/14 fired harrassing fires in Zone of Action of 5th Marine Division from 1900 to 0630 and 0900 to 1000.

14th Marines fired preparation in Zone of Action of 5th Marine Division from 0903 to 0913. Firing hour 0730.

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12 March, 1945 - 3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 11 March to 1500, 12 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Preparation	4	1093
Harrassing & Defensive	80	572
	84	1,665

4. Casualties -

KILLED OFF	KILLED ENL	WOUNDED OFF	WOUNDED ENL	MISSING OFF	MISSING ENL
			1		

5. Combat efficiency 85%.

13 March, 1945 - D/22. Weather, clear and cool.

1. No change.

2. Artillery - Units of 14th Marines available to reinforce 13th Marines on call until 1130.
1/14 - Closed station at 1130.
2/14 - Closed station at 1100.
3/14 - Closed station at 1000.
4/14 - Closed station at 1130.
No attack, no preparation.

3. Type of fires fired from 1500, 12 Mar to 1500 13 March:

TYPE OF FIRE	NO. MISSIONS	NO. ROUNDS
Harrassing & Defensive	118	652

4. Casualties -

KILLED OFF	KILLED ENL	WOUNDED OFF	WOUNDED ENL	MISSING OFF	MISSING ENL
			1		

5. Miscellaneous - 3/14 and 2/14 fired harrassing fires in Zone of Action of 5th Marine Division.

6. Combat efficiency 85% prior to 1000.

7. Billeting parties of H&S 14th Marines, 3/14, 4/14 and 4th Marine DUKW Company went aboard APA 234.

14-15 March, 1945 - Continued loading of equipment and personnel; H&S Battery, 3/14, 4/14 and detachments from 1/14 and 2/14, 4th Marine DUKW Company aboard APA 234 (USS BOLLINGER). 1/14 aboard APA 172 (USS GRIMES). 2/14 aboard APA 228 (USS ROCKBRIDGE), 15 March, 1945. Ten (10) men from 4/14 aboard APA 133 (USS BEECHAM).

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FOURTEENTH MARINE REGIMENT WAR DIARY (Cont'd).

16 March, 1945 - All organized resistance on Iwo Jima ceased.

17-18 March, 1945 - Anchored off Iwo Jima.

20 March, 1945 - Sailed from Iwo Jima enroute Guam Island, Marianas Islands, Central Pacific.

21 March, 1945 - Arrived Guam.

23 March, 1945 - Sailed from Guam, enroute Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands, Central Pacific.

27 March, 1945 - Arrived at Eniwetok.

28 March, 1945 - Sailed from Eniwetok, enroute Hawaiian Area.

4 April, 1945 - 2/14 arrived Maui. H&S, 1/14, 3/14, 4/14 arrived Pearl Harbor. H&S, 1-14, 3/14, 4/14 sailed from Pearl Harbor enroute to Maui.

5 April, 1945 - H&S, 1/14, 3/14, 4/14 arrived Maui.

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